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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
THE LORD OF GLOBAL STANDARDS: 
THE TWIN TOWERS 
 
 
‘Rules or Principles, which are better? Do I want Principles or 
Rules? If we do away with the Lord of the Rules, we only need to 
worry about Principles. If we do away with the Lord of the 
Principles, we only need to worry about Rules.’  
‘Master,’ he said ruefully, ‘what is the difference between Rules and 
Principles?’  
‘It is quite simple. A principle will tell you generally what is the 
right thing to do and then you must judge what to do in specific 
circumstances. A rule will tell you what to do in specific 
circumstances.’  
‘I see,’ beamed Gollum, ‘principles are like a compass which show 
you the direction and rules are like maps which show you exactly 
how to get there.’ After a few moments of reflection, he added, ‘I 
prefer maps.’  
‘It is not like that, Gollum. Maps can be wrong or if you are in 
uncharted territory or if you have no map, you will need a compass. 
Also, you cannot make precise maps for every part of Middle Earth. 
 
R. Hussey & A. Ong (Financial Reporting, Regulation & 
Governance, 2005) 
 
§ 1: Rules-based and principles-based accounting standards 
An ongoing debate in the area of financial accounting and reporting relates to the 
question whether we only need general principles to prepare financial statements, or 
whether extensive rules are necessary to comply with, serving the needs and expectations 
of external stakeholders. Let us go back to the discussion between Gollum and his Master 
in ‘The lord of global standards’. They questioned whether rules or principles are better. 
Resulting from different financial reporting failures at the beginning of the 21st century, 
such as the corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom and Royal Dutch Ahold, this debate 
even intensified in international literature. Enron, for instance, used financial 
constructions to transfer expenses and liabilities to (non-consolidated) subsidiaries; 
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increasing the companies’ results and fulfilling the expectations of investors (Weil, 
2002). 
These financial reporting failures led to a decreased confidence of external investors in 
financial markets, and in corporate management in particular. The management of Enron 
deliberately misled stakeholders by adjusting financial numbers in their annual reports. To 
restore the confidence of external stakeholders, and responding to the corporate failures, 
financial reporting standards were adjusted and ‘new’ accounting standards were 
introduced; resulting in two major institutional changes. First, and against the background 
of globalization worldwide, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) signed the ‘Norwalk Agreement’. 
In this agreement both boards formalized their commitment working towards one set of 
global standards (FASB, 2006). From 2002 onward, the FASB and IASB therefore started 
several convergence projects, inter alia related to the Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2008), 
with the aim to improve financial reporting worldwide. Secondly, as of January 1, 2005, 
listed corporations in Europe, Australia and other countries were obliged to adopt the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) of the IASB. This independent Board 
has the following objective: “to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high 
quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards that require high 
quality, transparent and comparable information in financial statements and other 
financial reporting to help participants in the world's capital markets and other users 
make economic decisions and to promote the use and rigorous application of those 
standards” (IASB, 2005). 
Resulting from these major institutional developments, standard setters debated on 
the appropriate level of rules to include in their accounting standards. An accounting 
standard is the total body of requirements necessary to comply with related to a specific 
accounting issue, such as inventories (IAS 2). The FASB intended to abandon their current 
allegedly ‘rules-based’ standards in favor of more ‘principles-based’ standards (Maines et 
al., 2003; Nelson, 2003; Nobes, 2005; Schipper, 2003). On the other hand IASB’s 
requirements strongly increased after the introduction of IFRS. These institutional changes 
are represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Rules-based & Principles-based accounting standards 
 
Principles-based accounting standards refer to a system of financial reporting that is 
based primarily on the fundamentals of accounting (decision usefulness, true and fair 
view, going concern, substance over form) with an appropriate level of specificity 
(Bennet et al, 2006; Benston et al. 2006; Schipper, 2003; Psaros and Trotman, 2004). An 
important principle here is the ‘true and fair view’: “Financial statements are frequently 
described as showing a true and fair view of, or as presenting fairly, the financial 
position, performance and changes in financial position of an entity” (IASB, 1989: 46).  
Although these fundamentals are important to consider for financial reporting, on 
several topics standard setters define additional specifications (rules) to improve the quality 
of financial reports. By adding specifications, bright lines and numerical thresholds 
standards become more rules-based (Nelson, 2003). Rules can be defined as specific criteria 
to increase the accuracy of financial reporting. Rules-based accounting standards have 
(very) extensive and precise elaborations concerning what is or is not allowed (Alexander 
and Jermakowicz, 2006).  
Rules-based and principles-based distinct in many respects, but one of the most 
important differences relates to professional judgment. Principles-based accounting 
standards are relatively soft, leaving much room for professional judgment. Rules-based 
standards, on the other hand, are very strict, simply requiring strict application with 
limited professional judgment. For example, consider both IAS 17 and SFAS 13 on lease 
accounting. IAS 17 (principles-based) states that “at the inception of the lease the present 
value of the minimum lease payments amounts to at least substantially all of the fair 
value of the leased asset” (IAS 17, 2009, pp. 9). On the same issue SFAS 13 (rules-based) 
prescribes that “the present value at the beginning of the lease term of the minimum lease 
payments (…), equals or exceeds 90 percent of the excess of the fair value of the leased 
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property to the lessor at the inception of the lease over any related investment tax credit 
retained by the lessor and expected to be realized by him” (SFAS 13, 1976, 9). To 
incorporate ‘substantially all of the fair value’ (principles-based) in the annual report 
requires a much greater need for professional judgment than incorporating the ‘90 
percent’ in SFAS 13. 
Nowadays, the discussion on rules-based and principles-based accounting standards 
again gains importance after the US debate concerning whether or not to adopt IFRS as 
opposed to US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) (Peytcheva and 
Wright, 2010) for their own financial reports; (potentially) resulting in an acceptance of 
more principles-based accounting standards.  
 
§ 2: Earnings management 
Following the 2008 Exposure Draft of the conceptual framework, providing decision 
useful information is the primary objective of financial reporting. Decision usefulness is 
defined as “information about the reporting entity that is useful to present and potential 
equity investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capacity as 
capital providers” (IASB, 2008: 12). Referring to the corporate scandals as discussed in 
the previous section, we may conclude that the decision usefulness of annual reports was 
relatively low. 
 Dechow and Skinner (2000), in this area, make an important distinction between 
fraud and earnings management. The corporate scandals mentioned earlier refer to ‘fraud’ 
cases, in which decisions are taken beyond the boundaries of GAAP. Earnings 
management, on the other hand, refers to situations in which Chief Financial Officers 
(CFOs)1 take decisions within the boundaries of GAAP. Earnings management occurs 
when agents deliberately use judgment and decision making in financial reporting to 
mislead stakeholders about the economic performance or influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on the financial report (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
This view of Healy and Wahlen (1999) on earnings management is commonly used, 
yet relatively limited. Ronen and Yaari (2008) divide several definitions of earnings 
                                                 
1Although CFOs do not take all decisions involved in the financial reporting process, in the end they are the 
primary responsible persons together with the CEO. Therefore, we focus on the role of CFOs in preparing 
financial statements. 
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management into three categories as white, grey or black. White earnings management is 
taking advantage of the flexibility in accounting standards to enhance transparency of 
financial reports. Grey earnings management refers to definitions that discuss both 
opportunistic and efficient (non opportunistic) views on earnings management (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008, pp. 25). Scott (2009, 403), for instance, defines earnings management as 
accounting policy choices or actions taken by managers so as to achieve some specific 
earnings objectives. In his book, Scott refers to good (efficient) earnings management for 
improving blocked communication, or bad earnings management which refers to the 
opportunistic view on earnings management. Finally, black earnings management refers to 
the practice of using tricks to misrepresent or reduce transparency of financial reports 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008, pp. 25). The definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999) belongs to this 
latter category.  
Even though we see many different definitions and application of earnings 
management, the prevalent feeling is that earnings management holds a negative 
connotation due to the deliberate misrepresentation of financial outcomes. Van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen (2005) therefore conclude that applying earnings management results in 
a decreased quality of financial reports. In other words, the more CFOs engage in 
earnings management, the less decision useful financial reports are. Although we 
elaborate on the issue of defining earnings management thoroughly in Chapter 2, we 
decided to accept the opportunistic view within the grey area for this study. 
Two distinct possibilities to engage in earnings management are accounting 
decisions and transaction decisions (Libby and Seybert, 2009; Cohen et al., 2008; Francis, 
2001). Accounting decisions refer to choices among equally acceptable rules and/ or 
judgment and estimates required to implement GAAP that are aimed at engaging in 
earnings management. Results from prior studies show that earnings management 
through accounting decisions may take place, amongst others, in the area of fair value 
estimates (Mazza et al., 2007). Transaction decisions, on the other hand, refer to choices 
of structuring transactions and contracts or adjusting real production and investment 
activities that are aimed at engaging in earnings management (Libby and Seybert, 2009). 
An example of a transaction decision is a machinery replacement decision used by 
Jackson (2008). 
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§ 3: Accounting standards and earnings management: Societal 
relevance 
Since this study discusses issues of importance to the accounting society, we start with 
this societal relevance first. Section 4 elaborates on the scientific contribution of this 
study. Before we start exploring the societal relevance, however, we first explain the 
process of financial reporting as included in Figure 2; contributing to an improved 
understanding of the societal relevance of our study. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Process of financial reporting 
 
A financial report is considered a means of communicating financial information from the 
company (via its management) to its external stakeholders, such as investors, creditors 
and tax authorities. More specifically, financial statements show results of the 
stewardship of management, or the accountability of management for the resources 
entrusted to it, to provide users information for economic decision making (FASB, 1980; 
IASB, 1989). 
Standard setters 
Principles-based vs Rules-based 
standards  
External 
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Resulting from the separation of ownership and control, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) contributed to the ‘agency theory’. 2 Drawing on this theory, CFOs (agents) have an 
information advantage over external stakeholders (principals) concerning the inside 
information of the company (Palliam and Shalhoub, 2003). To reduce this information 
asymmetry, standard setters serve a useful role in the financial reporting process as an 
outside actor. The aim of standard setters is that companies provide useful annual reports 
contributing to economic decision making. For this purpose, standard setters prescribe 
accounting standards to comply with, enforcing companies to provide sufficient 
information concerning the ‘economic reality’3 of their assets, liabilities, costs and benefits. 
 The final actor in the financial reporting process is the external auditor. The 
external auditors contribute to reducing the information asymmetry between agents and 
principals. For this purpose, auditors check (monitoring function) whether companies’ 
financial report complies with the accounting standards. Moreover, external auditors verify 
whether the annual report, at least to a large extent, provides a faithful representation of 
companies’ financial position.  
Our study (potentially) contributes to the accounting society in four different ways. 
First and foremost, this study may be useful to the FASB and IASB (standard setters). The 
discussion on rules-based and principles-based accounting standards became more 
important after the US debate concerning whether to incorporate IFRS for financial 
reporting (Peytcheva and Wright, 2010). Standard setters may contemplate our results 
when discussing the direction they are heading for developing future accounting 
standards. Second, this study also contributes to external auditors. The objective of an 
audit for external auditors is to express an opinion whether the financial report is, in all 
material respects, in accordance with the financial reporting framework (IAASB, 2005). 
Improving insights into the area of earning management contributes to the quality of 
financial audits. Third, our study may help companies and CFOs in particular. Our study 
provides insights into the opportunities, but also the limitations of earnings management. 
                                                 
2 We could have chosen a different theory for studying earnings management, such as the stewardship 
theory. The assumptions of the agency theory, however, are commonly used in earnings management 
studies (e.g. Palliam and Shalhoub, 2003). 
3 “If information is to represent faithfully the transactions and other events that it purports to represent, it is 
necessary that they are accounted for and presented in accordance with their substance and economic 
reality and not merely their legal form. The substance of transactions or other events is not always 
consistent with that which is apparent from their legal or contrived form” (IASB, 1989, pp. B 1720). 
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Finally, the study contributes to the knowledge of external stakeholders, investors in 
particular. The overarching objective of this study is to answer the question which type of 
accounting standards is ‘better’; contributing to investors’ knowledge concerning the use 
of earnings management in different accounting environments.  
 
§ 4: Accounting standards and earnings management: Scientific 
contribution 
The question Gollum and his Master discussed at the beginning of the chapter concerns 
whether either rules or principles are ‘better’4. In this study, we investigate the effect that 
the nature of accounting standards has on earnings management. ‘Better’ therefore refers 
to ‘less earnings management’. More specifically, we examine the influence of rules-
based and principles-based accounting standards on the level of earnings management 
through transaction decisions and accounting decisions.  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS, 2006) prefers a 
principles-based system, amongst others because principles-based standards provide a 
comprehensive basis, and have the flexibility to deal with new environmental conditions. 
This flexibility, however, may be used to engage in earnings management through 
accounting decisions. Therefore, Nobes (2005) tends to prefer rules-based accounting 
standards. These precise standards hold the advantage of increased comparability 
between financial reports, and create more opportunities to verify reporting information 
for auditors (Nelson, 2003; Schipper, 2003). Moreover, rules-based standards largely 
eliminate opportunities to engage in earnings management through accounting decisions 
(Nobes, 2005). A disadvantage, however, is that the precise standards may be used for 
earnings management through transaction decisions (Nelson et al., 2002). As a result, 
both rules-based and principles-based accounting standards may induce earnings 
management; either through accounting decisions or using transaction decisions.  
Although recent research indicates that discretionary room in accounting 
standards affects earnings management decisions (Libby and Seybert, 2009), findings on 
the question ‘how’ (nature) and ‘to what extent’ (level) remain inconclusive. Nelson et al. 
                                                 
4 “Better” refers to the introduction of the rules-based/ principles-based discussion in ‘THE LORD OF 
GLOBAL STANDARDS: THE TWIN TOWERS’: mentioned in the first sentence of the introduction. 
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(2002) examine the effect of the precision of accounting standards on the nature of 
earnings management. Their survey results show that managers are more likely to engage 
in earnings management through transaction decisions in a rules-based setting, and 
similarly that principles-based accounting standards induce earnings management 
through accounting decisions. Cohen et al. (2008) confirm these results using databases 
and show that firms switched from accounting decisions to transaction decisions after the 
passage of the rules-based Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. These results suggest that firms 
may change their earnings management decisions, depending on the discretion given in 
accounting standards. 
Jamal and Tan (2010) examine the influence of rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards on the level of aggressive reporting (read: earnings management), 
using 90 financial managers in Canada. They find that principles-based standards reduce 
earnings management, but only if there is a matching shift in which auditors’ attitudes 
becomes more principles-oriented. Tsakumis et al. (2009) find that preparers are less 
likely to engage in earnings management under principles-based standards, and that 
principles-based standards act as a substitute for strong audit committees in constraining 
earnings management. 
Our research contributes to the literature by examining the effects rules-based and 
principles-based standards have on both transaction decisions and accounting decisions in 
one experiment. Where prior survey research (inter alia Nelson et al., 2002) and database 
research (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008) examine this substitution opportunity, these research 
methods have some disadvantages not present when using an experiment. Survey 
research, to a certain extent, examines what people intend to do, whereas database 
research has the disadvantage that different environmental developments may have 
contributed to changing earnings management applications. By using an experimental 
design, we are able to manipulate the type of accounting standards (rules-based and 
principles-based), and directly test the effects it has on the nature of earnings 
management. This largely disentangles interference found in natural settings (Libby and 
Luft, 1993). As a result, our study complements to these prior studies. Their contribution, 
however, is on earnings smoothing rather than earnings management. The first question we 
seek to answer is whether managers, in a principles-based setting, engage in earnings 
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management through accounting decisions rather than through transaction decisions. The 
second question we address concerns the opposite relation, whether in a rules-based area 
managers more often take transaction decisions than accounting decisions for earnings 
management purposes (Nelson et al., 2002). 
In addition to testing this substitution effect between accounting decisions and 
transaction decisions, we reflect on the question how much earnings management is 
applied in both a rules-based and a principles-based environment. Research in this area 
remains inconclusive. Nelson (2003) reviews some of the experimental literature and 
concludes that the aggressiveness of reporting decisions increases with an increase in 
flexibility in accounting standards. These findings, however, contrast recent results by 
Jamal and Tan (2010) and Peytcheva and Wright (2010) showing lower levels of earnings 
management when principles-based accounting standards are involved. Drawing on these 
contradictory results, we use an experiment, among others, to investigate whether the 
discretionary room in accountings standards has an effect on both the nature and level of 
earnings management.  
 The first method in our study for testing our hypotheses is the experiment. This 
experiment allows us to test hypotheses in a more controlled environment, resulting in 
stronger conclusions related to the effects of accounting standards on earnings 
management. A limitation, however, is that we need to make an operationalization of the 
concepts being studied; i.e. earnings management, rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards, accounting decisions, and transaction decisions. As a result of this 
framed environment questions raise to what extent these experimental results may be 
generalizable? From the experiment itself, the generalizability is limited. We need to 
have in mind that one of the purposes of this study is to contribute to policy makers 
(standards setters) and as a result that our experimental results must not only hold in our 
controlled environment, but ought to hold in common practice as well. Therefore, we 
decided to include a post experimental survey and in-depth interviews for improving the 
external validity of this study. Although this topic will be discussed extensively in 
Chapter 3, we conclude that three methods: the experiment, the post experimental survey, 
and the in-depth interviews complement each other, resulting in more valid results. 
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The post experimental survey contributes to the external validity in two ways. 
First, experiments are usually limited in the ability to nuance settings, actors and 
representative sample decisions (Libby and Seybert, 2009) of importance to policy 
makers. Therefore, in the post experimental survey we ask questions related to the 
experimental case and personal characteristics. The personal characteristics will be used 
as control variables. In this way we are better able to nuance results; creating a higher 
level of validity. Second, and in addition to these case related questions, our post 
experimental survey includes three additional questions autonomously contributing to our 
research question. When the experimental results and post experimental results lead to 
similar conclusions, this would strengthen the expectation that the experimental results 
hold in the ‘real’ world. Hence, this multi-method approach contributes to the validity of 
our study. 
 Furthermore, we use in-depth interviews, using actual CFOs, complementing the 
experiment and post experimental survey for answering our research question. These 
interviews contribute to creating more sound results in three distinctive ways. First, by 
discussing the results from experiment and post experimental survey we are able to create 
more subtle insights into these found results. Second, we discuss accounts being used to 
engage in earnings management, based on Graham et al. (2005). Within these accounts 
we vary between accounting decisions and transaction decisions improving insights 
concerning the relationship between rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards and earnings management; leading to additional insights concerning our 
hypotheses. Third, we discuss ‘unexposed areas’ with our interviewees; beyond the 
hypotheses tested. This part of the in-depth interviews provides additional insights into 
our research area and potentially results in new and interesting views to incorporate in 
future research. 
Essentially, our study aims to contribute to the research question concerning the 
effects the nature of accounting standards have on the type of earnings management 
(accounting decisions or transaction decisions) and the level of earnings management; 
using an experiment, post experimental survey and in-depth interviews.  
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Broadly speaking, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the ongoing debate concerning the 
influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on earnings management. 
As such, we try to explain the effects the type of accounting standard has on both nature and 
level of earnings management using three different methods: an experiment, a post 
experimental survey, and in-depth interviews held with (former) CFOs.  
 For this purpose, Chapter 2 starts off by discussing the theory and by describing 
hypotheses for this thesis. We begin with a conceptual model discussing the scope of this 
study. For a better understanding of our theoretical concepts we define what rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards are. Then we continue the chapter discussing earnings 
management. After defining the concept of earnings management we elaborate on the 
earnings management methods being used in common accounting practice, including 
accounting decisions and transaction decisions. These insights are necessary to improve our 
understanding concerning the research question. At the end of Chapter 2 we discuss prior 
research in the area of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings 
management and develop hypotheses.  
 The third chapter elaborates on the research methodologies used to study the influence 
of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on earnings management. We 
extensively discuss the relationship between the research question and contribution each 
method has. We use this elaboration to stress the importance of using a multi-method 
paradigm for this study. To this end, section three extensively elaborates on the experiment, 
including the experimental design and the execution of the experiment. We then continue 
Chapter 3 discussing the post experimental survey; emphasizing its potential contributions for 
this study. Chapter 3 ends with an extensive description of the methodological issues 
surrounding in-depth interviews. 
 Chapter 4 discribes the results of our experiment. Before discussing the results, we 
first shortly recapitulate on the research method, including subject selection, task, 
experimental design and procedure. In this way we are able to elucidate on the validity of our 
experimental results. We use our experimental results to test the developed hypotheses of 
Chapter 2. As mentioned earlier, the first question we seek to answer is whether managers, in 
a principles-based setting, engage in earnings management through accounting decisions 
rather than through transaction decisions. The second question we address relates to whether 
managers in a rules-based area more often take transaction decisions than accounting 
decisions for earnings management purposes (Nelson et al., 2002). In addition, we also test 
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the effect the nature of accounting standards has on the total level of earnings management 
applications. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the post experimental survey. As shortly elaborated in 
section 4, this survey contributes in two distinct ways; 1) gaining background information of 
participants, serving as control variable, which might be useful for standard setters and 2) 
autonomously reflecting on our developed hypotheses. Therefore, after a short introduction 
we provide information concerning the demographic data of our respondents. We continue 
with case related questions and experience. Experience in this research area might be of great 
importance; since prior experience can have an influencing effect on earnings management 
decisions taken (inter alia Bonner and Lewis, 1990; Chang and Ho, 2004). Moreover, we 
display results related to effects of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on 
earnings management. This latter part provides us with the opportunity to reflect on the 
proposed hypotheses from a different angle. At the end of the chapter we discuss the 
complementary contribution of the post experimental survey towards the experiment. 
Chapter 6 elaborates on the in-depth interviews. This chapter describes the results of 
our six interviews held with (former) CFOs. These interviews contribute to our study in three 
distinct ways (also see Figure 1, Chapter 3). First, we discuss the results from the experiment 
and post experimental survey to draw upon and improve our understanding of the results 
found. Second, we include questions regarding accounting decisions and transaction decision, 
which further contributes to a more thorough understanding of our hypotheses. Third, using 
interviews provides the flexibility of continuing with asking questions, an opportunity not 
available when using experiments or survey designs. In this way we create a more thorough 
view of the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on earnings 
management; beyond the developed and tested hypotheses. For this purpose, we start Chapter 
6 with explaining the procedure of the interviews, and we shortly elaborate on the expertise of 
our interviewees. We then discuss the verification of the experimental and post experimental 
result, followed by a discussion concerning other accounts being used to engage in earnings 
management. The latter part of the interviews relates to discussing ‘unexposed areas’. We 
finish the chapter reflecting on the complementary contributions of the in-depth interviews. 
In our final Chapter, number 7, we provide a summary of this thesis including our 
main results. We finish this thesis by discussing limitations and providing our view on 
potential directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and hypotheses 
 
§ 1: Introduction 
In Chapter 1 we introduced our research question: ‘What is the influence of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards on earnings management?’ By answering this research 
question we contribute to the overarching research question: ‘Which type of accounting 
standards, rules-based or principles-based, is likely to be the more effective?’ Although several 
studies have been conducted in this area (see Libby and Seybert, 2009 and Ronen and Yaari 
(2008) for recent reviews), the questions ‘how’ and ‘to what extent’ remain unanswered. 
 In this chapter we further embed the study by discussing ‘theory and hypotheses’. 
Section 2 starts with an extensive elaboration on rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards. The third section reflects on earnings management literature, accounting decisions 
and transaction decisions in particular. In section four we discuss ‘incentives’ as moderating 
variables influencing the relationship between accounting standards and earnings 
management. Section 5 reviews prior literature in the area of rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards and earnings management. At the end of this chapter we develop our 
hypotheses. Figure 1 provides an overview, displaying the Conceptual model of our study. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model 
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§ 2: Principles-Based and Rules-Based Accounting Standards 
 
§ 2.1: Definition 
In 2002, the IASB and FASB signed the ‘Norwalk’ agreement, expressing their desire to 
converge their accounting standards into one commonly used set of standards. During the 
convergence process of the IASB and FASB, the debate started on the appropriate precision of 
standards. One of the most important general differences between US GAAP and IFRS, is that 
US GAAP is more rules-based whereas IFRS is more principles-based (Bennet et al., 2006; 
Benston et al., 2006). The goal of the FASB was to abandon the allegedly ‘rules-based’ 
standards in favor of more ‘principles-based’ standards (Maines et al., 2003; Nelson, 2003; 
Nobes, 2005; Schipper, 2003). The discussion on rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards became more important after the US debate concerning whether or not to adopt 
IFRS as opposed to US GAAP (Peytcheva and Wright, 2010). 
This section will discuss rules-based and principles-based accounting standards by giving 
definitions and discussing advantages and disadvantages. It starts by reflecting both extremes 
on the rules-based/ principles-based continuum. These extremes, however, do not exist in 
current accounting practice. In the next section we therefore elaborate on the intermediary 
types of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards.  
 Our elaboration starts with a reflection on principles-based accounting standards, since 
these principles are assumed to be the fundamentals of both principles- and rules-based 
accounting standards (Nelson, 2003; Schipper, 2003). Principles-based accounting standards 
provide very general descriptions of an accounting topic with very few additional 
requirements. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) (2006) defines a 
principle as a general statement which intends to support truth and fairness and acts as a guide 
to action for several stakeholders. A principles-based standard supports reliability and faithful 
representation and helps to recognize events and transactions.  
In the ultimate form, principles-only are represented by the conceptual framework 
(CF). The goal of the CF is to provide the underlying principles of financial reporting (such as 
(decision usefulness, true and fair view, going concern, substance over form). In addition, the 
CF helps practitioners to cope with new circumstances that are not yet included in accounting 
standards. Although principles-based accounting standards (in ultimate form) do not exist in 
practice, it is still useful to think of the concept of principles-only. In the ultimate form, 
principles-only emphasize the importance of the CF, in which the CF consists of the users of 
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financial statements, the purpose of financial reporting, the principles of financial reporting 
including accrual accounting and going concern principle, and the qualitative characteristics 
to consider when preparing a financial report (IASB, 1989). 
An important concept within the CF is the so called ‘substance over form’, i.e. the 
principle, in which based on the true and fair view concept and override, management and 
external auditors are allowed to deviate from the accounting standard, if this deviation 
improves the financial insights of the economic reality of the company within the financial 
report (IASB, 1989). Although there is no clear definition of economic reality, substance over 
form, and true and fair view, because these are socially constructed concepts, there should be 
a generally accepted correspondence between the value of assets and liabilities in the financial 
report and the actual phenomenon that it purports to represent (Lee, 2006, pp. 232; Palliam 
and Shalhoub, 2003). Krishnan and Parsons (2008) discuss that economic reality is high, 
when presented earnings are in line with the financial activities in the reporting period. Based 
on the decision usefulness approach as emphasized by the IASB and FASB (2008), true and 
fair view refers to an independent and neutral view of economic reality, risks and benefits, 
incorporated in financial reports that helps users optimally allocate their resources or takes 
other financial decisions.  
To conclude, when we discuss a principles-only environment, preparers ought to take 
their decisions based on the CF only; stressing the importance of professional judgment. 
Psaros and Trotman (2004) define principles-based accounting standards in terms of 
‘substance-over-form’, to reflect economic substance of financial information over its legal 
form. This definition focuses on the high-level view of a principles-based standard, consistent 
with the objective of financial reporting. Based on these definitions of principles-based 
accounting standards in ultimate form, we focus on the fundamentals, the objectives of 
accounting and the principle of substance-over-form. Consequently we define principles-
based accounting standards in ultimate form as: “An ultimate principles-based accounting 
standard is a general description of the fundamental objectives of accounting, captured in a 
conceptual framework to emphasize substance-over-form.” 
On the other side of the continuum, we see rules-based accounting standards in 
ultimate form. Accounting standards assess the boundaries for financial reporting. The 
standards provide information on the definition, recognition, measurement (IASB, 1989), 
presentation and disclosure of an account, such as account receivables, cash and account 
payables. But why is it a continuum? Standards start as principles-based. By adding 
requirements, however, accounting standards become more rules-based. These requirements 
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may be defined by specific criteria, bright line thresholds, examples, implementation 
guidance, exceptions and scope restrictions. As a result we see that each additional 
requirement causes accounting standards becoming more rules-based (Nelson, 2003).  
Rules and principles, however, are not by definition contradictory. Schipper (2003), 
for instance, points out that new rules are based on underlying principles from the CF. The 
question remains what a rules-based accounting standard in ultimate form is? Assume a 
standard starts as fully principles-based, and by adding an indefinite number of requirements, 
all possible problems (and their solutions) are prescribed in the accounting standard; i.e. there 
is a solution for all problems in the accounting standards. The ultimate form of rules-based 
accounting standards occurs when there are no opportunities left to use professional judgment. 
Rules-based accounting standards have very extensive and precise elaborations 
concerning what is or is not allowed (Alexander and Jermakowicz, 2006). The ICAS (2006) 
defines a rule as a means of establishing unambiguous decision making. Psaros and Trotman 
(2004) describe rules-based accounting standards as very specific in wording and very direct in 
their requirements to incorporate by CFOs. Maines et al. (2003) describe the ultimate rules-based 
standard as ‘unequivocally rigid’, which leaves no room for judgment or disagreement. 
Another feature of rules-based accounting standards is the characteristic of ‘form over 
substance’; i.e. not economic substance, but simply the formal contracts combined with the 
precise description in the accounting standard determines how to recognize accounting events  
(Lee, 2006, pp 226-227).5 Moreover, Alexander and Jermakowicz (2006) compares rules-
based accounting standards with a cookbook, in which accurately has been determined how to 
prepare a meal. For an accounting setting, the ‘cookbook’ has been used as a metaphor, which 
prescribes the ‘right’ answer for all accounting problems in detailed form. Based on a review of 
prior research concerning rules-based accounting standards, we define rules-based accounting 
standards in ultimate form “as a cookbook with detailed provisions of methods for all accounting 
problems, where it is unambiguously clear how and when it is to be applied, stressing its legal 
form over its economic substance.” 
                                                 
5 We disclose ‘form over substance’, based on Lee (2006, pp. 226-227). Assume a jewelry company has bought 
gold at cost for € 5 million. The value of the gold will be € 21 million in ten years’ time. As for now, a bank 
agreed to take over the gold for € 8 million and to sell the gold back to the jewelry company in ten years for € 17 
million. The contract right now is written as a legal form of a sale, therefore increasing current years sales with € 
8 million and increasing earnings by € 3 million. Instead, it is actually a debt contract of € 8 million that will last 
for ten years and will be repaid by the repurchase of the gold for € 17 million. The difference of € 9 million 
represents paid interest. Consequently, where in substance (economic reality) this agreement represents a debt, 
the contractual form is written that in current years’ financial statement the contract represents sales for € 8 
million (Lee, 2006, pp. 226-227). 
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§ 2.2: Intermediary types of accounting standards 
After having presented the rules-based and principles-based characteristics in ultimate form 
we now have a closer look at rules-based and principles-based accounting standards as 
perceived in current accounting literature and common accounting practice. No principles-
only or rules-based accounting standards in ultimate form exist in current accounting practice. 
In this section we  therefore elaborate on different intermediary types of accounting standards 
that are included in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Principles-based and rules-based accounting standards 
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Dutch GAAP assumes a substance over form view (ter Hoeven, 2005), in which the economic 
substance of accounting events is more important than its legal form. Hence, both concepts of 
‘substance over form’ and ‘true and fair view override’ stress the importance of presenting 
economic reality in annual reports.  
At the similar discrete position on the principles- and rules-based continuum we see 
the ‘old’ IASB; 8 prior to 2005, the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The ‘old’ IAS is also based 
on a substance over form view with relatively few additional requirements; at least compared 
to IFRS and US GAAP. Moreover, the ‘old’ IAS lacked lawful obligation; hence being 
directives, whereas endorsed IFRSs have a legal obligation to comply with. In our view, 
Dutch GAAP and the ‘old’ IAS represent principles-based accounting standards. 
An important distinction, however, with principles-based in ultimate form is that on 
top of the CF, these principles-based accounting standards do have some additional 
requirements and application guidance for coping with certain accounting transactions or 
events. In line with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (US SEC, 2002) we see that 
principles-based accounting standards have the following characteristics: 
• They are based on an improved and consistently applied CF; 
• They clearly state the accounting objective of the standard; 
• They provide sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be operationalized 
and applied on a consistent basis; 
• They avoid usage of percentage tests (‘bright-lines’) that allow financial engineers to 
achieve technical compliance with the standard while evading the intends of the 
standard (US SEC, 2002). 9 
 
To conclude, in line with other research in this area (Jamal and Tan, 2010; Peytcheva and 
Wright, 2010; Bennet et al, 2006; Benston et al. 2006) principles-based accounting standards 
allow for additional requirements and soft guidance, but this must be kept to a minimum. An 
example of relatively soft guidance in this area is that development cost normally are 
amortized over a period not exceeding five years (Bennett et al., 2006); leaving much room 
for professional judgment.  In line with prior research we therefore define that “principles-
based accounting standards refer to a system of financial reporting, which is primarily 
based on the fundamentals of accounting (decision usefulness, true and fair view, going 
                                                 
8 In the latter years before the IFRS adoption, Dutch GAAP converged towards the IAS-standard; creating a 
translation of IAS to a large extent.  
9 A well known example is the 3 percent rule for ‘special purpose entities’ used in the Enron case to avoid 
consolidation. 
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concern, substance over form) with an appropriate level of specificity “. We use this 
vision of principles-based accounting standards throughout this study.  
Let us now turn to the second intermediary position on the rules-based and principles-
based continuum; ‘moderate rules-based/ principles-based’ as represented by the current 
IFRS. One opportunity for accounting standards becoming more rules-based is adding 
requirements. 10 After the beginning of the convergence project between IASB and FASB in 
2002, the requirements within the accounting standards of the IASB increased. The new 
IFRSs (1 to 9) include a thorough elaboration of how accounting transactions and events 
should be measured and recognized; far more than the ‘old’ IASB-standards. Furthermore, 
some of the old IAS-standards were revised (e.g. IAS 37 on provisions). The aim of this 
revised standard was to improve comparability and decrease the ability of possible abuse (ter 
Hoeven, 2005) to engage in earnings management. In comparison to US GAAP, however, 
IFRS contains relatively few requirements (ICAS, 2006).  
Besides these additional requirements to comply with, IFRS deviates in two ways 
from the old IAS; making it more rules-based. First, endorsed IFRS are enacted as lawful 
obligations, whereas the ‘old’ IASs were not. With this status, IFRS are more strongly capable 
of enforcing applications. Second, IFRS (more or less) lacks a true and fair view override; 
leaving limited opportunities to discuss the economic substance rather than the legal form. 
This latter argument also makes IFRS more rules-based than the old IASB standards. 
These arguments, however, do not directly contribute to the question whether IFRS is 
rules-based or principles-based. When comparing IFRS with Dutch GAAP, it seems that IFRS 
is rules-based. For academics and professionals from the US, however, IFRS is relatively 
principles-based (US SEC, 2008). Since academic researcher and professionals still discuss 
whether IFRS is rules-based or principles-based we conclude with the statement that IFRS 
holds an intermediate position between the old IASs and US GAAP.  
The final discrete position on the rules-based and principles-based continuum is US 
GAAP. In general, the requirements of the US SEC and FASB are considered to be rules-
based because they have very specific and extensive requirements (Schipper, 2003). These 
requirements may be defined by specific criteria, bright line thresholds, examples, 
implementation guidance, exceptions and scope restrictions. All quoted companies in the US 
                                                 
10 An interesting conclusion of Bennett et al. (2006) is that the perceived rules-based standard (SFAS 2) has 
relatively few rules (11) compared to IAS 9. This is due to the fact that SFAS 2 permits only one type of 
recognition (expense research and developments expenditures), whereas IAS 9 provides more opportunities and 
therefore includes more disclosure requirements. The perception of strict application (read: rules-based), 
however, remains for SFAS 2 (Bennett et al., 2006).  
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are obliged to comply with the rules enacted by the US SEC, whereas the 8000 pages of US 
GAAP disclose the requirements of the SEC. As an example of a rules-based standard we point 
at the recognition of sale and leaseback transactions: “If the present value of a reasonable 
amount of rental for that portion of the leaseback that is subleased is not more than 10 percent 
of the fair value of the asset sold, the leased back property under sublease is considered 
minor” (SFAS 98, 1988: 8). This lease standard was used in several recent studies in this area 
(e.g. Jamal and Tan, 2010; Tsakumis et al., 2009; Peytcheva and Wright, 2010). Essentially, 
the goal of the FASB creating US GAAP is to eliminate accounting choices left as much as 
possible. The US SEC (2008, pp. 49) states: “U.S. GAAP should be based on a presumption 
that formally promulgated alternative accounting policies should not exist. As such, the SEC 
should recommend that any new projects undertaken jointly or separately by the FASB not 
provide additional optionality, except in rare circumstances. Any new projects should also 
include the elimination of existing alternative accounting policies in relevant areas as a 
specific objective of those projects, except in rare circumstances.” 
To distinguish, however, between rules-based standards in ultimate form (see previous 
section) and the commonly used definition of rules-based accounting standards we refer to the 
following citation: ‘Evidence abounds that detailed standards cannot meet the challenges of a 
complex and rapidly changing financial world’ (Maines et al., 2003, pp. 74). In the previous 
sections we discussed that rules-based standards in the ultimate form will have a cookbook 
solution to all financial reporting problems. Furthermore, in the ultimate form there is no need 
for professional judgment, since all steps have been written down. In practice, however, the 
ultimate rules-based does not exist. Although in scientific literature US GAAP is accepted as 
being rules-based, there still may develop circumstances which are not yet described in 
accounting standards. Furthermore, and although rules under US GAAP are fairly strict, there is 
still room for professional judgment. In line with these prior studies we conclude that “rules-
based accounting standards refer to a system of financial reporting, which is based on 
detailed provisions of methods for most accounting problems, where it is unambiguously 
clear how and when it is to be applied.” The degree of specification is (obviously) quite large. 
 
§ 2.3: Advantages and disadvantages of accounting standards 
After defining what rules-based and principles-based standards are, we now discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of both types of standards. In academic and professional literature 
there is no clear preference towards either system. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS, 2006), for instance, prefers a principles-based system, whereas Benston et al. 
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(2006) stress the advantages of a rules-based system based, and shortcomings of a principles-
based system.  Proceeding with the structure from the previous section, we start with discussing 
the advantages and disadvantages of principles-based standards and then continue with rules-
based standards. We end this section with a schematic overview including characteristics, 
advantages and disadvantages for both rules-based and principles-based accounting standards. 
  
In the ICAS report of 2006, stressing the importance of a principles-based system, they come up 
with the following recommendations for future accounting practice (ICAS, 2006, pp. 3): 
- Principles-based accounting standards can serve the needs for business and public 
interest; 
- Complete comparability is never possible in accounting, therefore one should emphasize 
on explaining key judgments being made; 
- Principles-based accounting standards need a clear hierarchy of overarching concepts 
with limited additional guidance; 
- Rules-based accounting standards add unnecessary complexity; 
- Principles-based standards provide a comprehensive basis and have the flexibility to deal 
with new and different situations; 
- In a principles-based system, more responsibility for judgments and explaining 
judgments of preparers (CFOs) and auditors is necessary; 
- Resulting from differences in jurisdiction and different cultures around the world, 
convergence cannot be achieved if the basis is a rules-based approach, since this will be 
difficult to implement.  
 
Note that some advantages of a principles-based system directly refer to a disadvantage of a 
rules-based system and vice versa. Bennett et al. (2006) conclude that, in a principles-based 
system, the true and fair view override is the cornerstone of professional judgment. Since 
principles-based standards emphasize the importance of fundamentals in accounting (decision 
usefulness, fair presentation), both concepts of economic reality and professional judgment 
become relatively important. Discussing the economic reality of events and transactions makes 
the accounting profession more interesting than the checklist mentality (Bennett et al., 2006) 
necessary in a rules-based system. Furthermore, with the provided flexibility in mind, CFOs and 
auditors put emphasis on economic reality. This view, however, requires standard setters and 
other stakeholders to cope with uncertainty and to accept the flexibility necessary of allowing 
management to exercise judgment in presenting that economic reality. 
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Besides advantages, principles-based accounting standards also have some limitations. 
The first limitation is that limited guidance may lead to enforcement difficulties (Schipper, 
2003). Since financial accounting theory lacks an unambiguously clear elaboration of the 
concept of profit and the goals they are aiming at, lacking guidance will harm earnings quality. 
Secondly, several authors (f.i. Walker, 2003) determine an inconsistency between the CF and 
accounting standards, which will hamper a principles-based approach. 11 An example of an 
inconsistency is that ‘highly reliable information may have little relevance to users, such as 
unamortized acquisition, exploration and development costs, which have no bearing on the 
value of mineral reserves but are reported in accordance with AASB 1022, Accounting for the 
Extractive Industries’ (Loftus, 2003, pp. 304). Nobes (2006) even determines six issues in 
which an inconsistency exists between the accounting standard and the underlying principles.  
A third limitation of principles-based accounting standards is the ability to use its 
flexibility for opportunistic behavior. Since there are no strict descriptions, CFOs may use more 
aggressive interpretations of their evidence for measuring an accounting event (Cuccia et al., 
1995). Since principles-based standards lack clear application guidance, proving the 
incorrectness of CFOs assessment is relatively hard. The ICAS (2006) stresses the importance of 
good documentation and disclosure, but the flexibility provided in principles-based standards 
leaves room for making decisions in accordance with provided incentives (Psaros and Trotman, 
2004). This refers to earnings management decisions, which we discuss extensively in section 
three. Finally, Nobes (2006) concludes that principles-only may cause comparability problems 
since it lacks clear guidance how to cope with accounting events.  
To overcome these problems, Nobes (2005) argues that standard setters may introduce 
additional requirements to diminish the disadvantages in principles-based standards; making 
accounting standards more rules-based. Nobes (2005) includes some potential advantages of a 
rules-based system over a principles-based system; comparably identified by Schipper (2003) 
and Nelson (2003): 
- Increased comparability; 
- Increased verifiability for auditors and regulators; 
- Reduced opportunities for earnings management through judgments (compared to a 
principles-based system); 
- Improved communication of standard setters’ intention. 
                                                 
11 Although the IASB and FASB work on a new version of the conceptual framework (e.g. IASB, 2008), these 
academic papers still use the old CF, since the new CF is still unfinished.  
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As a rules-based system provides more additional guidance, financial reports become more 
comparable. Nobes (2005) emphasizes that by including rules, both clarity and verifiability 
improves. He even states that rules-based standards are ‘what practitioners want’; since it 
provides precise answers to questions CFOs are coping with. CFOs may not be willing to cope 
with uncertainty. Finally, rules-based standards have a strong enforceability and are authoritative 
(ICAS, 2006). 
Similar to principles-based accounting standards, however, rules-based accounting 
standards have some limitations. Rules might be arbitrary and the result of a political process, 
causing annual reports that deviate from their economic reality. Additional requirements of rules-
based accounting standards are sometimes inconsistent with the conceptual framework (Nobes, 
2005), although in theory the CF should provide the underlying principles of these accounting 
standards (Schipper, 2003). Furthermore, and drawing on the ‘cookbook’ point of view, 
companies may structure transactions to meet the specific requirements of the accounting 
standards (Nelson, 2003). This refers to transaction decisions which we discuss in section 3.2.  
Another limitation of rules-based accounting standards is that in practice there will 
always arise new circumstances, which are not yet constitualized in accounting standards (ICAS, 
2006). Additionally, resulting from a limited need of professional judgment in a rules-based 
system, the accounting profession is simply less interesting. At the same time, rules-based 
accounting standards cause an enormous increase in complexity to apply in practice. As stated 
before, this type of accounting standards describes an (almost) exhaustive list of requirements, 
making it extremely complex to incorporate in practice (Alexander and Jermakowicz, 2006; 
Nobes, 2005; Maines et al., 2003).  
A final limitation of rules-based accounting standards is the effect of creating 
‘seemingly’ comparable financial reports. If an accounting standard is inappropriately strict, 
financial reports of different companies show exactly comparable approaches, whereas the day-
to-day operations differ enormously (Schipper, 2003). There is simply no room for professional 
judgment and no flexibility in accounting standards to cope with new environmental conditions. 
Comparability therefore is enforced by the accounting standards, even when the economic 
substance deviates among companies (ICAS, 2006, pp. 8). 
To summarize, Table 1 displays the main characteristics, as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards.   
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Principles-based Rules-based
General description Specific description (cookbook)
Fundamental objectives
Detailed methods for (almost) all 
accounting problems
Consistent with CF
Exactly clear when and how to 
apply
Substance-over-form Form-over-substance
True and fair view override
More professional judgment Increased comparability
Represent economic reality Increased verifiability 
Reduced opportunities for 
earnings management through 
transaction decsions 
Reduced opportunities for 
earnings management through 
accounting decisions  
More flexibility to cope with new 
environmental conditions Improved communication 
Enforceable and authoritative 
Enforcement difficulties Arbitrary
Inconsistency with application 
guidence
Inconsistent with conceptual 
framework
(Ab)use of flexibility Foster creative accounting
Lack of comparibility Seemingly comparable
Cannot be comprehensive
Reduce professional judgment
Increase in complexity
Main characteristics
Types of accounting standards
Disadvantages
Advantages
Table 1: Types of accounting standards; characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. 
  
§ 3: Earnings Management 
 
§ 3.1: Definition 
We started this chapter with the conceptual model (Figure 1) that serves the role of ‘umbrella’ 
for this chapter. After our thorough elaboration of accounting standards, we now continue 
with earnings management. In Chapter 1 we already mentioned to work with a definition from 
the grey area; the opportunistic view in particular. The reason for this is that we examine the 
effect that the nature of accounting standards has on earnings management; using the 
opportunistic view to adjust financial figures, and reducing the decision usefulness of annual 
reports (van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). Therefore, we now continue with defining 
earnings management, starting from the grey area. We discuss the earnings management 
methods and patterns in the upcoming sections. 
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Grey earnings management, as already mentioned in Chapter 1, refers to engaging in 
earnings management from both an opportunistic and an efficient (non opportunistic) view 
(Ronen and Yaari, 2008, pp. 25). Field, Lys and Vincent (2001, pp. 256) define accounting 
choices (read: earnings management) as: ‘Any decision whose primary purpose is to influence 
(either in form or in substance) the output of the accounting system in a particular way, 
including not only financial statements published in accordance with GAAP, but also tax 
returns and regulatory filings’. The key element of this definition is managements’ intent to 
make deliberate accounting choices. In this definition, Field et al. (2001) include earnings 
management through accounting decisions as well as transaction decisions influencing 
accounting numbers. Scott (2009, 403) defines earnings management as accounting policy 
choices or actions taken by managers so as to achieve some specific earnings objectives. Scott 
contributes by arguing that good (efficient) earnings management refers to improve blocked 
communication and for creating a signaling function, whereas bad earnings management 
refers to the opportunistic view on earnings management; hence, the main focus of our study. 
Black earnings management holds an even stronger negative connotation and refers to the 
practice of using tricks to misrepresent or reduce transparency of financial reports (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008, pp. 25). Definitions included in this area come from Schipper (1989) and Healy and 
Wahlen (1999). Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as a purposeful intervention in 
the financial reporting process, to obtain private gains. Earnings management occurs when 
agents deliberately use judgment and decision making in financial reporting to mislead 
stakeholders about the economic performance or influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
the financial report (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Beneish, 2001; Palliam and Shalhoub, 2003). 
Where Schipper (1989) primarily considers personal gain as a reason to engage in earnings 
management, the definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999) also incorporates misleading external 
stakeholders as a reason to apply earnings management practices 
The research area of earnings management gained popularity after the corporate scandals 
of inter alia Enron and Ahold at the beginning of the 21st century. Most authors explicitly (or 
more implicitly) use a black definition on earnings management; resulting in the premises that an 
increased use of earnings management reduces the decision usefulness of financial reports (Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). However, we think this view of ‘using tricks’ and 
‘misleadingness’ is too extreme, since earnings management can either be reviewed as good 
(efficient contracting view) or bad (opportunistic behavior view). Therefore, we come up with 
the following definition, falling within the grey area: ‘All deliberate and purposeful 
interventions in the financial reporting process or actions affecting earnings, so as to 
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influence stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes that depend on the financial 
report, within the boundaries of GAAP’. 
Our definition includes the phrase: ‘within the boundaries of GAAP’. In addition to the 
distinction of Ronen and Yaari (2008), Dechow and Skinner (2000) discuss earnings 
management in terms of conservative, neutral and aggressive accounting. They define better 
than economic reality as aggressive accounting, whereas conservative reporting refers to 
decisions taken to adjust financial outcomes below economic reality. One important note to 
make here is the distinction between earnings management and fraud. Earnings management 
literature focuses on accounting decisions within the boundaries of the accounting standards, 
whereas not complying with GAAP refers to fraud (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). This latter 
issue is beyond the scope of this study. One of the assumptions of this study is the premise 
that ‘economic reality’ exists. 12  Economic reality is defined in the conceptual framework as: 
“If information is to represent faithfully the transactions and other events that it purports to 
represent, it is necessary that they are accounted for and presented in accordance with their 
substance and economic reality and not merely their legal form. The substance of transactions 
or other events is not always consistent with that which is apparent from their legal or 
contrived form” (IASB, 1989, pp. B 1720). In other words, CFOs are assumed being able to 
prepare a financial statement displaying a true and fair view of financial activities in the 
financial report. Neutral accounting (read: no earnings management) results from a neutral 
interpretation of the economic performance of the company in the financial report without 
specific bias (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). The advantage of this premise is that by stating an 
economic reality both income increasing and income decreasing earnings management can be 
assessed (Ronen and Yaari, 2008, pp. 28). Essentially, earnings management concerns all 
decisions taken to deliberately deviate from this neutral (non earnings management) 
perspective.  
 
§ 3.2: Earnings management methods  
After our elaborations on the definition of earnings management, we now prolong with the 
earnings management methods. In current earnings management literature (e.g. Libby and 
Seybert, 2009; Cohen et al., 2008) we distinct between two types of earnings management 
decisions: accrual based earnings management (accounting decision) and real earnings 
                                                 
12 ‘Economic reality’, however, is socially constructed and for instance based on a general consensus concerning 
the true and fair view of the values of assets and liabilities; (mostly) without objective measurement.  
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management (transaction decisions). Before we elaborate on these two issues, we first explore on 
methods ‘how’ CFOs may engage in earnings management. Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 31-33) 
combine Francis’ (2001) overview with other research papers and come to the following, non 
exhaustive list of earnings management methods: 
1) A choice among accounting policies, equally acceptable under GAAP, such as 
inventory valuation based on LIFO or FIFO; 
2) A decision on the timing of the adoption of a new standard. A major research 
area concerns the first time adoption of IFRS; 
3) Accounting estimations, necessary under GAAP: depreciation, assets 
valuations and write-offs; 
4) Choices among classification, for instance whether or not to present earnings 
above or below the line of operating earnings; 
5) Structuring transaction decisions to achieve desired earnings outcomes, such as 
adjusting lease contract to meet operational lease requirements; 
6) Timing the recognition of revenues and expenses within the boundaries of 
GAAP; whether or not to capitalize brand name expenses; 
7) Real production and investment decisions, for example reducing research and 
development expenses; 
8) Managing the transparency of presentation; whether or not to use footnotes; 
9) Managing the informativeness of earnings through various means such as 
presenting comprehensive income under the statement of equity rather than 
under the income statement; 
10) Present pro forma earnings (e.g. EBITDA) rather than GAAP earnings by 
excluding nonrecurring items. 
 
Let us emphasize that all these bullets are research areas on their own. In line with Cohen et 
al. (2008) and Libby and Seybert (2009), however, we focus on two notions; accounting 
decisions and transaction decisions. We combine choices among equally acceptable rules 
(bullet 1) and judgment and estimates required to implement GAAP (bullet 3) and refer to this 
as ‘accounting decisions’. These accrual based earnings management decisions strongly 
depend on the accounting standards given and are taken during the preparation of the annual 
report. “Accounting decisions refer to choices among equally acceptable rules and/ or 
judgment and estimates required to implement GAAP that are aimed at engaging in 
earnings management.” 
 41
On the other hand, Cohen’s (2008) decisions to structure transactions (bullet 5) and 
real production and investment decisions (bullet 7) combined are referred to as ‘transaction 
decisions’. These real earnings management decision are often taken throughout the year, in 
which CFOs deliberately structure transactions (adjusting contracts, postpone investments, 
reducing R&D) to reach the desired earnings outcome. “Transaction decisions refer to 
choices of structuring transactions and contracts, or adjusting real production and 
investment activities that are aimed at engaging in earnings management.” 
These decisions fall within our definition of earnings management and include: all 
timing, transaction structuring, accounting policy and/or accounting estimate decisions 
deliberately made influencing financial outcomes. We will elaborate these earnings 
management methods more thoroughly in the upcoming parts, starting with accounting 
decisions. The other bullets are beyond the scope of the study, yet can be viewed as equally 
interesting, for which Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 31-33) may provide a recent start up. 
 
Accounting decisions 
Most research papers in the area of earnings management are based on the accrual principle: 
”Under this basis, the effects of transactions and other events are recognized when they occur 
(and not as cash or its equivalent is received or paid) and they are recorded in the accounting 
records and reported in the financial statements of the periods to which they relate“ (IASB, 
1989: 22). Accruals arise when there is a discrepancy in timing between cash receipts and 
expenditures on the one hand, and the accounting recognition in term of costs and revenues of 
the transaction on the other hand. As an example in this area we may point at the distinction 
between the cash payment and cost recognition of a prepaid insurance.  
 In the area of earnings management, and accounting decisions in particular, researchers 
discern between non discretionary and discretionary accruals (see Bartov et al. (2001) for a 
review); in which the paper Jones (1991) 13 is very influential. Non discretionary accruals are 
‘normal’ accruals given the company’s performance level and business strategy; leaving limited 
room for management interventions. For example, and based on a consistent application of 
measurement methods, fixed asset depreciation remains largely comparable throughout the 
                                                 
13 Although this study is on earnings management and we will use accruals to distinct earnings management from 
non earnings management decisions, we will not go into further detail concerning accrual methodology (technique 
and research), which is beyond the scope of this study. Ronen and Yaari (2008) provide an overview of the accrual 
methodologies in Chapter 10 and 11 where both accrual methodologies and modifications of the Jones’ model are 
discussed. These chapters could be used as start up for further research. 
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years. As a result, CFOs have limited discretionary influence on the amount of depreciation 
considered in the annual report. 
 Jones’ model builds on the opportunity to assess the non discretionary accruals. When 
researchers are familiar with the ‘total accruals’ and the non discretionary accrual, they are able 
to deduce the discretionary accruals; using these discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management through accounting decisions. Discretionary accruals refer to accruals for which 
CFOs have sufficient freedom for deliberately engaging in earnings management (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008, pp. 371-372). An example of a discretionary accrual is the percentage ‘allowance 
for doubtful accounts’. This account is relatively subjective, leaving sufficient room to adjust the 
percentage deliberately to influence financial outcomes (Hoogendoorn, 2004).  
  In general, accounting decisions can either be accounting policy choices (e.g. straight line 
versus accelerated depreciation methods) or accounting estimates. In this part, we provide a non 
exhaustive list of accounting measurement and valuation choices used for earnings management 
purposes. For instance, Neill, Pourciau and Schaefer (1995) focus on the relationship between 
accounting method choices and the pricing of initial public offerings. The goal of their paper is to 
improve understanding of the use of accounting policy choices for engaging in earnings 
management. Neill et al. (1995) discuss two accounting method choices; 1) the distinction 
between a FIFO or LIFO system for inventory measurement and 2) whether companies use 
accelerated or straight line depreciation methods for their fixed assets. One of their conclusions is 
that the combination of accelerated depreciation and LIFO is considered quite conservative.  
 Another example of an accounting decision (potentially) used for engaging in earnings 
management is included in the paper by Bowen, Davis and Rajgopal (2002). They examine both 
internal and external incentives to increase revenues. Their study concerns internet based 
companies that may use ‘grossed-up’ and advertising ‘barter’ revenues to increase revenues. 
When grossed-up revenues are included in the financial report, whereas the economic substance 
suggests to include net revenues, Bowen et al. (2002) state that this strategy may be used to boost 
revenues; showing aggressive reporting numbers. Barter revenues, on the other hand, refer to 
revenues ‘earned’, based on transactions in which internet companies place advertisements on 
each other’s websites (Bowen et al., 2002). The question is whether this barter revenue actually 
should be recognized. Essentially, both opportunities may be used to engage in earnings 
management through accounting decisions. An additional opportunity of using accounting policy 
choices to engage in earnings management refers to the distinction between successful effort 
accounting and full cost accounting. Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 31) discuss this opportunity. 
The difference between the two methods depends on the recognition of oil and gas. Under the 
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full cost method, all costs are capitalized, whereas under successful effort accounting only 
flourishing drillings are allowed to be capitalized. These types of decisions will have a 
significant influence on the companies’ financial results.  
In addition to opportunities in accounting policy choices, the definition of earnings 
management through accounting decisions also includes changes in accounting estimations. As a 
result of lacking ‘hard rules’, these estimations need subjective judgment and decision making. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 32) explore several issues under which GAAP requires estimates, 
such as depreciation of assets, allowances and provisions, asset valuation, pension accounting 
and asset write-offs. To disclose this issue, we provide a non exhaustive list of accounting 
estimations that could be used to engage in earnings management. One of the accounting 
estimation Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 33) refer to are pension plans as used in a study by Hann 
et al. (2007). They discuss projected benefit obligation (PBO), i.e. pension obligations for 
‘defined benefit’ plans. They argue that the assessment of PBOs provides considerable flexibility 
in assumptions; as a result, this discretion may be used to engage in earnings management. Their 
research question synthesizes whether the discretion allowed under GAAP to estimate discount 
rate and compensation growth influences the value relevance of PBOs. Contrarily to their 
expectations, their results show that although discretion is allowed, pension plan are not used for 
earnings management purposes (Hann et al., 2007). Secondly, Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 33) 
refer to asset write-offs, which involves accounting estimations. Burgstahler et al. (2002) 
examine whether the implications of special items are fully reflected in market prices. Asset 
write-offs leave room to use discretion in these special items to manage earnings. Other special 
items mentioned in the paper are losses on sale of assets, restructuring charges and write-downs. 
Although write-offs are being considered as transitory, security prices do not fully reflect the 
relationship between current and future earnings (Burgstahler et al., 2002); hence, write-offs may 
be used to engage in earnings management. Finally, Bishop and Eccher (2000) examine the 
effects of changes in the estimation of the useful life of long-lived assets on market value. 
Increasing or decreasing useful lives will have an ongoing effect on reported income. By 
expanding the estimated useful life of an asset, short term income increases. Their results suggest 
that investors do not forget about these accounting changes in subsequent years. Their results 
also indicate that income increasing decisions were seen as earnings management (e.g. income 
maximization), whereas income decreasing decisions were related as representing real 
productivity declines (Bishop and Eccher, 2000).  
To finish this part concerning earnings management through accounting decisions we can 
conclude that both accounting policy changes and accounting estimates may be used to engage in 
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earnings management. An important distinction between the two is that adjusting accounting 
estimations seems less rigorous, and (formally) needs less disclosure in terms of showing 
comparable financial figures. The aim of both methods, however, is comparable; adjusting 
financial outcomes to meet the desired outcome. 
 
Transaction decisions 
After the elaboration of accounting decisions we now explore opportunities to engaging in 
earnings management through transaction decisions. Note that these decisions must be made 
deliberately to influence the financial reports; for earnings management purposes. General 
strategic decisions coincidently affecting financial results are beyond the scope of this study.  
The first transaction decision method is using sale and leaseback transactions for fixed assets. 
This transaction decision opportunity is used in several prior studies (for example Maines et 
al., 2003). 14 The crux of a sale and leaseback transaction concerns the distinction between 
operational and financial lease. If a lease contract classifies as financial lease, the asset must 
be presented on the balanced sheet. An operational lease, on the other hand, will not be 
recognized on the balance sheet; resulting in ‘off balance financing’. Consequently, 
operational leases improve companies’ ‘debt to equity ratio’ (Maines et al., 2003). An 
empirical contribution of the use of lease contracts is made by Imhoff and Thomas (1988), 
examining the lease disclosure rule change. Following the adoption of SFAS No. 13 (FASB, 
1976), Imhoff and Thomas document a systematic substitution from financial to operating leases. 
Their cross sectional results show the magnitude responses to these numerical statements in 
relationship to accounting ratios. Contracts are adjusted to comply with this accounting 
standard to ‘create’ operational leases; given the 90 percent criterion included in SFAS No. 
13, the lease will be characterized as operational lease, although the substance of the 
transaction might suggest otherwise. 
 A second contribution on earnings management though transaction decisions is 
the paper by Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2002). They examine the question: ‘What factors 
influence firms’ use of acquisition accounting method, and are firms willing to pay higher 
acquisition premiums to use the pooling-of-interest accounting method?’ (Ayers et al., 2002, pp. 
5). The study examines the controversy of how acquiring firms account for the difference 
between the price paid for the acquired company and the book value of the stockholders equity 
                                                 
14 Sale and leaseback transaction are also used in several experimental studies (e.g. Jamal and Tan, 2010; Peytcheva 
and Wright, 2010). We discuss these experimental studies in section 5. 
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on the balance sheet. The pooling-of-interest method does not require recognizing the difference 
between acquisition price and book value. This method consolidates the financial statement of 
both companies and combines the income reported as of the beginning of the acquisition year. 
The purchase method, on the other hand, first requires adjusting the financial report of the 
acquired firm into fair market prices. The excess value between acquisition price and fair market 
prices is assigned as goodwill. Ayers et al. (2002) show that financial reporting incentives 
influence how acquiring firms structure their acquisition, i.e. paying a higher acquisition 
premium is associated with the pooling-of-interest method. In other words, companies are 
willing to pay an even higher premium if this allows them to use the pooling-of-interest 
accounting method. These results suggest that CFOs deliberately structure their acquisition 
transaction. Comparably, Comiskey and Mulfurd (1986) study the proposition that the ‘20 
percent ownership criterion’ (as included in Accounting Principles Board opinion Nr.18) 
influences firms’ investment decisions. If the investment exceeds 20 percent ownership, equity 
method must be applied. Acquiring less than 20 percent ownership results in an application of 
the cost method. Their result shows an unusually heavy concentration of positions between 19 to 
19.99 percent and 20 to 20.99 percent. These results suggest that the extent-of-holding is 
influenced by the ownership criterion. In other words, CFOs deliberately adjust their acquiring 
decision based on the preferred method to comply with.  
A final example of earnings management through transaction decision has been 
examined in a study by Marquardt and Wiedman (2005). Their study focus is on using 
contingent convertible bonds to increase diluted earnings per share (EPS). SFAS 128 (FASB, 
1997) states the way EPS and diluted EPS should be measured. 15 Convertible bond transactions 
are often excluded from diluted EPS calculations and Marquardt and Wiedman (2005) find 
that the likelihood of firms issuing contingent convertible bonds is significantly associated 
with the reduction in diluted EPS that would occur if the bonds were traditionally structured. 
In other words, firms deliberately use this method to adjust financial outcomes. 
 In addition to adjusting contracts, our definition of earnings management through 
transaction decisions also incorporates operational decisions deliberately taken to influence 
financial results. Graham et al. (2005) investigate several examples of earnings management 
through transaction decisions in their survey study:  
                                                 
15 Basic EPS excludes dilution and is computed by dividing income available to common stockholders by the 
weighted-average number of common shares outstanding for the period. Diluted EPS reflects the potential 
dilution that could occur if securities or other contracts to issue common stock were exercised or converted into 
common stock or resulted in the issuance of common stock that then shared in the earnings of the entity. 
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- Decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, advertising, maintenance, etc.)  
- Delay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in value  
- Provide incentives for customers to buy more products this quarter  
- Sell investments or assets to recognize gains this quarter  
- Repurchase common shares  
 
Although many examples of earnings management through transaction decisions occur in 
practice, limited studies have included these earnings management through transaction 
decisions in their archival research. The earlier discussed Jones’ model (1991), for instance, is 
not capable of measuring real transaction and only focuses on accrual decisions to engage in 
earnings management. In 2008, however, Cohen et al. came up with a tool to measure real 
earnings management (transaction decision). As a result we expect more studies on earnings 
management through transaction decisions in the upcoming years.  
 
§ 3.3: Earnings management patterns 
In this section we explore earnings management patterns. Note that these patterns may take 
place using both accounting decision and transaction decisions. The premise is that the patterns 
discussed deviate from ‘truth-telling’. In other words, we assume there is an economic reality 
(true and fair view) and the earnings management patterns deviate from this reality. We briefly 
summarize these patterns: 
1. Taking a bath. This may take place in periods of organizational stress or reorganization. 
If a firm must report a loss anyway, CFOs may consider showing a large one, since 
market reaction will be bad anyway (Scott, 2009, pp. 405; Healy, 1985). After a 
management change, the new CFO might blame his predecessor. Consequently, CFOs 
accept unusually large expected future costs and include relatively large write-offs on 
assets such as goodwill (Sevin and Schroeder, 2005). This premature cost recognition 
creates so called ‘cookie jar’ reserves. These reserves provide opportunities in future 
periods being used to improve financial outcomes. 
2. Income minimization. Big bath accounting is actually an extreme form of income 
minimization. An income minimization pattern might be chosen in periods of high 
profitability by politically visible companies; reducing political heat. This subject refers 
to the political cost hypothesis as discussed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978; 1986; 
1990). Accounting policies that may suggest a pattern of income minimization are: when 
R&D expenditures are expensed, when companies include rapid write-offs of capital 
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assets and when inventory policies such as LIFO rather than FIFO are included (Scott, 
2009, pp. 405). Ronen and Yaari (2008, pp. 342) argue that income minimization studies 
often relate to conservatism, as discussed in the paper by Dechow and Skinner (2000). 
3. Income maximization. Both Sevin and Schroeder (2005) and Levitt (1998) discuss 
‘Improper/ premature revenue recognition’, i.e. recording revenue before it is earned. 
Companies may try to boost reported profits by preliminary recognition of revenues. 
Such pattern might be chosen in periods of relatively low profits to increase bonuses or 
decrease the chances of violating debt covenants (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
4. Income smoothing. From a contracting perspective, managers are risk-averse and 
therefore prefer a smoother bonus pattern (Scott, 2009, pp. 405). Consequently, managers 
may create cookie jar reserves: overstating sales returns in good times and using these 
overstatements in bad times to reduce additional costs of sales returns (Sevin and 
Schroeder, 2005). In this way CFOs are able to show smoothened earnings, resulting in 
relatively constant flow of annual bonuses. 
These question concerning ‘when’ CFOs engage in which earnings management pattern depends 
on the incentives and pressure CFOs perceive. We discuss these incentives in the upcoming 
section.  
 
§ 4: Incentives  
Libby and Seybert (2009) argue that for studying earnings management it is important to have a 
thorough understanding of incentives influencing CFOs decision making. In their review paper 
on earnings management, Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that earnings management occurs for 
a variety of reasons. They discuss several earnings management incentives, including capital 
market incentives, increasing management compensation, avoiding lending contract penalties 
and avoiding interventions of government regulators. Nelson (2003) argues that incentives are 
very important for studying earnings management. More specifically for this study, we must 
understand incentives, serving a moderating role between accounting standards and earnings 
management. 
 
§ 4.1: Incentives as moderating variables 
Prior research has provided evidence on managers’ incentives to engage in earnings 
management (e.g. Libby and Seybert, 2009). Nelson (2003) argues that incentives are even 
more important to engage in earnings management than accounting standards. In a regular 
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incentive based study (e.g. Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002), incentives are used as an independent 
variable and the question is what the effects of incentives are on earnings management, or 
other types of decisions. Figure 3 shows the relationship between provided incentives and the 
effect these incentives have on earnings management decisions, given certain accounting 
standards. 
 
 
Figure 3: Regular incentive based studies and earnings management 
 
In this study, however, we focus on the influence of accounting standards on earnings 
management. Without incentives, CFOs are not very likely to engage in earnings 
management. Therefore, we still need to include incentives as moderating variables to 
measure the effect rules-based and principles-based accounting standards have on limiting 
earnings management (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Accounting standards and earnings management; incentives as moderating variable 
 
§ 4.2: Types of incentives 
 
Capital markets incentives
16
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) present three types of incentives perceived or exerted from the 
stock market. First, they show that managers are likely to use income increasing accruals prior 
to equity offers. By doing so, stock prices increase prior to the equity issue, resulting in an 
                                                 
16 For an overview of capital market research: see Kothari (2001). 
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increased additional premium received from the stock market. Secondly, Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) suggest that managers of buyout firms have an incentive to decrease earnings, because 
earnings information is important for valuations in management buyout. Third, they stress the 
importance of companies to meet investors’ or analysts’ expectations. Cohen et al. (2008) use 
comparable incentives in their study, i.e. meeting or beating last year’s earnings figures, 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecast, and avoiding reporting losses.  
 Marques (2010) studies five incentives from earnings benchmarks, namely: analysts’ 
forecast, industry performance, last year’s earnings, avoid losses, and higher performance. 
The study explores international differences in the use of non-GAAP earnings measures to 
meet strategic benchmarks. Marques (2010) concludes that from the five earnings benchmarks 
studied meeting analysts’ forecast is most important and provides the strongest motivation.
 17
 
Another important reason to engage in earnings management is probably the 
maximization of shareholder value (Ezzamel et al., 2007). If companies are unable to create 
shareholder value, investors may change their investment decisions and buy other stocks. 
Furthermore, if creation of shareholder value stagnates (or even declines), companies become 
more interesting for takeover bids. In case of ABN AMRO, moderately increasing firm value 
(less than its competitors) is one the main reasons why Barclays started to have a bid in the first 
place. And essentially, ‘the more disgruntled the shareholders are, the more likely that such a 
takeover bid will be successful’ (Scott, 2009, pp. 450). 
 
Contractual incentives 
Nelson et al. (2002) point at two important contractual incentives, namely meeting targets 
included in compensation contracts and meeting targets included in lending agreements. 
These two incentives refer to the bonus plan hypothesis and the debt covenant hypothesis as 
introduced by Watts and Zimmerman in 1978. The bonus plan hypothesis describes the 
effects bonus plans have on CFOs decision making, if CFOs are provided with opportunities 
in accounting standards. This hypothesis presumes (and is empirically proven (e.g. Healy, 
1985; Holthausen et al., 1995) that if all other things are equal, managers of firms with salary 
incentives based on accounting numbers take accounting decisions shifting reported earnings 
from future periods to current periods. By increasing current periods’ earnings, CFOs 
remuneration increases. 
                                                 
17 In line with Marques (2010), we use analysts’ forecast to incorporate in our experiment. 
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 Comparable to the bonus plan hypothesis, the debt covenant hypothesis also examines 
an incentive to increase current periods’ earnings. Prior research (e.g. Dichev and Skinner, 
2002) proves that the closer the firm is to violating a debt covenant, the more likely the 
manager will select accounting opportunities that shift reported earnings to current periods. 
The reasoning behind this premise is that increasing current year’s earnings decreases the 
probability of a contractual default. Most often debt agreement impose penalties, if 
requirements are violated (Scott, 2009, pp. 290-291). Hence, improving current years’ income 
may prevent violating contractual obligations. 
 
Governmental incentives 
In addition to capital market and contractual incentives, Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that 
potential intervention from the government may also create incentives influencing financial 
reporting outcomes. One of these incentives is based on the political cost hypothesis (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978), which describes an incentive to decrease current years’ earnings. An 
event study by Patten and Trompeter (2003) examines corporate response to a 1984 chemical 
leak at Union Carbide’s Bhopal. As result of this incident, companies in this sector expected 
the government to increase lawful requirements. All 40 companies in this industry decreased 
their earnings; trying to overcome additional governmental requirements, and decreasing 
political cost (Patten and Trompeter, 2003). More generally, if political costs increase, ceteris 
paribus, managers are more likely to choose accounting procedures that defer reporting 
earnings to future periods. Political costs arise when firms report (too) high profits for several 
periods. Such attention can translate into political ‘heat’ (Scott, 2009, pp. 288), potentially 
leading to additional requirements from the government. 
 Healy and Wahlen (1999) also discuss industry regulations. Some industries face 
regulatory monitoring explicitly tied to accounting data. For instance Basel II explicitly 
includes minimum capital requirements, which banks need to consider. Similarly, insurance 
regulation requires minimum condition being met by insurance companies for showing their 
financial viability. After the financial crisis of the latter few years, banks and insurance 
companies feel an even stronger pressure from governmental institutions concerning their 
financial results, and solvency ratios in particular. Healy and Wahlen (1999) demonstrate that 
such regulations create an incentive to manage earnings based on variables of interest to 
regulators. 
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§ 5: Accounting standards and earnings management 
Before we start developing our hypotheses (Section 6), we first reflect on prior studies in the 
area of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings management, 
particularly related to the nature and level of earnings management. We start with some 
research related to the relationship between types of accounting standards and the nature of 
earnings management. Libby and Seybert (2009) include this discussion in their paper. They 
review recent behavioral studies of the effects of regulation on earnings management. 
Behavioral studies contribute to shedding light on potential unintended consequences (such as 
earnings management) and overall efficacy of proposed regulations, inter alia demonstrating 
what determines managers' preferences for different earnings management methods (both 
accounting decisions and transaction decisions). Their review shows that rules-based settings 
induce managers to engage in earnings management through transaction decisions, whilst a 
principles-based environment induces accounting decisions. 
 The conclusions of Libby and Seybert (2010) are in line with Cohen et al. (2008) and 
Nelson et al. (2009) and Tan and Jamal (2006). Cohen et al. (2008) document that earnings 
management through accounting decisions increased steadily from 1987 until the passage of 
the SOX in 2002, followed by a significant decrease after the passage of SOX. Conversely, 
the level of earnings management through transaction decisions increased significantly after 
the passage of the rules-based SOX, suggesting that firms switched from earnings 
management through accounting decisions to earnings management through transaction 
decisions after the accounting standards becoming more rules-based. Confirming this 
substitution effect, Nelson et al. (2002) use a survey to examine the effects types of 
accounting standards have on the nature of earnings management. Their results indicate that 
financial managers are more likely to engage in earnings management with unstructured 
transactions (read: accounting decisions) in a principles-based environment, whereas 
managers are more likely to engage in earnings management using structured transactions 
(read: transaction decisions) in a rules-based environment. Finally, in 2006, Tan and Jamal 
test the effect of accounting discretion on the ability of managers to smooth earnings. Their 
results show that managers are more likely to engage in earnings smoothing behaviour when 
there is significant discretion in GAAP (read: more principles-based). And to prevent 
managers from misrepresenting, standards setters may decide to limit the level of discretion 
left to prevent managers from engaging in earnings smoothing. Consequently, however, Tan 
and Jamal (2006) show that when accounting discretion is reduced (read: becomes relatively 
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rules-based), managers are more likely to use operational variables for earnings smoothing 
purposes. In other words, Tan and Jamal (2006) show that managers in the rules-based setting 
reduce their investments in assets with variable returns (e.g. R&D) and increase their 
investments in short-term assets with stable returns (e.g. advertising). This latter result 
suggests that financial managers adjust their financial decisions from accounting decisions to 
transaction decisions when discretion in accounting standards is reduced. 
In addition to discussing effects of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards on the types of earnings management CFOs engage in, either through accounting 
decisions or transaction decisions, we now discuss the effects of accounting standards on the 
level of earnings management, reviewing experimental literature in particular. One of the first 
papers in this area comes from Cuccia, Hackenbrack and Nelson (1995). Their paper explores 
whether replacing a standard that employs a vague, verbal disclosure threshold (principles-
based) with a standard that employs a more stringent, numerical threshold (rules-based) 
mitigates the aggressiveness of reporting decisions. Using two experiments in a tax setting, 
their results indicate that (1) under principles-based treatments, tax practitioners use the 
latitude available in a verbal standard to support aggressive reporting decisions, whereas (2) 
under a rules-based standard, tax practitioners use the latitude available in assessing evidential 
support to justify an aggressive reporting decision. They demonstrate that a shift in incentive 
effect is convincing enough for managers to engage in earnings management, yet equally 
aggressive under both the numerical standard (rules-based) and the verbal standard 
(principles-based). These results suggest that replacing verbal thresholds with numerical 
thresholds may not diminish the aggressiveness of reporting decisions. 
Several experiments have been conducted to assess whether rules-based or principles-
based accounting standards are better able to limit earnings management. Nelson (2003) reviews 
some of this experimental literature and concludes that the level of earnings management 
increases with an increase in flexibility of accounting standards, i.e. principles-based accounting 
standards allow for more earnings management. One of the papers used by Nelson is the paper 
by Trompeter (1994). Trompeter uses audit partners and varies the precision of accounting 
standards in a marketable security valuation case. He shows that audit partners accept more 
income-increasing interpretations in cases with less precise (principles-based) standards, since 
the auditors are less able to reject the economic substance based on the discretion provided 
within the standards. Similarly, Libby and Kinney (2000) study the latitude available in 
accounting standards and the output to recognize in financial statements. Their evidence 
shows that auditors require less adjustments, if the adjustments result in a change that is 
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qualitatively (principles-based) material to their client; in other words, auditors allow for more 
earnings management in a principles-based environment. 
Contrary to these results, however, we also see papers showing hardly any effect of 
accounting standards on the level of earnings management. Psaros and Trotman (2004), for 
instance, examine preparers’ consolidation judgments in relation to rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards. In Experiment 1 they find that when subjects used a 
principles-based accounting standard, preparers justified their consolidation judgments on 
case specific information rather than on different interpretations of the phrase ‘capacity to 
control’, whereas preparers in the rules-based setting engage in earnings management made 
through their assessments of case specific information. Psaros and Trotman (2004) conclude 
that only marginally significant more subjects applied an earnings management decision in a 
rules-based setting, while both groups had the same incentive not to consolidate. Another 
paper in this area comes from Segovia and Arnold (2006). They examine political pressure 
based on a letter from the SEC to review the impact of asset write-downs, restructuring 
activities, or acquired in-process research and development. In their research Segovia and 
Arnold (2006) show that this pressure results in comparable levels of earnings management 
applications in both a rules-based and a principles-based environment. Segovia and Arnold 
(2006) conclude that both types of accounting standards were unable to significantly decrease 
the level of earnings management. 
 In the latter few years, however, empirical papers occurred showing a preference for 
principles-based accounting standards. Inter alia Jamal and Tan (2010) show that principles-
based accounting standards reduce earnings management, using a 2x3 between-subject 
design. They asked experienced financial managers to make a (hypothetical) lease decision, in 
which they manipulated the accounting standards (rules-based and principles-based) and use 
three different types of auditors (namely client oriented, principles-oriented, or rules-
oriented). Jamal and Tan (2010) find that auditor type has no effect on earnings management 
decisions under a rules-based standard, whereas under a principles-based standard, financial 
managers are less likely to report aggressively when the auditor is principles-oriented. In 
other words, principles-based accounting standards, combined with a principles-oriented 
auditor reduce the level of earnings management. 
In addition, Tsakumis et al. (2009) also use a lease experiment, in which they 
manipulate rules-based and principles-based accounting standards in term of ‘equal to 75% or 
more’ of expected life (rules-based) or ‘for the major part’ of expected life (principles-based). 
Using 96 experienced financial statement preparers in a 2x2 between-subject design, 
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Tsakumis et al. (2009) find that that CFOs are less likely to report aggressively under a less 
precise (more principles-based) standard than a more precise (more rules-based) standard. 
They also find that CFOs in a rules-based environment are less likely to engage in earnings 
management in the presence of a strong audit committee than a weak audit committee, 
whereas this effect did not occur when the standard was less precise (principles-based). 
Finally, Peytcheva and Wright (2010) show similar results as principles-based standards 
positively affect decision performance, using a lease experiment. They find that 
principles‐based standards lead auditors to make judgments more consistent with the 
economic substance (read: no earnings management) of the transaction than rules‐based 
standards.  
 
§ 6: Hypotheses development 
For developing the hypotheses, we start with principles-based accounting standards. We 
expect managers to engage in accounting decisions more in a principles-based setting than in 
a rules-based setting (Libby and Seybert, 2009; Nelson et al., 2002). Principles-based 
standards leave more room for professional judgment. This flexibility, however, may also be 
used to engage in earnings management (Tan and Jamal, 2006; Nobes, 2005; Schipper, 2003; 
Nelson, 2003). Managers may use the substance-over-form discussions to convince the 
auditor concerning the economic reality of the account. Therefore, firms use the accounting 
policy choices given or estimate opportunities provided to meet with their incentives. These 
opportunities, however, are not included in rules-based standards. As a consequence, Nobes 
(2005) concludes that rules-based standards reduce opportunities for earnings management 
through judgment (accounting decisions). As a result, in the area of earnings management, we 
expect managers to engage in accounting decisions more in a principles-based setting 
compared to a rules-based setting. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Managers engage more in accounting decisions in a principles-based 
setting than in a rules-based setting. 
 
To ‘solve’ this problem related to principles-based standards, standard setters can decide to 
add requirements, bright lines and implementation guidance, thereby decreasing the 
opportunities left to engage in earnings management through accounting decisions (Tan and 
Jamal, 2006). By adding requirements, standards become more rules-based (Nelson, 2003). 
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We expect that managers are more likely to use transaction decisions, when accounting 
standards are rules-based rather than principles-based. Tan and Jamal (2006) show that 
financial managers use the available discretion opportunities in GAAP to engage in earnings 
management. However, when this discretion is reduced (read: becomes more rules-based), 
managers use earnings management through transaction decisions to influence financial 
outcomes. Consistently, Nelson et al. (2002) show that if structured decisions comply with 
precise (rules-based) numerical thresholds, auditors are less likely to require adjustments, 
even if the financial result deviates from the economic substance. Similarly, since principles-
based standards lack numerical thresholds and rely on accounting principles tied to a 
conceptual framework (Jamal and Tan, 2010), adjusting contracts in a principles-based setting 
seem useless because auditors may still require material adjustments (Nelson et al., 2002). 
Consequently, we expect that managers are more likely to attempt earnings management 
using transaction decisions in a rules-based setting than in a principles-based setting. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Managers engage more in transaction decisions in a rules-based setting 
than in a principles-based setting. 
 
The final question that remains reflects on the effect of rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards on the level of earnings management. We expect that managers are more 
likely to engage in earnings management in a rules-based environment than in a principles-
based environment. This premise is in line with the theoretical reasoning in the paper of Jamal 
and Tan (2010). First, they consider accounting standards as a source of negotiation power for 
the manager. Financial statements, in particular when reflecting on earnings management 
opportunities, result from negotiations between the auditor and the manager, and the 
accounting standards may be used to justify and legitimize a preferred stand. For example, if 
the rules-based standard permits CFOs preferred stand, but this stand deviates from the 
economic substance (read: is an earnings management decision), the auditor may propose the 
client to drop the adoption of this accounting opportunity (Jamal and Tan, 2010). However, 
the auditor’s negotiation power is constrained by the rules and the form over substance 
application, through which the auditor cannot enforce this proposed adjustment. On the other 
hand, when principles-based accounting standards are involved, auditors may comparably 
discuss the economic substance of the annual report. Contrarily to a rules-based system, 
however, auditors in a principles-based environment can even require adjustments based on 
the ‘true and fair view’ concept and override. In other words, in a principles-based 
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environment, auditors have a higher negotiating power to limit the extent of earnings 
management applied. Secondly, Jamal and Tan (2010) reflect on psychology research with 
respect to perceived norms attributable to principles-based and rules-based accounting 
standards. They argue that for a principles-based environment, managers may infer that the 
spirit of the accounting standards is to properly record economic substance. For rules-based 
standards, on the other hand, managers may infer that the specificity of the rules create 
legitimacy to search for loopholes and exceptions for engaging in earnings management 
(Jamal and Tan, 2010).  
This theoretical premise was statistically confirmed in the paper of Jamal and Tan 
(2010). Using a 2x3 between-subject design, they asked experienced financial managers to 
make a (hypothetical) lease decision, in which they manipulated the accounting standards 
(rules-based and principles-based) and use three different types of auditors (namely client-
oriented, principles-oriented, or rules-oriented). A lease decision implies both a potential 
transaction decision (whether or not to lease the asset) and an accounting decision; 
determining whether the lease is classified as operational lease (off-balance) or financial lease 
(on balance). Jamal and Tan (2010) find that auditor type has no effect on earnings 
management decisions under a rules-based standard, whereas under a principles-based 
standard, financial managers are less likely to engage in earnings management when the 
auditor is principles-oriented. In other words, principles-based accounting standards, 
combined with a principles-oriented auditor reduce the level of earnings management when 
compared to a principles-based environment with a client-oriented or rules-oriented auditor.  
Moreover, the assumption that rules-based standards result in a higher application of 
earnings management was also confirmed in two other financial manager experiments. The 
first study is of Tsakumis et al. (2009). Using 96 experienced financial statement preparers in 
a 2x2 between-subjects design, Tsakumis et al. (2009) find that financial managers applying 
the principles-based treatment level are less likely to report aggressively than subjects in a 
rules-based environment. Second, Psaros and Trotman (2004) marginally show that rules-
based accounting standards result in a higher engagement of earnings management. They 
show that while both groups had the same incentive not to consolidate, the influence of these 
positive incentives was slightly greater in the rules-based setting than in the principles-based 
setting.  
Contrary to these results, other experiments show that principles-based accounting 
standards allow for more earnings management application. Nelson (2003) reviews some of 
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this literature18 and concludes that principles-based accounting standards induce more earnings 
management applications. Nelson’s (2003) results, however, are based on auditor experiments, in 
which auditors are taking decisions whether or not to require adjustments and accept the 
financial statements when earnings management was applied. These experiments therefore differ 
in scope, as these experiments test auditor’s capability to constrain earnings management 
applications, whereas financial manager experiments test whether these managers will actually 
engage in earnings management. 
 Consequently, as this study reviews CFO behavior, using financial managers to 
participate in the experiment, preparer studies are more directly relevant for developing our 
hypothesis. These preparer studies show that managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management in a rules-based environment compared to a principles-based environment. 
Moreover, theory suggests that rules-based standards induce earnings management application. 
First, because financial managers may justify and legitimize a preferred stand in a rules-based 
environment and auditor’s negotiation power is constrained by these strict rules and a lack of the 
’true and fair view override’. Second, Jamal and Tan (2010) argue that managers in a 
principles-based environment may infer that the spirit of the accounting standards is to 
properly record economic substance, whereas rules-based standards may infer managers that 
the specificity of the rules create legitimacy to search for loopholes and exceptions for 
engaging in earnings management. Hence, in line with the results from preparer studies and 
these theoretical elaborations, we hypothesize that rules-based accounting standards result in a 
higher application of earnings management than principles-based accounting standards. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management in a rules-
based setting than in a principles-based setting. 
 
                                                 
18 See section 5 of this chapter (e.g. Trompeter, 1994; Libby and Kinney, 2000). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
§ 1: Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we discussed our theory and hypotheses. In this chapter we elaborate on the 
research methods used for this study; an experiment, a post experimental survey and in-depth 
interviews. In section three we elaborate on the type of experiment we use, and we discuss the 
operational design and the execution of the experiment. In section four the development of the 
post experimental survey takes place, whereas section five discusses issues to consider during 
our in-depth interviews. 
 
§ 2: Research designs 
 
§ 2.1: Role of experiment, post experimental survey and in-depth interviews 
Traditionally, in the area of financial accounting, earnings management and standard setting, 
most researchers tend to focus on archival research (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). During the last 
decade, however, the importance of experimental approaches in accounting research increased 
(Kachelmeier and King, 2002). This study uses an experimental design, complemented with a 
post experimental survey and in-depth interviews. We will now discuss why we have chosen 
this combination of methods for answering our research question.   
 
Why not archival research? 
This study examines the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards 
on earnings management. The question is: which type of research method do we need to 
measure this? Approximately 80-90 % of financial accounting research, including earnings 
management research, is based on archival research. Field et al. (2001), however, point out 
that archival studies of earnings management often bear significant endogeneity. In other 
words, for our study, using databases decrease the ability to draw strong conclusions related 
to causal inferences amongst the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards and earnings management, because this effect cannot be isolated. 
 Moreover, archival studies make it difficult to estimate potential effects of newly 
proposed accounting standards (Libby and Seybert, 2009). If we want to test the intended 
effects of the IASB and FASB on the rules-based/ principles-based continuum, result are 
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simply unavailable, since the results of these project have not been implemented yet. As a 
consequence, archival studies have limited ability to determine the characteristics of 
accounting standards that discourage or encourage earnings management behaviour (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). Finally, Sprinkle (2003) argues that the dependent variable and 
independent variables in archival research may contain measurement errors. For instance, when 
measuring earnings management via the commonly used modified Jones model (see Bartov et 
al., 2001 for a review of methods), the questions is whether this method is actually detecting 
earnings management behavior (Libby et al., 2002). More importantly, however, the question 
remains whether this is due to rules-based and principles-based accounting standards. Based on 
these limitations we decided not to use archival data for studying our research question. 
 
Why an experiment?  
In their 2009 review, Libby and Seybert are emphasizing the importance of experimental 
studies for evaluating issues related to earnings management and accounting choices. 
Kachelmeier and King (2002) agree, and argue that experiments may very well contribute to 
policy making issues in financial accounting. Our study is concerned with the issue of 
evaluating the effects of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on earnings 
management. Following Jamal and Tan (2010), Libby and Seybert (2009), Jackson (2008), 
Hunton et al. (2006), and Kachelmeier and King (2002) we use an experimental design. 
 Experiments hold four advantages to consider. First, the strength of experiments is the 
ability to describe the consequences attributable to a deliberately applied treatment (causal 
description). In this study, we review the effects rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards have on earnings management. Using an experimental design allows us to manipulate 
accounting standards to find out what the effects are on earnings management decisions. This 
directly relates to the second advantages; to control the environment. The main difference 
between experimental and archival research is the ability of experiments to control the 
environment. This allows us to disentangle interference found in natural settings, leading to 
stronger inferences (Libby and Luft, 1993). After manipulation of the accounting standards, the 
measured effects on earnings management will be attributable to the nature of these accounting 
standards, because potential influential variables are controlled for by holding them constant or 
randomization of the participants (Libby and Seybert, 2009). 
The third advantage of experimental methods is the ability test effects of proposed 
institutional changes ex ante. Conditions that do not exist in current accounting practice can be 
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created, which allows testing of proposed regulatory adjustments before the actual adoption 
(Libby and Seybert, 2009; Kachelmeier and King, 2002). When considering institutional 
changes on the rules-based/ principles-based continuum, experiments can therefore contribute to 
evaluating the effects proposed changes have on earnings management. Finally, creating 
different settings also allows testing of motives leading to earnings management decisions; 
providing additional explanations to standards setters understanding when and why CFOs 
engage in earnings management (Libby and Seybert, 2009). To conclude, using experiments 
seem useful for evaluating the effects rules-based and principles-based accounting standards 
have on earnings management. 
 
Each research method, however, has strengths and weaknesses. The strength of experiments 
mostly draws on its internal validity, which refers to the extent in which the independent 
variables can be attributed to the variations of the dependant variable (Libby et al., 2002). In 
other words, by using an experiment, we are able to measure the effects of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards on earnings management, while controlling for 
environmental influences. On the other hand, a limitation of experimental research is the 
external validity; the extent to which the experiment represents the ‘real’ world. The relevance of 
experimental methods rests on the assumption that experimental settings are real environments 
(in a reduced form) in the sense that applications in the experiment are fairly comparable to the 
‘real’ world (Mäki, 2005: 306).  
 Since experiments are created artificially, experiments are usually limited in their ability 
to generalize results towards different settings, decisions and actors. Moreover, only a small 
number of independent variables can be manipulated in one experiment; restricting appropriate 
generalizability (Libby et al, 2009). Libby and Seybert (2009) therefore suggest combining 
results from experimental and survey studies, since these methods are complementary. Using 
a multi-method approach can provide answers to different parts of the research question, 
resulting in a stronger basis for valid conclusions (Libby and Seybert, 2009). Hence, resulting 
from the limitations of experimental studies we decided to include a post experimental survey 
and in-depth interviews to complement the experiment.  
 
Why a post experimental survey? 
The main difference between experiments and survey research is the ability of experiments to 
intervene by active and purposeful manipulation of variables (Sprinkle, 2003: 289). Surveys, on 
the other hand, give up some of the control in experiments, and focus on studying a large sample 
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of objects for statistical research (Babbie, 2007). The strength of surveys is that it creates more 
representative results. For instance, for this study, we might examine questions concerning the 
effects rules-based and principles-based accounting standards have on earnings management 
behavior. A potential conclusion from the survey might be that “60% of the CFOs think that 
principles-based accounting standards allows for more earnings management than rules-based 
standards”.  
As a result of different response biases, however, surveys face the risk that participants 
will not respond in accordance to their actions in their natural environment; there may be a 
discrepancy between what people say they do and their actual behaviour (Libby and Seybert, 
2009; Russell Bernard, 2000, pp. 214). On the other hand, since experiments and surveys are 
complementary to a high degree, the post experimental survey contributes to improving 
insights concerning our research question leading to a more generalizable view on the effects 
of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on earnings management.  
 
Why in-depth interviews? 
In addition to the experiment and the post experimental survey, we include in-depth interviews in 
our study. Libby and Seybert (2009) argue that both surveys and experiment (to a different 
degree) face the risk that participants respond differently from their actions taken in the natural 
environment. Drawing on this line of reasoning, in-depth interviews serve a useful contribution 
to answering our research question because this method is an empirical inquiry that studies a 
phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 1989: 23) rather than an artificial context; this 
method is useful for evaluating research topics in more social settings (Babbie, 2007, pp. 362). 
  The interviews contribute in different areas. First, we can use the insights from the 
experiment and the post experimental survey to draw upon and discuss our research question 
and hypotheses more thoroughly. We use the empirical results, both in line with or contrary to 
our expectations, to discuss during the interviews for improving the explanation of these 
results. Second, using interviews provides the flexibility of continuing with asking questions; 
an opportunity not available when using experiments or survey designs. To create a more 
thorough view of the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on 
earnings management, we expand the argument by discussing the ‘why’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ 
question in depth. We will now explore the specific contributions of our experiment, post 
experimental survey and in-depth interviews for answering our research question. 
 
 
 62
§ 2.2: Research question and contributions of methods 
 
Figure 1: Research question and contributions of methods 
 
Research question: What is the influence of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards on earnings management? 
 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2 
 
Experiment: goal is testing hypotheses (based on 
operationalization of theoretical concepts) 
 
 Survey: goal is twofold.                         
& 1. Green block includes case related questions; to be used as 
 control variables when analyzing experimental results 
2. Green lines refer to the latter three questions in the post 
experimental survey directly related to the hypotheses   
 
In-depth interviews: goal is threefold.  
1. Verify previous results from the experiment and survey 
2. Discuss additional literature concerning the hypotheses 
3. Contribute to discussing knowledge gaps: e.g. incentives, specific 
accounts and integrity 
  
 
1 2 3 
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In the previous section we explained why we combine three research methods for answering 
our research question. In this section we more specifically discuss the contribution each 
research method. Figure 1 discloses these contributions. In Chapter 2, we started with the 
entire area concerning the relationship between rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards and earnings management (Yellow circle). In line with prior literature (e.g. Libby 
and Seybert, 2009; Ronen and Yaari, 2008) we developed hypotheses in the area of 
accounting decisions and transaction decisions (Blue circle). The first method in our study to 
test these hypotheses is the experiment (Red circle). This experiment allows us to test 
hypotheses in a controlled environment, resulting in stronger conclusions related to the effects 
of accounting standards on earnings management. A limitation, however, is that we need to 
make an operationalization of the concepts being studied; i.e. earnings management, rules-
based and principles-based accounting standards, accounting decisions, and transaction 
decisions. Drawing on prior literature, we use an impairment loss decision (Segovia and 
Arnold, 2006) and selling ‘available for sale’ securities (Hunton et al., 2006) as operational 
concepts for the experiment.  
 The second method we use is the post experimental survey.
 19
 This post experimental 
survey contributes to creating more valid results by complementing to the experiment in two 
ways. First, experiments are usually limited in the ability to nuance settings, actors and 
representative sample decisions (Libby and Seybert, 2009) of importance to policy makers. 
The question that remains after the experiment is to what extent the conclusions from the 
experiment are representative to the entire debate concerning rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards and earnings management. Standard setters may wonder whether results 
depend on age, experience, gender; in other words, to what extent results hold under different 
conditions. Therefore, in the post experimental survey we ask questions related to the 
experimental case and personal characteristics (Green block), being used as control variables. 
Second, and in addition to these case related questions, our post experimental survey includes 
three additional questions autonomously contributing to our research question. To further 
explore our hypotheses, we directly ask respondents to answer whether they agree with our 
hypotheses (Green lines). These latter three questions autonomously contribute to creating 
more insights into the research question. When the experimental results and post experimental 
results lead to similar conclusions, this would strengthen the expectation that the experimental 
                                                 
19For the experiment and post experimental survey we used the same respondents. For a more elaborate 
discussion on this issues: see section 3.5 and 4.3 of this Chapter. 
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results hold in the ‘real’ world. Hence, this multi-method
20
 approach contributes to the 
external validity of our study. 
 Furthermore, our in-depth interviews (white circles), using actual CFOs, contribute to 
answering our research question. Although interviews are not suitable to test hypotheses, we 
may use these interviews to discuss the results found in the experiment and the post 
experimental survey. One of the limitations of experiments is that we can only manipulate a 
small number of independent variables (e.g. rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards), which makes them less appropriate for an exploratory analysis (Libby and 
Seybert, 2009). To overcome this ‘problem’ we use the information found in the experiment 
and post experimental survey to discuss in our in-depth interviews to what extent these results 
would hold in the outside world and which nuances should be made when discussing the 
relationship between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on the one hand 
and earnings management on the other hand. This information contributes to creating a better 
understanding of earlier results found. 
 As shown in Figure 1, however, the entire research question contains more than the 
tested hypotheses alone. Our in-depth interviews (white circles) contribute to gathering 
knowledge for this entire research area. The in-depth interviews, essentially, contribute in 
three distinct ways. First, we discuss the results found in our experiment and post 
experimental survey (white circle No. 1). Second, we discuss accounts being used to engage 
in earnings management found in prior empirical research (e.g. Graham et al, 2005) (white 
circle No. 2). Within these accounts we distinguish between accounting decisions and 
transaction decisions. Discussing these accounts improves insights on the relationship 
between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings management; 
leading to additional insights concerning our proposed hypotheses 1a and 1b. Third, we 
discuss ‘unexposed areas’ with our interviewees. These unexposed areas go beyond the 
hypotheses tested (white circle No. 3). Potential areas to think of refer to the influence of 
incentives and integrity, combined with rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards and the effects on earnings management. In the latter part of the in-depth interviews 
we also provide our interviewees with the opportunity to discuss ‘other unexposed areas’ that 
may contribute to answering our research question. Although we do not ‘test’ results with 
                                                 
20 In this study we deliberately use ‘multi-method’ design rather than ‘triangulation’. Triangulation is a powerful 
technique that facilitates validation of data using two or more sources; mainly in positive research (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006). In particular, it refers to the application of combining different methodologies to study the 
same phenomenon. For our study, however, we use the same respondents in the experiment and post 
experimental survey, which limits the independence of our methodologies and limits the opportunities to fully 
apply triangulation. 
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these suggestions, they may very well contribute to creating a better understanding of our 
research question, particularly against the background of the ‘real’ world. This part of the in-
depth interviews provides additional insights into our research area and potentially creates 
new insights to incorporate in future research. 
 
§ 3: Experiment 
Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson (2002) reflect on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
experimental designs. An experiment is efficient if it achieves desired results as economically 
as possible. An experiment is effective, if the provided evidence is internally valid; that the 
readers believe the results from the hypotheses testing. At the same time, for being effective, 
results must have sufficient external validity relating to the accounting issue of interest (Libby 
et al., 2002). To increase the effectiveness of our study, we use the commonly used Libby 
boxes (predictive validity framework) and discuss the 5 linkages in the upcoming sections.  
Section 3.4 reflects on the execution of the experiment.  
 
§ 3.1: Libby boxes 
In state of the art financial accounting experiments (e.g. Peytcheva and Wright, 2010), 
experimental cases based on common accounting problems are used to verify their research 
questions. One of the assumptions underlying this type of research is the usage of ‘Libby’ 
boxes (Libby et al., 2002). These generally accepted Libby boxes help experimental 
researchers with the question how accounting experiments can be conducted successfully. For 
this study, addressing the research question concerning the relationship between rules-based 
and principles-based accounting standards and earnings management, the Libby boxes are 
presented in Figure 2. We will discuss the distinct links; including an elaboration of the 
questions we struggled with. 
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Figure 2: Libby boxes 
 
Link 1 
Link 1 depicts the relationship between theory and hypotheses on construct level. No theory 
can be tested directly, but must be made operational. The first determinant of an effective 
experimental study is the specification of a good research question (Libby et al., 2002). In 
Chapter 2 we extensively elaborated on the question concerning the effects of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards on earnings management. For this study, the addressed 
research question is: What is the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards on earnings management? Based on our theoretical elaboration, we developed 
hypotheses. We expect more accounting decisions in a principles-based environment 
(hypothesis 1a), and we expect more transaction decisions in a rules-based setting (hypothesis 
1b). Finally, we hypothesize that rules-based standards induce earnings management 
compared to principles-based standards (hypothesis 2). 
 
Link 2 and 3 
Link 2 and 3 of the Libby boxes relate to the process of operationalizing the theoretical 
concepts. Link 2 relates the antecedent theoretical concepts ‘rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards’ to the independent variables as operationalized and used in the 
experiment. Link 3 relates the consequential concept ‘earnings management’ to the dependent 
variable as operationalized and tested in the experiment. Difficulties concerning link 2 and 3 
refer to questions such as: How to choose the correct proxies? Why these, and not other 
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proxies? How can we make the experiment convincing enough? We decided to combine link 
2 and 3, comparable to Libby’s study (Libby et al., 2002).  
This study is concerned with the question related to the influence is of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards on earnings management. In chapter two we elaborated 
that CFOs in practice can either choose to engage in earnings management through 
accounting decisions and/ or earnings management through transaction decisions (Libby and 
Seybert, 2009; Cohen et al., 2008). Therefore, our experiment provide two opportunities to 
engage in earnings management; one concerning a potential accounting decision (for testing 
hypothesis 1a), and one concerning a potential transaction decision (for testing hypothesis 
1b). Combining the results of both decisions provides us with the opportunity to test the level 
of earnings management resulting from the nature of accounting standards (hence, for testing 
hypothesis 2). We start with explaining which constructs we use for testing our hypotheses. 
We develop the experiment on the level of execution in the upcoming sections. 
 
Earnings management through accounting decision; Impairment loss 
In line with the developed hypotheses, we start with earnings management through accounting 
decisions. Accounting decisions refer to choices among equally acceptable rules and judgment 
and estimates required to implement GAAP (Libby and Seybert, 2009). Prior research 
demonstrates that earnings management through accounting decisions can occur in the areas 
of assets write-offs (Burghstahler et al., 2002) inventory measurement (Neill et al., 1995), 
revenue recognition (Bowen et al., 2002), fair value estimates (Mazza et al., 2007), and 
pension plans (Hann et al., (2007). This subject is discussed extensively in the previous 
chapter.  
For this experiment we operationalize the ‘accounting decision’ by using an 
impairment loss decision, comparable to the study of Segovia and Arnold (2006). Prior 
research shows that valuation of long term assets are both large in frequency and magnitude in 
terms of earnings management. Jackson (2008), for instance, shows that machinery 
replacement decisions depend on asset valuation; whether this decision would result in a 
direct loss or gain. Moreover, the adoption of impairment loss decisions inherently includes a 
subjective estimate. Riedl (2004) shows a high association between write-offs and big bath 
accounting; impaired assets are frequently noted as being used for engaging in earnings 
management. An impairment loss decision provides us with a perfectly clean opportunity to 
engage in earnings management through accounting decisions. In line with Segovia and 
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Arnold (2006) and Riedl (2004), we use an impairment loss decision for engaging in earnings 
management through accounting decisions.  
 
Earnings management through transaction decision; Sale of securities 
In addition to this accounting decision, our experiment should also include a transaction 
decision. Transaction decisions refer to real production and investment decisions, or 
structuring transactions for engaging in earnings management (Libby and Seybert, 2009), 
which we discussed extensively in Chapter 2. Some of the operational opportunities to engage 
in earnings management through transaction decisions are: strategic security sales (Hunton et 
al, 2006), acquisition accounting methods (Ayers et al., 2002), strategically use sale and 
leaseback transactions (Maines et al., 2003; Imhoff and Thomas, 1988), machinery 
replacement decisions (Jackson, 2008), and using contingent convertible bonds to improve 
diluted earnings per share Marquardt and Wiedman (2005).  
Following Hunton et al. (2006), for the ‘transaction decision’ in our experiment, we will 
use an opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ financial assets. Hunton et al. (2006) use a very 
clear structure concerning the relation between transparency and earnings management. The 
opportunity to sell securities is easily applicable; leading to a clean and internally valid 
experiment. Other transaction decisions from the above mentioned enumeration could have been 
chosen as well, but seemed less appropriate and useful. For instance, a sale-and-leaseback 
transaction is often used in prior experimental studies, such as Jamal and Tan (2010). A 
limitation of sale-and-leaseback transactions, however, is that it combines an accounting 
decision and a transaction decision; limiting causal inference (Libby and Seybert, 2009) and 
leaving us with fewer opportunities to test our hypotheses. Hence, we draw on Hunton et al. 
(2006) and use an opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ financial assets for engaging in 
earnings management through transaction decisions. 
 
Accounting Standards 
Both opportunities discussed to engage in earnings management refer to the dependent 
variable (link 3 of Figure 2). After having decided which earnings management decisions to 
consider, we are now able to deduce and discuss on the accounting standards (rules-based and 
principles-based). One issue to consider relates to the structure of how to operationalize the 
independent variable; the way how to operationalize rules-based and principles-based 
standards from a construct level to an operational level. In line with Peytcheva and Wright 
(2010) we decided to use existing accounting standards and make adjustments to these 
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standards for representing the independent variables. We decided to use the IASB standards 
as basis and adjusted these standards to fulfill rules-based and principles-based requirements. 
The decision to start from an IASB point of view, however, was quite arbitrary. We could 
have chosen the FASB-standards equally well as a starting point of our operationalization 
process. The IASB standards for our issues, however, were easier to adjust. By adjusting 
existing accounting standards we overcome influential, non-controllable factors, since the 
actual IAS and FAS standards can convey unintended information about the nature of the 
underlying theory to be tested (Libby et al., 2002). For example, the difference in length 
between the IAS- and FAS-standard may already suggest the theory and expectations behind 
the study; which may have unintended effects, limiting the internal validity of the experiment 
(Libby et al., 2002). As a result of using an impairment loss decision and an opportunity to 
sell ‘available for sale’ securities we decided to use IAS 32 & IAS 39 on Financial instruments 
and IAS 36 (Impairment of assets) as basis and adjust these standards to distinct between 
rules-based and principles-based. The operationalization on the level of the experiment will be 
discussed in the upcoming section. 
 
Link 4 
Link 4 emphasizes the importance of internal validity on operational level. Link 4 in Figure 2 
describes the relationship between the operationalized independent variables and 
operationalized dependent variables, referring to internal validity. The internal validity of link 
4 depends on the question whether the variations in the earnings management outcomes are 
solely attributable to the variations in the rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards. A point of discussion worthy to note reflects on the following; based on 
Kachelmeier and King (2002) we accept the importance of a certain richness within an 
experimental case to contribute to policy making issues. Libby et al. (2002) suggest including 
a high level of realism, without detracting from internal validity. On the other hand, they also 
stress not to exaggerate the level of realism, especially not when this is not enhancing either 
internal or external validity. An example of this exaggeration was including a code of conduct 
as we did in the first draft of our experiment. Based on held pilot studies (see Appendix) it 
appeared that this code of conduct was influencing decision making, whereas the intention 
was to only serve as boundary ethics. Unintentionally influencing experimental outcomes 
decreases internal validity. We therefore eliminated this code of conduct from the 
experimental case. Similarly, the first draft of the experiment included a sale-and-leaseback 
transaction rather than an opportunity to sell short term financial assets for engaging in 
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earnings management through transaction decisions. As already discussed, a sale-and-
leaseback transaction did not fulfill our requirements to test our hypotheses as it combines an 
accounting and a transaction decision. Moreover, the case was rather complex; causing 
problems to attribute causal inference (Libby and Seybert, 2009). These doubts were 
confirmed in latter feedback conversations. Hence, to improve the internal validity of the 
study we decided to ‘de-rich’ the study to much easier descriptions; in which there is a tight 
relationship between the independent and dependent variable as discussed in the previous part 
concerning link 2 and 3.  
 
Link 5 
The aim of links 5 is to capture potential interferences (Libby et al., 2002); i.e. to consider 
influencing factors that create a variance in the measured outcome of the experiment, not 
attributable to the independent variables. Some influential variables are very general and 
common, such as age, gender, experience, and country. These variables will be used as 
control variables. Libby et al. (2002) distinct different possibilities to deal with influencing 
variables: such as ‘random assignment’, ‘manipulate influencing variables and test their 
effects’ and ‘measuring influencing variables’. The most important technique to deal with 
influencing variables is random assignment. Using randomization limits the chance of 
systematic biases within a certain treatment, creating homogeneous and comparable groups. 
Consequently, and combined with the manipulation of independent variables, it enables us to 
draw causal inference not influenced by structural biases (Libby et al., 2002). In addition to 
general control variables such as age and gender, for which we reduce the influence through 
randomization, we could ‘measure’ other elements for using them as covariates (Libby et al., 
2002). First, we measure subjects’ experience with rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards. Moreover, we examine prior experience subjects have had with both 
impairment loss decisions and selling financial assets. Prior studies have shown that 
experience might have an influence when CFO decision making is involved.  
 Very important for this study, however, is how to deal with incentives. In the previous 
chapter we explored the importance of incentives to engage in earnings management.
 21
 
According to Libby and Seybert (2009), incentives serve an important role in earnings 
management studies and are necessary for effectively studying the relationship between rules-
based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings management. They reflect on 
                                                 
21See section 4.1 (Chapter 2). 
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motives used in prior research, including capital market pressures, individual reputation 
concerns, tax saving and bonus compensation. Not including sufficient incentives would 
obstruct the validity of the financial accounting experiment. Incentives can be manipulated in 
the experiment (Libby et al., 2002) as we will explore in the upcoming section. 
 
§ 3.2: Conceptual design 
One of the limitations of early experiments in financial accounting was that accounting 
decisions were taken neutrally, rather than being influenced by the incentives of a CFO 
(Libby et al., 2002). In Chapter 2 we discussed the importance of both market based and 
contractual incentives as motives to engage in earnings management. Nelson (2003) argues 
that incentives (e.g. contractual incentives or capital market incentives)
 22
 might have a bigger 
importance to engage in earnings management than the nature of accounting standards. Our 
study is primarily concerned with the research question what the influence of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards is on earnings management. Essentially, it is important 
to decide which treatments to use in the experiment for testing the effects on earnings 
management. 
Drawing on Hunton, Libby and Mazza (2006), we conduct an experiment using a 2x2 
design. In their paper, Hunton et al. (2006) examine the relationship between financial 
reporting transparency and earnings management. They distinguish two transparency formats 
for presenting comprehensive income. Moreover, and based on prior earnings management 
literature, their paper includes an incentive to adjust financial outcomes. Hunton et al. (2006) 
use analysts’ expectations as incentive to either increase or decrease net earnings. This is in 
line with Marques (2010) stressing the importance of analysts’ forecast as incentive to adjust 
financial outcomes.  
 Although our operational experiment will be discussed in the upcoming section, on a 
high abstraction level we decided to follow Hunton et al. (2006), using a 2x2 between-
subjects design. In our experiment, and drawing on our research question, we will use rules-
based and a principles-based accounting standards as treatment to test the influence on 
subjects’ earnings management decisions. These two treatments could be compared with the 
two transparency formats as given in Hunton’s study. In addition, we also include analysts’ 
                                                 
22The issue of incentives was previously discussed in section 4.2 of Chapter 2. These incentives, however, do not 
directly refer to monetary incentives gained by experimental subjects as they show a better performance. This 
opportunity is left out in the study and the issue will be discussed in section 3.5 of this chapter. Essentially then, 
the use of analysts’ forecast as incentive rests on the assumption that the experimental subjects, comparable to 
common practice (see Marques (2010)), try to at least meet analysts’ consensus forecast. 
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consensus forecast as incentive to engage in earnings management. Following Libby et al. 
(2002), we deal with incentives by manipulating analysts’ forecast (high and low) and test 
their effects. For testing our hypotheses and answering our research question, however, we 
compare the outcomes of the rules-based and principles-based treatment levels that include 
similar analysts’ forecast. For this purpose, we compare group A with group B of Figure 3. 
These subject groups both receive an incentive to increase earnings (analysts’ forecast high). 
Consequently, since the independent variables (rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards) are manipulated and other influential variables (including incentives) are held 
constant or are controlled for by randomizing the participants, we are able to test our 
developed hypotheses; leading to stronger causal inference (Libby et al., 2002; Libby and 
Seybert, 2009). In other words, the measured differences are attributable to the provided 
rules-based and principles-based treatment. Similarly, we compare group C and D, in which 
both groups receive analysts’ forecast low to decrease financial outcomes. Our experimental 
design is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Experimental design (2x2) 
 
§ 3.3: Operational experimental design 
 
Task 
The full experimental task is presented in Appendix 1 of Chapter 4 (Experimental results). 
The experimental task starts with an introduction of the case, as presented here:  
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Introduction  
You are about to participate in a research which contributes to a better understanding of the decision-
making of financial managers. You will be asked to take decisions, for which there are no correct or 
incorrect answers. Although you normally might prefer to receive additional information for such 
decisions, the purpose is to take decisions based on the presented information. Try to answer the 
questions comparable to decisions during common practice, i.e. like you would normally do.
 23
  
 
This research exists of three parts. In part one a casus is described, which you must read carefully 
and thereafter you must take the two requested decisions. Afterwards you will be asked to answer 
questions directly related to the casus and questions concerning individual/ personal characteristics. 
 
The total research will last approximately 15 minutes. To thank you for your cooperation, we would like 
to donate € 5, - to a charity fund, which you can indicate at the end of the research. On behalf of the 
charity funds and the research group we would like to thank you for your participation in advance. The 
data are treated confidentially and will be used for scientific purposes only. 
 
Case
24
 
After the introduction, respondents soon learn they work for a public company that is 
followed by analysts. To finish current years’ financial results respondents still have to take 
two decisions. The task is designed to test our three hypotheses and respondents are randomly 
assigned to our four potential treatments (see Figure 3), in which they receive their accounting 
standards (rules-based or principles-based) and the analysts’ forecast (high or low) to meet the 
expectations, participants can engage in an impairment loss (accounting) decision or a 
security sale (transaction) decision. Both the experimental task as well as the use of analysts’ 
forecast will be discussed thoroughly in this section. 
 
Case: Link 2 and 3 
In the previous section we elaborated on the operationalization of the dependent and 
independent constructs (see link 2 and 3, Figure 3). Link 3 relates the consequential concept 
‘earnings management’ to the dependent variable as operationalized and measured in the 
experiment; hence, the impairment loss decision as proxy for accounting decisions and selling 
                                                 
23 Essentially, the experimental results rest on the assumption that the experimental subjects react comparable to 
common practice, try to at least meet analysts’ consensus forecast (see Marques (2010)). 
24The ‘case development’ part is described as if it were developed at one moment in time. As results from pilot 
studies (Appendix) show, however, we significantly changed the experiment after the first pilot. Describing this 
part as a smooth construction makes it better readable.  
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short term financial assets as proxy for earnings management through transaction decisions.  
Link 2 relates the antecedent theoretical concepts of rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards to the independent variables as operationalized in the experiment; 
adjusted versions of IAS 36 (impairment of assets) and IAS 32/39 (Financial instruments).  
One of the difficulties described in Libby’s (2002) paper concerns choosing the 
appropriate realism of the given treatments. Without relatively realistic treatments (read: 
framing), the respondents may not be motivated enough to use their professional insights 
making decisions in line with common practice (Libby et al, 2002). Since we want to test 
CFO decision making, the experiment must be sufficiently realistic to stimulate this 
knowledge. Therefore, framing of the experiment is important. Furthermore, realistic 
treatments might help us to convey to the readers the way in which the measured results relate 
to prior research and ‘real’ world phenomena; improving external validity. However, it is also 
important not to exaggerate to extent of realism, as we discussed earlier. As a result, 
treatments must be different enough to yield strong effects resulting in sufficient statistical 
power, yet within a relevant range (Libby et al., 2002). 
We tried to make the independent treatments as realistic as possible by drawing on 
prior literature (such as Hunton et al., 2006 and Segovia and Arnold, 2006), and debating the 
design with practitioners and academics (such as Ken Trotman). At the same time, our 
independent variables were developed, having enough differences in between to yield 
sufficient effects. We now discuss the earnings management decisions, the accounting 
standards, and the incentives provided on the operational level of the experiment. 
 
Earnings management through accounting decision; Impairment loss decision 
The text concerning our ‘accounting decision’ is presented below: 
1. First of all you, two months ago, you received a bulletin from the municipality which stated that 
Snilco’s building, with a carrying value of € 25 million, stands on polluted ground. After consultation of 
the auditor and in conformity with the accounting standard you decided to request an appraisal office 
to assess the value of the building.  
 
Appraisal office A is very renowned, has a domestic coverage and already looked after several 
projects for Snilco Inc. in the past. They assess the current value of the building and ground as € 15 
million, which implies an impairment loss of € 10 million. The results will be taken very seriously by the 
Supervisory Board. However, two months ago, you discovered that the neighbours’ building, a fairly 
comparable building that also stands on polluted ground, was sold for € 20 million. Moreover, you 
have asked a less renowned appraisal office B. They have assessed that the current value is € 10 
million.  
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Schematically this could be presented as follows: 
(€ in millions) Appraisal office A Appraisal office B Neighbours' 
building
Carrying value € 25 € 25 € 25 
Assessment current 
value € 15 € 10 € 20 
Impairment loss € 10 € 15 € 5 
 
 
This part elaborates that the companies’ building stands on polluted ground. The CFO must 
decide on the amount of impairment loss to consider, where the impairment loss decision is used 
as proxy for earnings management through accounting decision. The non earnings management 
position in this part would be the assessed impairment loss as stated by the very renowned and 
domestic appraiser from Appraisal Office A;25 leading to an impairment loss of € 10 million. 
Our case provides two opportunities to deviate from the assessment of this renowned assessor. 
First, a local appraiser is hired, which roughly assesses that the value of the companies’ 
building is € 10 million. In other words, companies’ financial result would decrease with € 15 
million, leading to an attempt (decrease) in earnings management of € 5 million. Secondly, 
the case includes a statement concerning the previously sold building of their neighbors. Since 
the selling price was € 20 million, this would result in an impairment loss of € 5 million, i.e. 
an earnings upgrade with € 5 million. Both answers deviating from appraisal office A are 
considered to be earnings management through accounting decisions; deliberately made for 
adjusting financial outcomes.  
 
Accounting standards for assessing the impairment loss 
The operational opportunities to attempt in earnings management through accounting 
decisions (link 3, Figure 3) are similar under both the rules-based and principles-based 
treatment. The distinction between both accounting standards, however, is created by using 
IAS 36 (Impairment of assets) as basis and adjust this standard to distinct between rules-based 
and principles-based. This strategy is comparable with Peytcheva and Wright (2010).  For the 
impairment loss decision, we use Our impairment loss decision concerns the previously 
described building standing on polluted ground; inherently creating a necessity to impair its 
value. Both accounting standards used in the experiment are included in appendix 2 (principles-
                                                 
25 Although this argument can be debated, we verified in our post debriefing analysis whether participants find 
the assessment of Appraisal Office A the most ”objective”. The participants confirmed this statement (74% was 
neutral to fully agreed). 
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based) and appendix 3 (rules-based) of Chapter 4. The distinction between both accounting 
standards depends on the following:  
 
Principles-based:  
(b) If there is no binding sale agreement or active market for an asset, fair value less costs to sell is 
based on the best information available to reflect the amount that an arm’s length transaction between 
knowledgeable, willing parties, after deducting the costs of disposal. In determining this amount, an 
entity may consider the outcome of an assessment of an expert. 
 
Rules-based: 
(b) If there is no binding sale agreement or active market for an asset, fair value less costs to sell is 
based on the best information available to reflect the amount that an arm’s length transaction between 
knowledgeable, willing parties, after deducting the costs of disposal. In determining this amount, an 
entity must adopt the primary outcome of an assessment of a renowned expert. If the company 
decides to deviate from this assessment, an entity must disclose why they have chosen this valuation 
and what the impact was on the financial results. 
 
A first distinction between the rules-based and principles-based standard concerns the 
difference between ‘may consider’ and ‘must adopt’. May consider inherently accepts 
professional judgment whether or not to comply with this standard, referring to the principles-
based setting. CFOs may use their ‘true and fair override’ if in their view the situation 
deviates from the outcome of the accounting standard. Moreover, we explicitly include 
‘renowned’ in the rules-based standard. This phrase is comparable to the case description and 
emphasizes the form over substance discussions previously mentioned for rules-based 
standards.
 26
  
Finally, we included a ‘disclosure obligation’ for the rules-based setting, if a CFO 
decides to deviate from the renowned expert. This obligatory requirement in the rules-based 
setting refers to the limited choices CFOs have in practice due to the stringency of accounting 
standards. If respondents decide to deviate, they must accept the obligation to become 
transparent and fulfill the disclosure requirements. With these different technical 
considerations to comply with, for both the rules-based and the principles-based setting, we 
                                                 
26In an earlier version of the experiment, comparable transactions were included in the accounting standard to 
refer to substance over form. With this phrase, however, and based on our pilot studies, including ‘comparable 
transaction’ made it hardly possible to distinguish between earnings management and non-earnings management 
decisions. Therefore, we decided to eliminate this phrase from the principles-based accounting standard. 
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expect subjects to perceive appropriate stimuli, leading to internal valid and sufficiently 
strong results (Libby et al., 2002). 
 
Earnings management through transaction decision; Selling ‘available for sale’ securities 
The text concerning our ‘transaction decision’ is presented below: 
2. Beside the impairment loss decision, you can also choose to sell a portfolio of `available for to sale' 
securities. You may choose between portfolios Y or Z. Portfolio Y holds an unrealized gain of € 5 
million, whereas portfolio Z holds an unrealized loss of € 5 million. Although it will have not a 
significant influence on the companies’ financial result, selling available for sale securities implies 
transaction costs. An explicit remark for this purpose is that you do not need the released cash from 
the selling of the securities to create a balance in your liquidity budget. In accordance with the 
accounting standards, one is not obliged to include an unrealized loss in the financial statement, if this 
loss is expected to be of temporary nature. In other words, both the unrealized loss and the unrealized 
gain will be realized at sale. 
 
We provide an opportunity to sell short term financial assets. Portfolio Y holds an unrealized 
gain of € 5 million, whereas portfolio Z holds an unrealized loss of € 5 million. By selling this 
portfolio, subjects are able to either increase or decrease net earnings. This opportunity is 
equal under both a rules-based and principles-based regime. 
Two important remarks must be made. First, the case states that selling these financial 
assets is not necessary to fulfil liquidity requirements. In other words, subjects are provided 
with the opportunity NOT to sell a portfolio of ‘available for sale’ financial assets. Second, 
and based on the concept of prudence, accounting standards may require to immediately 
recognizing unrealized losses in the income statement. Under IAS 32 and 39, however, the 
standards allow preparers to hold unrealized losses in the owners’ equity part. Consequently, 
the case explicitly states that realisation of unrealized gains and losses are due after selling the 
portfolio.    
 Thus, we use an opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ financial assets as proxy to 
engage in earnings management through transaction decisions. Earnings management refers to 
all deliberate and purposeful interventions in the financial reporting process to influence 
financial outcomes. Since CFOs in this case are not obliged to sell these financial assets for 
liquidity purposes, not selling financial assets is considered as the non earnings management 
decision. Selling either portfolio Y or portfolio Z explicitly refers to earnings management, since 
the only purpose to engage in this transaction is to adjust net earnings for meeting analysts’ 
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forecast; the incentive we discuss later in this section. This is comparable to the design of Hunton 
et al. (2006). 
 
Accounting standards for selling ‘available for sale’ securities 
The artificial standard concerning selling financial assets is derived from IAS 32 (Financial 
Instruments). The distinction between both accounting standards depends on the following:  
 
Principles-based: 
If necessary or wishful to enhance the insights of financial statement users, the company is allowed to 
separately disclose the amount that was removed from equity and recognized in profit or loss for the 
period. An entity may disclose material items of income in profit or loss or as a separate component of 
equity.  
 
Rules-based: 
The company should at least disclose all material items for the amount that was removed from equity 
and recognized in profit or loss for the period. An entity shall disclose material items of income in profit 
or loss or as a separate component of equity. 
 
We started with the prescriptions in IAS 32. The distinction between rules-based and 
principles-based starts with the phrase ‘If necessary or wishful to enhance the insights of 
financial statement users’ in the principles-based setting. This phrase, obviously lacking in 
the rules-based setting, emphasizes the importance of professional judgment in deciding 
whether this decision seems useful to financial statement users. In addition, the difference 
between the company ‘is allowed to disclose’ (principles-based) and ‘should at least disclose’ 
(rules-based) stresses the distinction of professional judgment and flexibility (PB) on the one 
hand vis-à-vis with what one ought to do on the other hand (RB). Finally, the notions ‘may’ 
versus ‘shall’ again represent a difference in which the situation of what a CFO can do (PB) is 
compared to the mandatory representation in the rules-based setting. With these distinctions, 
we expect subjects to perceive appropriate levels of stimuli that are different enough to yield 
sufficient statistical effects.  
 
Incentives 
As previously discussed, ’incentives’ are part of link 5. For earnings management studies’, 
however, choosing the appropriate incentives is important (Libby et al., 2002; Libby and 
Seybert, 2009). We therefore elaborate the incentives autonomously. Moreover, we discuss 
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the used operationalization on the level of the experiment in this part; leaving us with a better 
opportunity to critically reflect on link 4. We have discussed incentives as moderating 
variables extensively in Chapter 2. Motives to engage in earnings management includes tax 
saving, individual reputation concerns, capital market pressures and bonus compensation. 
Libby and Seybert (2009) conclude that capital market incentives motives are one of the most 
important motives to engage in earnings management. Following Marques (2010), Baik and 
Jiang (2006), Hunton et al. (2006) and Libby and Kinney (2000), we include analysts’ 
forecast as incentive to influence financial outcome. Including analysts’ forecast provides us 
with a neutral, yet relevant opportunity to influence CFOs decision making. The incentive 
information included in the case is presented here: 
 
As a quoted corporation, it is important to meet the analysts’ and investors’ expectations. Year after 
year Snilco succeeded in meeting analysts’ forecast, leading to a relatively high share price for the 
company. A high share price is important to remain ‘healthy'.  
 
The analysts’ consensus forecast for your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million [€ 35 
million]. 
 
Both the structure of the analysts’ forecast, as well as the expected outcomes are comparable 
to Hunton’s (2006) study. In their study, Hunton et al. present an analysts’ forecast of $ 1010 
(income increasing incentive) or $ 990 (income decreasing incentive). The non earnings 
management situation in their case represents current years’ earnings of $ 1000. For our 
study, we start with a financial result of € 50 million; however, after the non earnings 
management decision related to impairment loss financial results end up being € 40 million. 
Consequently, € 45 million provides an incentive to manage earnings upwards, whereas € 35 
million serves the role of an income decreasing incentive. A distinction between our presented 
incentive and the one in Hunton’s study is our introductory paragraph, which should 
emphasize the importance of meeting this forecast. 
A difficult argument to consider for incentives is whether or not these incentives are 
‘too strong’, meaning that participants do not have a serious rational alternative, which would 
result in measuring the reading capabilities of our respondents rather than their actual 
financial reporting decision making.27 To overcome this potential problem, we include three 
                                                 
27As a consequence, we contemplated different alternatives to include in the case. Inter alia, we considered a 
statement that explicitly refers to engaging in earnings management in relation to the detection abilities of 
investors, but found this counterpart too strong. 
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subtle counterparts that must withhold the case from becoming too easy. First, in the 
accounting standards we included references to disclosing this information to external 
stakeholders, which may withhold subjects from deciding to engage in earnings management. 
Second, in the impairment loss-part we have an explicit reference to the supervisory board: 
‘The results will be taken very seriously by the Supervisory Board.’  Hence, this statement 
prevents subjects from engaging in earnings management without considering the political 
consequences of their decision taken. Third, when considering selling the ‘available for sale’ 
securities, we included a sentence referring to the transactions costs related to this transaction: 
“Although it will have not a significant influence on the companies’ financial result, selling 
available for sale securities implies transaction costs.” Although in comparison the financial 
effects are negligible, stressing on the transaction costs related to selling these financial assets 
restrains respondents from taking this decision without contemplating the consequences. 
These three counterparts are obviously equal for all four treatment levels. 
 
Case: Link 4 
When discussing link 2 and 3, we extensively discussed the independent and dependent 
variables. The earnings management decisions can either take the form of an impairment loss 
decision, or a sale of financial assets, or both. For the independent variable, we use two 
adjusted principles-based and rules-based accounting standards to consider for making these 
earnings management decisions. For the transaction decision we adjusted IAS 32 on financial 
instruments, whereas an adjusted version of IAS 36 was included to comply with for the 
impairment loss decision. Furthermore, the case includes an incentive to either decrease or 
increase net earnings, depending on the treatment level. As just discussed, we use analysts’ 
consensus forecast to motivate CFOs to engage in earnings management. Since the non 
earnings management situation represents a financial result of € 40 million, analysts’ forecasts 
are either € 45 or € 35 million. For answering our hypotheses, however, we compare the 
treatment levels with similar analysts’ forecast (see Figure 3). To conclude, our 2x2 design is 
presented in Table 1, whereas the opportunities to choose from are included in Table 2. 
 Rules-based (adj IAS 36 
and adj IAS 32/39) 
Principles-based (adj IAS 
36 and adj IAS 32/39) 
Analysts’ forecast 45   
Analysts’ forecast 35   
Table 1: 2x2 operational experimental design 
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Case outcomes (in € M)
Security sale
Neighbours'  
building (-5)
Appraisal 
office A (-10)
Appraisal 
office B (-15)
Portfolio Z (-5) 40 35 30
No security sale (0) 45 40 35
Portfolio Y (+5) 50 45 40
Impairment loss
 
Table 2: Case outcomes 
 
As discussed in the previous part, we operationalized earnings management through a 
transaction decision providing an opportunity of selling ‘available for sale’ securities. Related 
to this transaction decision, subjects may choose between not selling the portfolio of financial 
assets, selling portfolio Y with an unrealized gain of € 5 million, and selling portfolio Z with 
an unrealized loss of € 5 million. The impairment loss decision, on the other hand, proxies for 
the ‘accounting decision’. 28 Subjects may decide to follow the assessment of a very renowned 
Appraisal office A; resulting in an impairment loss of € 10 million (no earnings management). 
Furthermore, respondents may follow the assessment of a local appraiser (B), indicating an 
impairment loss of € 15 million. The third opportunity to consider in this area is represented 
by the recently sold neighbours’ building. The building and ground are fairly comparable and 
sold for € 20 million; suggesting an impairment loss of only € 5 million, i.e. an earnings 
upgrade of € 5 million. All opportunities are included in Table 2, in which € 40 million 
represents a non earnings management situation. 
 
Case: Link 5 
The aim of Link 5 is to capture control variables (Libby et al., 2002), i.e. to consider 
influencing factors that create a variance in the measured outcome of the experiment, not 
attributable to the independent variables. Note, that the analysts’ forecast used for this study is 
an example of an influencing variable, which we discussed in the previous part. In addition, 
an important advantage of experiments is that effects of extraneous variables can be 
controlled for by holding them constant or randomization. Randomization 
limits the chance of systematic biases within a certain treatment, creating homogeneous and 
comparable groups in terms of age, gender, or experience. Another advantage of our straight 
                                                 
28For an impairment loss decision it seems more common (inter alia Segovia and Arnold, 2006 and auditing 
judgment literature) to let respondents assess their own impairment loss, without limiting them by providing 
three discrete position. For testing hypothesis 2, however, it is important to create an exact analogy with the 
opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities. Hence, we decided to include three alternative positions rather 
than an open impairment decision. 
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forward experimental design is that the statistical analysis is relatively easy. In most cases, 
using a simple t-test, Chi square analysis, ANOVA-test or non-parametric equivalents is 
sufficient to draw statistical conclusion (Libby et al., 2002). For instance, for the pilot study of 
February 16, 2009 (Appendix 1), we used a samples-paired T-test to test our hypotheses. 29  
By using this method, we were able to statistically assess whether the financial outcomes 
under a rules-based treatment significantly deviated from results in the principles-based 
setting. Hence, we are allowed to use these relatively simple variance analyses for drawing 
conclusions concerning the acceptance or rejection hypotheses 1a and 1b; whether CFOs 
indeed use more accounting decisions in a principles-based setting and more transaction 
decisions in a rules-based setting. Similarly, by combining both the accounting and 
transaction decision, we can test whether the average amount of earnings management 
between the rules-based and principles-based accounting standard statistically deviates; 
testing hypothesis 2. 
 
§ 3.4: Reflection on the operational experimental design: Hypotheses and measurement 
The case material asks participants to assume they work as a CFO for a public company. After 
a short introduction concerning the company’s past, subjects are asked to consider the 
following situation. It is December 19, and the company is working on their financial 
statement. The current situation would result in net earnings of € 50 million. Two decisions, 
however, need to be taken before year ending. First, an impairment loss decision, because the 
companies’ building stands on polluted ground. Second, the company owns two portfolios of 
‘available for sale’ securities that may be sold to influence net earnings. For simplicity 
purposes, the case ignores tax consequences and does not include a balance sheet or statement 
of cash flows. The experimental task (hand out) is included in appendix 1 of Chapter 4 
(Experimental results). The task is designed to test our three hypotheses. The measurement of 
our hypotheses will be shortly discussed here. A more extensive elaboration takes place when 
discussing our measured results. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Managers engage more in accounting decisions in a principles-
based setting than in a rules-based setting. 
 
                                                 
29 In the end we decided to use a Chi square analysis, which is better suitable for this study.  
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To test this first hypothesis, we compare the number of accounting decision taken between a 
rules-based and a principles-based setting. Hence, we compare the number of participants that 
either choose € 5 or € 15 million to include as an impairment loss and compare this number of 
decisions taken for both the rules-based and principles-based setting. We expect more 
accounting decisions in the principles-based setting. In other words, we expect subjects in the 
rules-based setting to follow the renowned appraiser A more often than in the principles-based 
variant. Using an Chi square-test, we examine whether this hypothesis is statistically 
confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Managers engage more in transaction decisions in a rules-based 
setting than in a principles-based setting. 
 
Comparable to testing hypothesis 1a, this hypothesis is tested by comparing the number of 
earnings management through transaction decisions taken under both a rules-based or a 
principles-based regime. Not selling these short term financial assets represents the non 
earnings management decision. Selling either portfolio Y or Z is considered to be an earnings 
management through transaction decision. Again, we will use a straightforward Chi square-
test to reject or accept our hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management in a 
rules-based setting than in a principles-based setting.  
 
Based on the accounting and transaction decision taken, we are able to deduce respondents’ 
net earnings. The results that occur can ultimately deviate between € 30 and € 50 million (see 
Table 2), with € 40 million representing the non earnings management situation. The first 
question and measurement relates to whether subjects actually engage in earnings 
management. This will be statistically tested by using a simple T-test and compare the 
average net earnings in the four treatment levels with € 40 million. Since we estimate 
analysts’ forecast on either € 35 or € 45 million, we expect participant will indeed attempt to 
take earnings management decisions. The more interesting question, however, relates to 
hypothesis 2. This hypothesis reflects on the question what influence type of accounting 
standards has on the level of earnings management. By comparing the net earnings between 
the rules-based and the principles-based setting, using a paired-sample T-test, we can 
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statistically test which type of accounting standards allows subjects to engage in earnings 
management more. 
 
§ 3.5: Execution of accounting experiment 
 
Subject selection  
An often held debate for executing an accounting experiment is whether or not students are 
appropriate for the particular study. Libby et al. (2002) suggest avoiding using professionals 
unless it is necessary to achieve the research goals. According to Elliot et al. (2006) using 
students as a proxy for non-professional investors is a valid methodological choice, because 
they are able to make similar decisions and students most often have some experience as 
investors.  Prior research (e.g. Chang and Ho, 2004), however, shows that students are 
inappropriate for professional decision making. Chang and Ho (2004) compare 222 
experienced managers with 146 undergraduate students. One of their conclusions is that 
students show little sensitivity to contextual information. Potters and Van Winden (2000) 
confirm this expectation. Using a lobbying experiment, they find a significant difference 
between students and professionals, based on professional rules of conduct. Moreover, 
Hunton et al. (2006) use 62 financial executives for their study because they aim ‘to peer into 
the minds’ of experienced managers.  
The goal of our study is creating a better understanding of CFOs decision making in 
the area of rules-based and principles-based and earnings management. For examining CFOs 
decision making, lacking experience would be a problem. According to Bonner and Lewis 
(1990), expertise is often a combination of training, experience and cognitive abilities. To 
examine CFO decision making it is not only important to understand the experiment 
autonomously, but also to understand the effects these decisions might have on companies’ 
reputation or share price. Therefore, having at least some experience in practice is important 
for respondents being useful as surrogates for representing CFOs decision making; in other 
words, expertise is a necessary condition to guarantee the validity of our results.  
Experienced participants are also used in prior state of the art papers. Hunton et al. 
(2006) use 62 financial executives for their study, whereas Psaros and Trotman use 195 
experienced financial preparers. In more recent experimental papers in this research area we 
see that Jamal and Tan (2010) use 90 very experienced financial managers, whereas Tsakumis 
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et al. (2009) use 96 experienced financial statement preparers in their 2x2 between-subject 
design. 
Our goal is to peer into the minds of professional managers (CFOs), who are aware of 
the effects of their financial reporting decisions taken. As a result, we decided to use ‘Register 
Controllers’ (RC’s) connected to the ‘Vereniging van Registercontrollers’. RC’s are highly 
educated controllers that receive this official title after finishing two or three years of 
postmaster education combined with at least three years of practical experience; roughly 
comparable with being a chartered controller. Solely focusing on CFOs alone is not possible. 
To create some statistical power in the results of our experiment, 50 subjects per treatment 
level is what we strive for. Since we have four treatment levels, we need 200 potential 
respondents. In the Netherlands we only have approximately 150 companies quoted at the 
Amsterdam stock market, leaving us with too few CFOs. 
 
Within- or between-subjects designs 
Another issue to reflect on when conducting an experiment is whether to use a between- or a 
within-subjects design for executing the experiment. For our experiment, we will use a 
between-subjects design, following the current state of the art research papers in the area 
(Hunton et al., 2006; Jamal and Tan, 2010; Tsakumis et al., 2009). In a within-subjects 
design, or repeated measures design, respondents are assigned to different conditions. Within-
subjects design can increase statistical power, since subjects take part in more than one 
treatment level. However, within-subjects designs may have some limitations such as practice 
effects, order effects and fatigue effects which will diminish the validity of the study (Shadish 
et al., 2002, pp 109). Hence, the repeated measure, rather than the assigned treatment might 
cause the subjects’ answer, limiting the validity of the experiment.  
Therefore, we decided to use a between-subjects design for the experiment for three 
reasons: first, because on average it takes 15 to 20 minutes tom complete the case. If 
respondents are asked to participate in all four treatment levels, their level of concentration 
will decrease, which might devaluate the value of the answers given; which causes inference 
problems. Furthermore, mortality problems may occur; referring to the fact that participants 
may not be willing to complete the latter experiments (Russell Bernard, 2000, pp. 111). 
Second, we like to overcome salient effects, i.e. overcome unintended effects based on the 
fact that respondents ‘re-do’ the case. For our study it seems plausible that respondents 
receiving a new accounting standard will not notice the difference between the previously 
received standard and the current accounting standard and therefore might answer the exact 
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same; i.e. the treatment will not work out properly (Libby et al., 2002). Third, even though 
earnings management is legal, it remains a topic on the edge of morality (Libby and Seybert, 
2009). Therefore, respondents might provide socially desirable answers in latter cases, 
because they are aware of the background of the experiment that concerns an earnings 
management operationalization. The answers then given might not be attributable to the 
provided treatments anymore. A disadvantage, however, of using a between-subject design, is 
that we need to recruit more respondents for creating sufficient statistical power.  
On the other hand, this study also uses a within-subject design when reflecting on the 
post experimental survey as well. Since the respondents for the experiment and post 
experimental survey are the same, ordering effects might occur. Ordering effect means that 
the outcome of the study is affected by the order in which the treatments are presented 
(Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 510). Particularly when we reflect on the final three questions of the 
post experimental survey, directly asking subjects to answer whether they agree with the three 
developed hypotheses, ordering effects may occur.
 30
  However, asking these questions up 
front might have created a demand effect (Libby et al, 2002). Therefore, we decided to ask 
these questions after the experiment. The results as discussed in section 7.2 (Chapter 5) 
suggest that no ordering effects occurred when answering the post experimental survey 
questions. 
 
Monetary incentives 
A third issue discussed in Libby’s 2002 paper relates to the efficiency of an experiment is 
whether or not the experimentalist should include monetary incentives. Experiments testing 
economic theory generally use performance contingent incentives; monetary rewards that are 
strongly related to the performance of the subjects in the experiment. Studies that 
experimentally test psychological influences on behaviour, however, generally use fixed 
payments (Libby et al., 2002). 
 For our study we do not use monetary payment at all, for two reasons. First, because 
we primarily use professionals and paying them a sufficient amount, comparable to their 
regular payments would result in strongly exceeding our budget. Secondly, Libby et al. (2002) 
conclude that larger monetary incentives are unlikely to alter nature and directions of the 
decisions taken. In other words, although the magnitude may differ, variable payments are 
unlikely to change the directions of the decisions taken. Since our budget was limited, we 
                                                 
30 See section 4.3 of this chapter.  
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motivated potential subjects to participate in the experiment by offering them a donation of € 
5 to a charity fund of their choice. Nowadays, many people find it extremely important to 
contribute to society. Hence, in this way, we are able to control our budget, yet still having 
sufficient power to motivate subjects to cooperate and participate in the experiment. Not 
including monetary incentives is commonly accepted in accounting experiments (Jamal and 
Tan, 2010; Hunton et al, 2006). 
 
Procedure 
From the VRC we have received a batch of 2,340 email addresses. This batch included all 
chartered controllers in the Netherlands. We randomly assigned respondents to one of the four 
treatment level through http://www.randomizer.org. Using this method overcomes problems 
of researcher interference and thereby contributes to the internal validity of our experiment. 
For executing our experiment, and in line with Libby et al. (2002), we used an online 
application and email rather than a laboratory for executing our experiment. Libby et al. 
(2002) emphasize that using laboratory markets does not substantially alter an experiment’s 
effectiveness, because laboratory experiments only tend to influence the magnitude but not 
the sign of the measured results. On the other hand, using a laboratory does dramatically 
increase the costs of our study. Since we do not test market interactions among participants 
and we are aware of our budgetary constraints, we decided not to use a laboratory setting but 
an online application. 
The online application we use is ‘Netquestionnaire’ (www.netq.nl). As presented in 
Figure 3, we have four treatment levels in our 2x2 between-subjects design. Embedded in the 
case, a link was created to inform subjects about their accounting standards; either rules-based 
or principles-based. These accounting standards were accessible via a hyperlink; ‘Bijlage’. 
http://fbw.ruhosting.nl/ferdy/abba67.html presents the obligatory principles-based standards, 
whereas http://fbw.ruhosting.nl/ferdy/bastiaan24.html shows the rules-based accounting 
standard to comply with (see Appendix 2 and 3 of Chapter 4). The accounting standards are 
presented on less than one page. We deliberately decided to have very dissimilar links used. 
By using these links, subjects are unable to ‘guess’ what the website of the other accounting 
standards might be. 
Subjects were allowed to participate in the experiment between September 28, and 
October 14, 2009. The introduction included a phrase that the research will last approximately 
15 minutes. To thank participants for their cooperation we promised to donate € 5 to a charity 
fund of their choice. Our application registered IP-addresses; subjects were only allowed to 
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participate once. The application did not allow participants to look back. Hence, they were 
unable to verify the case when answering the manipulation check questions afterwards. 
Moreover, the application prevented participants from adjusting their decisions taken after 
becoming aware of the research questions. 
 
Manipulation check questions  
Manipulation check questions directly relate to the provided case and verify whether 
respondents understood the case correctly, which is important to guarantee the internal 
validity of the experiment (Libby et al., 2002). In other words, the manipulation check 
questions will provide an answer whether or not the treatments levels were perceived the way 
they were planned.  
 In most studies, manipulation check questions are asked after the experiment has taken 
place. Hunton et al. (2006) verify whether their respondents correctly understood the 
comprehensive income format they had to consider. A difference with this study, however, is 
that we ‘adjusted’ accounting standards rather than using existing accounting standards. 
Consequently, respondents regularly working with IAS 32 or 36 may potentially neglect the 
adjustments in the accounting standards. Since the adjustments made in the standards are of 
extreme importance to distinct between rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards, we cannot face the risk that respondents do not perceive these adjustments. 
Therefore we decided to ask the MC-questions concerning the accounting standards prior to 
the earnings management decisions.31 Participants were only allowed to continue after a 
correct assessment of the accounting standards that were provided. The questions asked are 
presented below. 
 
• Concerning the issue of assessing your impairment loss decision, tick the box of the 
accounting standard that was applicable to you. When determining the impairment loss….  
A. an entity may consider the outcome of an assessment of an expert. 
B. an entity must primarily adopt the outcome of an assessment of a renowned expert. If 
the company decides to deviate from this assessment, an entity must disclose why 
they have chosen this valuation and what the impact was on the financial results. 
C. I have no idea 
 
 
                                                 
31 We would like to thank Ken Trotman for his advice on this matter. 
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• Concerning the issue of selling available for sale securities, tick the box of the accounting 
standard that was applicable to you. 
A. If necessary or wishful to enhance the insights of financial statement users, the 
company is allowed to separately disclose the amount that was removed from equity 
and recognized in profit or loss for the period. An entity may disclose material items of 
income in profit or loss or as a separate component of equity. 
B. The company should at least disclose all material items for the amount that was 
removed from equity and recognized in profit or loss for the period. An entity shall 
disclose material items of income in profit or loss or as a separate component of 
equity.
 32
 
C. I have no idea 
In addition to verifying the presented accounting standards, we asked three manipulation 
check questions/ statements concerning the case description after the experiment was 
executed:  
• If you would follow the assessment of appraisal office B, this would imply an impairment loss 
of € 15 million. 
• The opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities provided an opportunity to create both an 
additional loss and a gain? 
• The analysts’ consensus forecast for your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million. 
 
These statements directly refer to the case given, and we provided them with three enclosed 
answer categories, i.e. ‘yes/ no/ I have no idea’. Obviously, only one answer is correct. These 
manipulation check questions are considered to be of importance to verify the validity of the 
study. Current experimental papers, inter alia Jackson (2008) and Jamal and Tan (2010) 
similarly use this method to verify and accept their experimental results. We use these 
manipulation check questions to filter out respondents that not fully understood the 
experiment. Eliminating these respondents cleans up our data file, leading to stronger causal 
inferences as suggested by Libby et al. (2009). 
 
Pilot tests33  
The aim of a pilot test is verifying whether the experiment works out fine, whether subjects 
understood the case correctly and whether adjustments have to be made. Before executing a 
                                                 
32 After the experiment had taken place, we found that despite our reasoning in this section, asking MC questions 
prior to the earnings management decisions resulted in internal validity limitations. We discuss this issue in 
section 5 of Chapter 4. 
33 In the appendix we show the results from our held pilot tests. Based on these outcomes we changed some parts 
of the operational experiment, such as explicitly stressing the importance of meeting analysts’ forecast.  
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pilot test, we developed and extensively debated the design and content of the experiment. 
The case was first developed in MS Word, and then transferred into the Netq-format. For this 
study, we executed three pilot studies. The first was held on 13 March 2008, using master 
students in Accounting & Finance at the Radboud University Nijmegen. The second pilot was 
held on 16 February 2009, using different master students in Accounting & Finance at the 
Radboud University Nijmegen. The third pilot used master students from the Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam and was held on the 16th of March. For improving the readability and 
relevance of this chapter, however, we decided not to discuss the results from the pilots 
extensively, although they obviously had great influence on the finally used experimental 
design. The results of the held pilot studies are displayed in the appendix. 
 
§ 4: Post experimental survey34 
As explained in section 3, the strength of experimental methods mainly is in its internal 
validity (Shadish et al., 2002); allowing us to directly test the effect of rules-based and 
principles-based standards on earnings management. To complement to the experiment this 
study also incorporates a post experimental survey. This survey contributes in two distinct 
ways. First, we ask questions related to experimental case, referring to age, gender, prior 
experience with rules-based and principles-based accounting standards, and recent experience 
with either impairment loss decisions or selling financial assets. These questions serve the 
role of control variables (Green block, Figure 1). Second, and in addition to these case related 
questions, our post experimental survey includes questions directly referring to our 
hypotheses; asking respondents to assess whether they agree with our hypotheses.  
In the following part we start with discussing the type of survey to use. Then we 
discuss the topics to consider in the post debriefing analysis, including case related questions, 
case related experience and earnings management effects. The latter part of our post 
experimental survey relates to the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards on earnings management; referring to the hypotheses being tested (Green lines; Fig. 1).  
 
§ 4.1: Type of survey 
For our survey part, the question is which type of post experimental survey to use in our 
study. An important debate to consider is whether to use open or closed questions. Schuman 
and Presser (1981, 79-85) discuss both types of questions. Open questions have two 
                                                 
34 The final text of the post experimental survey is included at the end of Chapter 4, Appendix 1.  
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advantages in comparison with closed questions. The first advantage is that closed questions, 
constructed ex ante, may fail to provide appropriate and meaningful alternatives to consider. 
The second advantage of open questions is that respondents are not influenced by the answer 
categories given. A more valid picture would be obtained if respondents produce the answer 
themselves (Schuman and Presser, 1981, pp. 80-81). 
 Contrary to these advantages, however, open questions have some limitations as well. 
These disadvantages of open questioning refer to the efficiency, coding and analysis of the 
survey results. Closed questions are far more efficient, since results can be easily imported 
into statistical applications. And as a result, the analysis of closed questions is often easier 
Moreover, researchers do not have to recode the answers given; leaving out the potential 
coding errors and subjective assessments that could occur. Schuman and Presser (1981, pp. 
79) thus conclude that results of social surveys most often rely on pre-coded, closed 
questions. Hence, although we considered open questions to ask in our post experimental 
survey, we have chosen to include closed questions for two reasons. First, since we will use 
results from the post experimental for statistical testing. Second, we do not necessarily need 
open questions, since the study also includes in-depth interviews (to be discussed in section 
5), using semi-structured interviews. This provides us opportunities to ask open question 
anyway. 
 
§ 4.2: Post debriefing analysis  
 
Case related questions 
In line with Hunton et al. (2006) we analyze subjects’ beliefs concerning case related 
questions. These questions examine their assumptions influencing their decisions taken in the 
experiment, such as the influence of analysts’ expectations. These insights might be important 
for creating a better understanding of the experimental results found. The results will be used 
as control variables. Contrary to the manipulation check questions we previously discussed, 
these questions do not provide perfect answers. Since there are no perfect answers, we 
included a 5-points Likert scale rather than a yes/no distinction.  
The closed answer categories are ‘fully disagree—fully agree’ (5-points Likert scale). 
• Given the applicable accounting standards, I expect most managers would consider the 
assessment of appraisal office A being most objective? 
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• As referred to in the case, it seems very important as financial manager to meet analysts’ 
consensus forecast?
 35
 
• The instructions were clear to me. 
• I was motivated enough to fulfill the requirements of the case. 
• The case contained a proper reflection of problems CFOs might encounter in common 
practice.  
 
The first question indicates what respondents perceive as ‘economic substance’; to verify the 
non earnings management situation of the case. Since ‘economic reality’ remains socially 
constructed and earnings management refers to deliberate influencing financial outcomes 
deviating from this economic reality, we enclosed this question to ‘set the norm’; verifying 
whether our respondents accept the assessment of appraisal office A as the non earnings 
management situation. Furthermore, we indicate the perceived importance of meeting 
analysts’ forecast. If respondents do not accept this importance, our included incentive seems 
less useful. Then we ask questions whether they were motivated enough, whether they find 
the case clear enough and whether or not this was a valid example of potential problems 
CFOs might encounter. These latter three questions may be important to control for 
influencing variables. The questions are in line with Hunton et al. (2006). 
 
Case related experience 
After asking these questions related to the case directly, we debrief participants with 
statements that could be useful to further explore our research topic and potential 
relationships. Hence, we start with very general questions concerning age, experience, gender, 
current job title, official titles, and country. These questions relate to link 5 from the Libby 
boxes (see Figure 3). These questions will be used as control variables. 
Moreover, in the previous section we explained why it is important to have 
experiences managers for executing our experiment. Our goal is to peer into the mind of 
CFOs, and experience might have a significant influence on the case outcomes. Therefore, we 
ask respondents about their experience with rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards. Moreover, we asked two questions related to their recent experience with both 
impairment loss decisions and selling ‘available for sale’ securities. These questions 
                                                 
35 In addition, since we do not include a monetary incentive in the experiment we could have asked the subjects 
whether the analysts’ forecast in the experiment worked comparably to its effect in common practice. This could 
have improved both internal and external validity.  
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contribute to creating a better understanding of the experimental results found; providing us 
with the opportunity to control for influencing variables, based upon the following questions:  
• How much experience do you have with so called ‘principles-based’ accounting standards? 
(PB definition is disclosed) 
36
 ‘very much—very little’ (5-points Likert scale) 
• How much experience do you have with so called ‘rules-based’ accounting standards? (RB 
definition is disclosed) 37 ‘very much—very little’ (5-points Likert scale) 
• Have you recently, in your daily practice, considered impairment loss decisions? (Y/N) 
• Have you recently, in your daily practice, considered decisions concerning selling ‘available for 
sale’ securities? (Y/N) 
 
As prior research indicates, experience may have an influencing effect on decision making 
(inter alia Bonner and Lewis, 1990; Chang and Ho, 2004). Respondents with recent 
experience in the area of ‘impairment loss decisions’ or selling ‘available for sale’ financial 
assets may be less sensitive to the adjustments made in the accounting standards given. 
Furthermore, Foddy (1981) suggest that an often made mistake is to include unfamiliar words. 
Based on our pilot tests and feedback rounds, we therefore decided to disclose the notions 
‘principles-based’ and ‘rules-based’ to overcome validity problems of the answers given. 
 
Earnings management effects 
To further investigate participants’ beliefs underlying their choices, Hunton et al. (2006) 
measure in their debriefing analysis effects of earnings management on companies’ 
reputation, and companies’ stock price. Moreover, they measure the detectability of earnings 
management applications. The purpose of their questions was to increase insights among the 
transparency formats (more and less transparent) and earnings management. Their results 
show that earnings management seems less detectable, when the transparency requirements 
by the accounting standard are limited. Furthermore, Hunton et al. (2006) show that applied 
earnings management in a more transparent environment results in decreased stock prices and 
a deteriorated reputation. 
 Comparable to the study of Hunton et al. (2006), we could expect similar effects as a 
result of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings management. 
According to Nobes (2005), rules-based accounting standards improve transparency. In line 
                                                 
36Principles-based accounting standards refer to a system of financial reporting that is based primarily on the 
fundamentals of accounting (decision usefulness, true and fair view, going concern, substance over form) with 
an appropriate level of specificity. 
37Rules-based accounting standards refer to a system of financial reporting, that is based on detailed provisions of 
methods for most accounting problems, where it is unambiguously clear how and when it is to be applied. 
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with Hunton et al. (2006), we therefore expect that respondents participating in the rules-
based treatment to assess a higher detectability of earnings management and lower results on 
companies’ stock price and reputation. Similar to Hunton’s (2006) study, we therefore test the 
expected effect of earnings management on companies’ stock price, and we examine the 
effect of earnings management on companies’ reputation, leading to the following three 
questions on a 5-points Likert scale:   
• If companies use earnings management techniques, such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, how easy would it be for users of an annual report to 
detect these techniques? ‘very easy—very hard’ (5-points Likert scale) 
• If companies use earnings management techniques, such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, what would be the effect on the companies’ stock 
price? ‘Decreases enormously -- Increases enormously’ (5-points Likert scale) 
• If companies use earnings management techniques, such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, what would be the effect on the companies’ 
reputation? ‘Aggravates enormously -- Improves enormously’ (5-points Likert scale)
 38
 
 
The first question tends to measure respondents’ expectations concerning the use of accruals 
and their detectability by financial statement users; relates to the easiness of detecting 
earnings management through impairment loss decisions and selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities by investors. Furthermore, drawing on shareholder value literature (inter alia 
Jegadeesh and Livnat, 2006), we ask what the effect of earnings management on the 
companies’ stock price will be. Another important issue related to earnings management is the 
effect of earnings management on companies’ reputation. Subjects may draw back from 
engaging in earnings management decisions if they believe this will strongly influence the 
companies’ reputation.  
 
§ 4.3: Accounting standards and earnings management  
In addition to the experiment we autonomously measure subjects’ opinion concerning the 
relationship between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings 
management. In other words, and to further explore our hypotheses, we directly ask 
respondents to answer whether they agree or disagree with our developed hypotheses (Green 
lines). These latter three questions, directly reflecting on the hypotheses, contribute to creating 
more valid results as suggested by Libby and Seybert (2009).  
                                                 
38We have not tested whether an ordering effect occurred, for these three questions in particular. 
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To overcome validity debates concerning these ethical questions asked, we decided to 
draw back on prior accepted research of Nelson et al. (2002) in The Accounting Review. 
Their survey paper finds evidence about managers’ and auditors’ earnings management 
decisions. The first question refers to managers’ attempt to engage in accounting decisions in 
a principles-based environment; reflecting on hypothesis 1a. The second question contributes 
to hypothesis 1b, examining the expected application of transaction decisions in a rules-based 
environment. The latter question reflects on hypothesis 2. A minor problem that might occur 
is that differences in ‘tacit’ definitions of respondents may have an influence on their answers 
given. As a result we decided to disclose what respondents must associate with both 
accounting and transaction decisions. These questions were measured at a 5-point Likert scale 
‘fully agree—fully disagree’ and are given below: 
• Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management with unstructured transactions* in 
a principles-based setting than in a rules-based setting. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points 
Likert scale) 
o * examples of unstructured transactions are: estimates, substance over form 
reasoning, convince the auditor the validity of management’s interpretation (Gibbins, 
2002) (H1a) 
• Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management with structured transactions* in a 
rules-based setting than in a principles-based setting. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points 
Likert scale)  
o * examples of structured transactions are: “not shipping a product available for 
shipment because the quarter had already reached budgeted level; writing contract for 
revolving credit facility to avoid current liability recognition; hastening delivery of 
materials to recognize revenue under percentage of completion method” Nelson et al. 
(2002) (H1b) 
• Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management in a rules-based setting than in a 
principles-based setting. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points Likert scale) (H2)  
 
§ 5: In-depth interviews 
In addition to the experiment and the post experimental survey, elaborated in sections 3 and 4, 
we include in-depth interviews in our study. Libby and Seybert (2009) argue that both surveys 
and experiments (to a different degree) face the risk that participants respond differently from 
their actions taken in the natural environment and suggest a multi-method paradigm for 
answering research questions. In-depth interviews are complementary to these two methods, and 
combining results across methods provides the strongest basis for valid conclusions (Silverman, 
2005, pp. 8). These interviews are held with CFOs who did not participate in the experiment 
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and post experimental survey. The interviews provide the flexibility of going on asking 
questions, an opportunity not available when using experiments or survey designs (Babbie, 
2007, pp. 303-315).  
We start this part with discussing the type of interview we use. Then we shortly 
elaborate on the interviewing process. In section 5.3 we discuss the interview topics. We end 
this part with a short preview of our respondents. 
 
§ 5.1: Type of interview 
Russell Bernard (2000, pp. 190-193) distinct four interview situations based on the amount of 
control the interviewee tries to have over the respondents’ responses: informal interviews, 
unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews and structured interviews. These 
distinctions are drawn on a continuum that starts with the ‘informal interview’ and ends with 
‘structured interviews’. ‘Unstructured’ and ‘Semi-structured or in-depth interviews’ are 
discrete positions in between. An informal interview is characterized by a total lack of 
structure and control. This method is particularly useful when you are doing participant 
observations (Russell Bernard, 2000, 190-191). The second discrete position on this 
continuum is the unstructured interview. The interviews are based on a clear plan, however, 
also more or less lack control over respondents’ responses. This method is particularly useful 
when the goal is to let people open up (Russell Bernard, 2000, 190-191). The third method, 
using in-depth interviews (semi-structured), is again more structured. This type uses an 
interview guide; a written list with questions and topics to consider in a particular order. Most 
interviews executed in academic research use this method (Russell Bernard, 2000, 191). With 
this semi-structured method interviewers maintain having the flexibility for respondents to 
open up, yet at the same time remain having a clear instruction in the interview guide. This 
type of interview is particularly useful when dealing with managers, bureaucrats or elite 
members. The final type of interviewing is the structured interview. The discretion in this 
interviewing method is left out, leaving us with previously formulated closed questions 
(Russell Bernard, 2000, 192-193). This method would largely overlap the method we used for 
our post experimental survey.  
The question is which interviewing method to use for our study? The interviews must 
contribute to our three purposes; 1) verifying and discussing the prior results found in the 
experiment and post experimental survey 2) reflecting on prior earnings management 
accounts and 3) debating unexposed areas of importance to better understand our research 
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area. For discussing the results from the experiment and the post experimental survey we can 
use a strongly structured method. Similarly, we could use a fairly structured interview for the 
second part. These two parts come in a chronological order and provide us with a better 
understanding of our earlier results found. The latter part, however, relates to the unexposed 
areas useful to answering our research questions. This part of the interview is more open, 
because we do not exactly now where the interviewees are heading. Obviously we do include 
some topics to discuss, such as incentives and integrity, of importance to the entire yellow 
circle in Figure 1. 
To interview our respondents, we therefore decided to use a semi-structured interview 
design. Russell Bernard (2000, pp. 191) emphasize that semi-structured interviews are 
particularly useful when dealing with managers or elite members; as CFOs are. One 
advantage of this methodology is that it provides deeper insights into the topic, yet in a fairly 
structured manner. It demonstrates that the interviewer is in full control of the interview using 
his or her interview guide. On the other hand, this method also leaves room to follow new 
paths. Hence, in a more subtle way we are able to discuss the relationship between rules-based 
and principles-based accounting standards; increasing insights in the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of our 
research area.  
 
§ 5.2: Interviewing process 
For meeting the three goals assessed for our interviews, it is important to carefully structure 
the interviewing process. Our contemplations concerning the interviews draw on Kvale 
(1996). Kvale (1996, pp. 88; cited in Babbie, 2007) explores seven stages to consider for 
completing the interview process: 
1. Thematizing: clarifying the purpose of the interviews. For this study, the purpose of 
the interviews to be held is gaining deeper insights in the area of rules-based and 
principles-based standards and earnings management in three ways. First, by 
discussing the results found in the experiment and post experimental survey. Second, 
by exploring other areas in prior research. Third, by discussing unexposed areas of 
importance to our study.  
2. Designing: explaining the way to accomplish the purpose. For this study, we use a 
semi-structured design. We start with formulating interview topics, and then further 
elaborate these issues into an interview guide. In this way we will not forget topics of 
extreme importance to the study, yet we remain having the flexibility to find new and 
unexposed areas. 
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3. Interviewing: doing the actual interviews. We intend to tape the interviews on MP-3, 
providing us with the opportunity verifying the discussions in the interviews. 
Moreover, we make sufficient notes, leading to a better focus on the conversation and 
preventing the interviewer to forget research questions. 
4. Transcribing: creating a written text of the interviews held and send it to the 
interviewee for verifying our description. 
5. Analyzing: determining the meaning and insights gained from the interview. Since we 
use a multi-method approach, the interviews are of particular interest for making 
subtle distinctions not demonstrable through the experiment or post experimental 
survey. 
6. Verifying: checking the reliability and validity of the material. The multi-method 
approach used in this study contributes to both the internal and external validity of the 
results found. 
7. Reporting: what have we learned from the interviews; which additional insights did 
the CFOs provide. Obviously, this refers to the contribution the interviews have for 
this study. 
 
After thematizing, which strongly relates to our research question, we must elaborate the 
design of the interview. The interview topics will be discussed in the next session. Drawing 
on Russell Bernard (2000), it is important to have an interview guide when doing semi- 
structured interviews. This is a list of questions and topics to consider when executing the 
interview which is included in the appendix of Chapter 6.  
  Part three of Kvale’s (1996) list to consider relates to the interview itself. Russell 
Bernard (2000) stresses the importance of probing, using a tape recorder and ‘response 
effects’ to consider before starting interviewing. ‘Response effects’ refer to answers deviating 
from the real life truth, such as a deference effect or inaccurate descriptions. Inaccurate 
descriptions occur when people do not actually remember what happened, or when they 
suppose it happened, rather than giving a description of what they actually saw. The deference 
effect is related to people who tell you what they think you want to know. Part 4 to 7 refers to 
the elaboration of the interviews, which relates to the content of Chapter 6.   
 
§ 5.3: Interview topics 
As discussed in section 5.1, we will use a semi-structured interview design. CFOs of cross 
national quoted companies are of particular interest, since they have experienced both types of 
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accounting standards. The first aim of the interview was to discuss the results found in the 
experiment and post experimental survey. Therefore, we start with discussing these 
quantitative results. However, although we accept the importance of verifying these 
experimental and post experimental results, we stress the importance of having and an open 
and unaffected interview. Therefore, we discuss the following issues without explicitly 
mentioning our results found (also see Chapter 3): “What is the influence of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards on earnings management?” 
- Type of accounting standards in relation to the nature of earnings management 
decisions (either accounting decisions or transaction decisions)  
- Level of earnings management related to the accounting standards 
- Preference for future developments of accounting standards (based on earnings 
management) 
 
Our second aim is to discuss accounts being used to engage in earnings management in 
relationship with rules-based and principles-based accounting standards. In 2005, Graham et 
al. survey and interview more than 400 executives to determine factors influencing earnings 
management decisions. We use this non exhaustive list of Graham et al. (2005) and 
distinguish between accounting decisions (AD) and transaction decisions (TD), which is as 
following: ‘Near the end of the quarter, it looks like your company might come in below the 
desired earnings target. Within what is permitted by GAAP, which of the following choices 
might your company make?’ (Graham et al., 2005, pp. 35) We distinguish between ‘probably 
not, perhaps and most likely’.  
- Decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, advertising, maintenance, etc.) (TD) 
- Delay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in value (TD) 
- Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if justified in either quarter) (AD) 
- Provide incentives for customers to buy more products this quarter (TD) 
- Draw down on reserves previously set aside (AD) 
- Postpone taking an accounting charge (AD) 
- Sell investments or assets to recognize gains this quarter (TD) 
- Repurchase common shares (TD) 
- Alter accounting assumptions (e.g. allowances, pensions) (AD) 
These accounts improve insights concerning the relationship between rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards and earnings management, related to hypotheses 1a and 
1b in particular. 
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The third goal of our interviews is to create deeper insights into unexposed areas not included 
in the experiment or post experimental survey. Therefore, we discuss the role and importance 
of incentives when having our interviews. Nelson (2003) argues that incentives might have a 
bigger influence on engaging in earnings management than the nature of accounting 
standards. Similarly, we discuss the role and importance of integrity in relationship with rules-
based and principles-based accounting standards to explain effects on earnings management. 
In this area, most managers must consider a ‘code of conduct’ including an important role of 
integrity. The differences in discretion between rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards suggest a different role for integrity working under both systems Issues to consider 
when discussing the ‘unexposed areas’ are: 
- In addition to the non exhaustive list of Graham et al. (2005), which other 
opportunities could you use to engage in earnings management?  
- Are these methods used differently when income increasing incentives are involved 
compared to a situation with income decreasing incentives? 
- How often did you use earnings management methods to improve financial numbers 
to meet expectations? 
o Is this different for different CFOs? And why? 
- What is the role of incentives in applying earnings management methods? Also 
compared to type of accounting standards? (Which is pervasive?) 
- What is the role of integrity when considering the topic of earnings management? 
- What is your general attitude towards the topic of earnings management? 
o Will CFOs (in general) brook this behavior, or is earnings management 
behavior more or less seen as unethical? 
In addition to these specific issues, we might have left some areas out of the discussion 
although these issues might be important for our study. Therefore we provide interviewees 
with the opportunity to mention unexposed for further exploration. 
 
§ 5.4: Interviewees 
We end this chapter discussing the appropriateness of the interviewees. Remember that the 
primary research objects for this study are companies’ CFOs. We explained the impossibility 
to use only CFOs to fill in our experiment. In the Netherlands we only have approximately 
150 CFOs of publicly traded companies. Therefore, we decided to use ‘Register Controllers’ 
filling in our experiment and post experimental survey. At the same time, discussing the 
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results from the experiment and  post experimental survey with several CFOs seems useful to 
enrich our study, since these subjects are still of our primary focus. The interviews will 
therefore be held with very experienced CFOs of multinational companies, who intensively 
experience(d) the influence of both rules-based principles-based accounting standards when 
preparing their financial statements. 
An important issue related to executing interviews is choosing the best interviewees. 
Since our research topic is relatively specific, we must find respondents meeting the following 
requirements: 
• Current or recent experience as a CFO, since this is our primary object of study; 
• Experience in working for a publicly traded companies. 39 The interviewees must have 
experience in understanding the environment of a quoted company and the pressures 
to consider; 
• Experience with both US and European financial reporting, which will result in an 
improved understanding of the debate concerning rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards. 
 
Based on these requirements, we selected our 6 interviewees. We discuss their specific 
experience in Chapter 6. 
                                                 
39These companies are subject to the international debate on rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards such as the development among IFRS. Companies in the Netherlands solely using Dutch GAAP are 
only influenced by this debate to a limited extent. 
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Appendix: Pilot studies  
 
Pilot study 13 March 2008 
 
The first draft of our case was written in WORD. We asked two of our student-assistants to 
‘make’ the case. After two post experimental depth interviews we restructured the case 
partially. In construct, the intended stimuli were retained, but many minor flaws were 
adjusted. Some of their remarks were: 
- the clearness of the treatment levels were insufficient; 
- Some questions could be relabelled or restructured; 
- the case still contained typing errors. 
 
After this first test, adjustments were made and we further discussed on the appropriate level 
of the case. Finally we decided to transform the WORD document into an internet application, 
mainly as result of the chosen subjects. With this internet based experiment, we are able to 
send the case all over the world without additional problems. We have chosen to use 
‘Netquestionnaire’ (www.netq.nl). Although this applications primary goal aims at survey 
research, for this study, the provided opportunities within ‘Netq’ are enough. Netq has the 
advantage over experiment applications (such as Authorware) that is more user-friendly, i.e. 
easier to work with. 
 
After transferring the case from WORD into Netq the first ‘official’ pilot study could be 
planned. A week before this pilot (with 22 subjects from the master Accounting & Finance), 
we tested whether the case technically worked out the way it should be. One problem 
experienced during that test was the incompatibility of some items in Netq and the lack of 
Flash player on several computers. We therefore simplified the layout (not the content) to 
overcome these compatibility problems. 
 
Prior to this pilot test, we randomly assigned 22 (expected) subjects over four treatment 
levels, by ‘blind drawing’. Since we wanted some statistical power, we decided to equally 
divide (at least 5 per treatment level) subjects over the chosen treatment levels. We have 
chosen to test the following treatment levels: 
3: Principles-based/ Salary Incentive/ No Striking Pressure 
4: Principles-based/ No Salary Incentive/ No Striking Pressure 
5: Rules-based/ Salary Incentive/ Striking Pressure 
7: Rules-based/ Salary Incentive/ No Striking Pressure 
 
By using these treatment levels we were able to collect some feedback for all different stimuli 
and this would provide us the first indications whether everything worked out the way it was 
planned. 
 
On 13 March 2008 at exactly 11.13 am 15 subjects started. 7 Subject were unable to come due 
to different reasons. The following number of students started the pilot study: Treatment level 
3 (4 subjects), Treatment level 4 (5 subjects), Treatment level 5 (2 subjects) and Treatment 
level 7 (4 subjects). The average time students used to fulfil the case was 34 minutes and 46 
seconds, which is comparable to our 35 minutes as proposed in the invitation of the 
experiment. Also comparable to the invitation, we offered to help during the case, but no 
questions were raised. During the pilot test, no technical problems or limitations were 
detected. Furthermore, an additional piece of paper was distributed to (anonymously) provide 
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additional comments for improving the case. These remarks were considered for 
improvement. 
 
Results Pilot 
After the pilot study, we intensively analyzed the results. Based on discrepancies between our 
expectations and the student’s results we asked four students for depth interviews to 
contribute to a better understanding of their decisions made. We specifically selected students 
of whom the answers deviated most from our expected results. A non limitative enumeration 
of questions raised, based on students’ result: 
1. Why did someone choose financial lease in a rules-based setting, since the 89% 
criterion in the case does not fulfil the 90% criterion in the accounting standard? 
2. Why did someone choose to combine a financial lease classification with a sale-and-
leaseback construction, since it decreases return on assets (ROA)? 
3. After showing the results of question 2, why not revise your decision even after the 
effect on ROA has been shown? 
4. Based on these unexpectancies, was the knowledge base of these students high 
enough? 
5. Even without incentive to increase ROA, why did some students choose to increase 
ROA? 
6. Why was the standard deviation for the impairment loss decision in a rules-based 
setting relatively high? 
7. Why did the results of treatment level 3 (with salary incentive) show a higher average 
impairment loss than treatment level 4 (without salary incentive)? 
8. Why did students in treatment level 4 (without incentives) answer that they 
experienced pressure both to increase and decrease ROA? 
9. Why was the Cronbachs alpha for the construct ‘proselfs versus prosocials’ 
insufficient? 
10. Why was the Cronbachs alpha for the construct ‘rigidity’ insufficient? 
11. Why was the Cronbachs alpha for the construct ‘integrity’ insufficient? 
 
Students’ feedback: 
For the eleven questions raised, we will shortly present an overview of the answers as given 
by the four students interviewed in depth a few days after they made the cases: 
- Answer 1: Since the text of the case inclines towards financial lease and students are 
not fully used to make decisions based on accounting standards, this student has 
chosen for operational lease, which could be seen as contradictorily with the 
accounting standard. Other students strengthened our thought that this decision was 
partly due to lacking experience. Based on their arguments, we slightly modified the 
text in the case and made some minor adjustments in the rules-based accounting 
standard. 
 
- Answer 2: Clear answer: wrong interpretation of decision made. No follow up. 
 
- Answer 3: Not reading correctly; i.e. the student assumed she made the correct 
decision, hence did not really check the projected results and simply answered no on 
the provided opportunity for revision. No follow up. 
 
- Answer 4: Although these students are all master students, their background, 
experience and prior knowledge towards the subject differs enormously. Combined 
perhaps with different attitudes and motivation, not all results seem reliable.  To 
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overcome this problem, a new pilot test will be planned with post initial accounting 
students, whose knowledge base is enough. 
 
- Answer 5: In case 1, the branches average was 22 percent, whereas at the same time 
Snilco’s ROA was 20 percent. Therefore by definition, students perceived an incentive 
to increase ROA. Therefore we adjusted the branches average to 20 percent, to start 
from a more neutral point of view. 
 
- Answer 6:  For the impairment decision, based on the provided accounting standard, 
students were still allowed to choose between a high range of discrete positions 
without violation the accounting standard. This is contrary to the thoughts behind a 
rules-based system. Therefore we made some minor adjustments in the accounting 
standard, to decrease freedom in decision making. 
 
- Answer 7: No clear explanation found. Perhaps for this question the answer is due to 
the limited amount of subjects. The four students spoken did not have a clear 
explanation for this result. No follow up. 
 
- Answer 8: A perceived incentive to increase ROA is clear, based on answer 5. The 
incentive perceived to decrease ROA was an incorrect answer based on the earlier 
decision. No follow up.  
 
- Answer 9: We used four items to measure the concept of proselfs versus prosocials. 
However, three items are still related with the case and work in general. The final 
question more generally states the influence of others. By relating this item towards 
CFO’s work environment, we expect this Cronbachs alpha to improve strongly. 
 
- Answer 10: We used four items to measure the concept of rigidity. Two items are 
related to planning, two items are related to practise. Therefore, we decided to 
substitute two questions related to practise and include two new questions from the 
same personality based questionnaire related to planning. 
   
- Answer 11: We used four items to measure the concept of integrity based on subjects’ 
attitude toward earnings management related solutions. Since the cases are based on 
solutions given within GAAP boundaries (hence not fraud), we decided to eliminate 
two questions not directly related and substituted them for questions more directly 
related to earnings management practise. 
 
Case adjustments  
 
- Stricter alignment between research question, hypotheses and case (read: eliminate 
redundant information such as the code of conduct) 
- Include answers of alternatives directly (eliminates calculation problems/ errors) 
- More direct relationship between manipulation check questions and case (1 question is 
enough) 
- Decrease the number of questions in the post experimental survey to restore the 
balance between the experiment and the survey-part. 
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Pilot study 16 February 2009 
 
 
Table 1: Decision on impairment loss and Security Sale recommendations 
PB RB
Impairment loss Tax A (-10) 5 (63%) 7 (88%)
Tax B (-5) 0 (0%) 1 (12%)
pand Buren (-15) 3 (37%) 0 (0%)
Effecten verkoop Y (+5) 5 (63%) 6 (75%)
Z (-5) 0 (0%) 2 (25%)
geen verkoop (0) 3 (37%) 0 (0%)  
 
The RB results follow our expectations with very few accounting decisions and more 
transaction decisions. Why 2 subjects decided to sell security Y is not clear yet and needs 
further investigation, since it is contrary to analysts forecast. 
  
The PB results, however, seem somehow less consistent with our hypotheses. Although more 
subjects (37%) in a principles-based setting took an accounting decision than in a rules-based 
setting (12%), the results contradict the analysts’ forecast. The selling of the neighbours’ 
building seems to have more effect than assessor B. In the view of these respondents, 
‘economic reality’ is represented by this selling, which they stressed by answering that 
assessor A in their view is not the most objective.  
The fact that in the principles-based setting more subjects took a transaction decision 
rather than an accounting decision is less important, since we compare the number of 
accounting decisions between a principles-based and a rules-based setting. For testing 
hypothesis 1b, however, the number of transaction decision between a rules-based and a 
principles-based setting hardly differs. 
- Potential adjustment: reverse assessor B and the selling of the neighbours’ building 
 
Table 2: Net earnings resulting from impairment loss and security sale decision. 
PB RB
Analyst 
forecast (45) 41,25 43,13
St.D. (-4,43) (-5,30)
Analyst 
forecast (35) nvt nvt  
Table 2 shows the results of both the impairment loss decision and the security sale 
recommendation combined. The ‘non- earnings management’ situation is represented by net 
earnings of 40 million. In a principles-based (rules-based) setting, we see an average of 41,25 
(43,13) with a standard deviation of 4,43 (5,30). Since we used only 8 subjects per treatment 
level, the standard deviation is rather high. Since 40 million is the non- earnings management 
proxy, we see results being influenced by the analyst forecast of 45.  
We did not test the analysts forecast ’35 million’ treatment level. 
 
Table 3: Anova analysis 
Independent samples 
T-test t-statistics Sig.
PB (45)> 40 (No EM) 0,798 0,438
RB (45)> 40 (No EM) -1,667 0,118
PB (45) < RB (45) -0,767 0,456  
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I compared the means of the RB, PB and Non EM setting using independent samples T-test. 
As shown in table 3, all results are insignificant, although primary results in the RB-setting 
suggest a significant difference. Since both treatment levels contain only 8 subjects, however, 
statistical results do not contribute much.  
 
To verify how the results may look like in the actual experiment, I multiplied these results by 
entering the same results 5 times (hence 48 persons per treatment levels). If this would occur, 
the Anova test would show the following results: 
 
Table 4: Anova analysis (added to 48 persons per treatment) 
Independent samples 
T-test t-statistics Sig.
PB (45)> 40 (No EM) 2,067 0,041
RB (45)> 40 (No EM) -4,319 0.000
PB (45) < RB (45) -1,988 0,050  
 
Naturally, this is just a proxy and does not provide sufficient and reliable evidence. On the 
other hand, it provides us insights in the potential explanatory power of the case. 
• The rules-based case seems clear and show strong results.  
• The principles-based case is not yet convincing. This treatment level needs further 
investigation. 
• Finally, the difference between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards 
may become significant. The results, however, depend on the clearness of the 
principles-based part, which is not sufficient yet. 
 
Follow up: 
- Re-adjust the distinction between the neighbours’ building and appraiser B to 
overcome ‘economic reality’ problems to assess the impairment loss;  
- Identical will be rephrased to fairly identical; 
- Last week is substituted for two month ago, which will slightly diminish the strong 
relationship between both buildings; 
- Eliminate the phrase ‘comparable transactions’ in the principles-based accounting 
standard to overcome earnings management/ non earnings management discussions; 
- In the experiment, emphasize both parts of a priori assessed net expected earnings and 
analysts’ forecast by making this bold. 
- The next pilot session will be hold via Erasmus University Rotterdam on the 16th and 
17th of March. 
 
Manipulation Check questions 
 
These questions verify whether subjects understood the case correctly and the treatments were 
perceived the way they were meant to. 
 
If you would follow the assessment of appraisal office B, this would imply an 
impairment loss of 15 million. 
In both settings, only one subject answered incorrectly, suggesting a clear case. 
 
The opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities provided an opportunity to create 
both an additional loss or a gain?  
No incorrect answers. 
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The analysts’ consensus forecast for your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million.  
30 % of the respondents answered this question incorrectly. This result suggests that the 
analysts’ forecast needs more stressing to work out properly. 
 
Concerning the issue of assessing your impairment loss decision, tick the box of the 
accounting standard that was applicable to you. When determining the impairment 
loss…. 
RB no incorrect answers. PB, 3 incorrect answers. Why? Needs further investigation. 
 
Concerning the issue of selling available for sale securities, tick the box of the accounting 
standard that was applicable to you. 
Strange, for this setting no one in the PB setting answered incorrectly, whereas 50% of the 
subjects in the RB setting gave the wrong answer. Needs further investigation. 
 
Based on the MC questions for both the accounting standard and the analysts’ forecast I 
would suggest showing the case description two times. First, without the questions with a 
verification remark whether they read the case (including the accounting standard) carefully. 
Then include the questions. 
 
I expect that selling portfolio Y with an unrealized gain of 5 million would result in an 
increased stock price. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
3.12 and 3.50 average. Not very convincing. One explanation could be the lack of experience 
in this area. 
 
Given the applicable accounting standards, I expect most managers would consider the 
assessment of appraisal office A being most objective? fully agree—fully disagree (5-
points likert scale) 
3.38 and 3.87 with a quite high standard deviation. Most people that decided to adopt the 
impairment loss of the neighbours’ building choose a 1 or 2.  self falsification. Needs 
further investigation. 
 
The instructions were clear to me. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
Almost 4 average, which is sufficient (especially when considering the fact that these are 
regular master students). 
 
I was motivated enough to fulfill the requirements of the case. fully agree—fully 
disagree (5-points likert scale) 
Approximately 3.85, which is sufficient. 
 
The case contained a proper reflection of problems CFOs might encounter in common 
practice. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
3.87 and 3,62. Hence, in general the opposition against ‘white’ earnings management is 
limited. 
 
Finally, in your expertise as financial manager, would you expect rules-based or 
principles-based accounting standards to be used more in practice to engage in earnings 
management? Or don’t you expect any differences? Rules-based/ principles-based/ 
comparable amount for rules-based and principles-based 
63% expects PB, 25% expects an indifferent amount and only 12 % expect that RB standards 
would result in more earnings management. 
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Pilot study 16 March 2009 (EUR) 
 
Before we start, a remark must be made. Two respondents started the experiment but stopped 
since the text was too long to consider for that moment. Hence, they wanted to start the 
research afterwards, but this is blocked to overcome validity problems. Hence, in the 
following draft we include a statement which explicitly mentions the fact that they can only 
start the research once. The results are based on 6 persons only. 
 
Table 1: Decision on impairment loss and Security Sale recommendations 
PB RB
Impairment loss Tax A (-10) 4 (67%) 
Tax B (-15) 0 (0%)
pand Buren (-5) 2 (33%)
Effecten verkoop Y (+5) 3 (50%) 
Z (-5) 0 (0%)
geen verkoop (0) 3 (50%)  
 
 
The results as shown in Table 1 look quite promising. First, all respondents answered 
correctly on their question concerning analysts’ forecast, which was a limitation of the 
previous pilot. Furthermore, 33% of the subjects choose to follow our expected design to use 
the accounting decision for earnings management purposes. Moreover, none of the 
respondents noted a ‘non-accountable’ result, such as a financial outcome of 35, which is 
quite promising. 
 
Table 2: Net earnings resulting from impairment loss and security sale decision. 
PB RB
Analyst 
forecast (45) 44,17
St.D. -2,04
Analyst 
forecast (35) nvt nvt  
 
Table 2 shows the results of both the impairment loss decision and the security sale 
recommendation combined. The ‘non- earnings management’ situation is represented by net 
earnings of 40 million. In a principles-based (rules-based) setting, we see an average of 44,17 
with a standard deviation of 2,04. With an average of 44,17, these result would suggest that 
CFO’s indeed will use earnings management decisions in case of incentives. Whether these 
results would significantly deviate from the RB-setting remain unanswered, since we have no 
results based results on the new case. 
 
Manipulation Check questions  
 
These questions verify whether subjects understood the case correctly and the treatments were 
perceived the way they were meant to. One remark is that we have only 6 respondents  the 
results seem less reliable. 
 
 
If you would follow the assessment of appraisal office B, this would imply an 
impairment loss of 15 million. 
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No incorrect answers. 
 
The opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities provided an opportunity to create 
both an additional loss or a gain?  
One incorrect answer.  accept 
 
The analysts’ consensus forecast for your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million.  
No incorrect answers.  This seems promising, since the prior pilot showed 30% of incorrect 
answers  adjustments of colouring and bolding helped.  
 
I expect that selling portfolio Y with an unrealized gain of 5 million would result in an 
increased stock price. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
2 average (so most subjects disagree) I have no explanation for this point  what will the 
influence be on the results of the study? 
 
Given the applicable accounting standards, I expect most managers would consider the 
assessment of appraisal office A being most objective? fully agree—fully disagree (5-
points likert scale) 
2.5 with a standard deviation of 1.4. Some respondents totally disagree  makes it difficult to 
stress that deviating answers are EM-decisions. 
 
Other questions are less relevant to discuss, based on the given answers. 
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Chapter 4: Experimental results 
 
§ 1: Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we discussed our theory and hypotheses. Then we elaborated on the methods to 
use in this study in Chapter 3. The first method in our study to test our hypotheses is the 
experiment. This experiment allows to directly testing hypotheses in a controlled 
environment. A limitation, however, is that we need to make an operationalization of the 
concepts being studied; i.e. earnings management, rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards, accounting decisions, and transaction decisions. Drawing on prior 
literature, we use an impairment loss decision (Segovia and Arnold, 2006) and selling 
‘available for sale’ securities (Hunton et al., 2006) as operational concepts for the experiment.  
 In this chapter we discuss the results of our experiment. We start with a short 
reflection on our research method, including subject selection, experimental task, 
experimental design and applied procedure. We then continue with a section discussing the 
results of the experiment; we discuss our manipulation check questions, descriptive statistics, 
Chi-square and Anova results. We end this chapter with our main conclusions related to our 
hypotheses testing. 
 
§ 2: Research method 
 
§ 2.1: Subject selection 
The experimental participants were 175 ‘Register Controllers’ (RC’s)
40
 connected to the 
‘Vereniging van Registercontrollers’. As our experiment asks participant to assume the role of 
CFO, it was important to select experienced participants (Tsakumis et al., 2009) leading us to 
‘to peer into the minds’ of experienced managers (Hunton et al., 2006). Of the 175 
participants, 124 participants (71%) currently work as a controller/CFO. The demographics of 
our respondents are displayed in Table 1. In addition to these average results, we tested 
whether our respondents were equally divided among our treatment levels. These 
demographic results are displayed in Table 1b.  
 
 
                                                 
40
RC’s are highly educated controllers that receive this official title after finishing two or three years of 
postmaster education combined with at least three years of practical experience; comparable with a chartered 
controller. Similarly, RA is an abbreviation for ‘Register Accountant’, which is closely comparable to a CPA. 
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Demographic results 
Number Percent
Formal Certifications held by participants
RC 175 100%
RA 17 10%
MSc. 128 73%
other: 26 15%
Participants employed as controller/ CFO 124 71%
Male 151 86%
Female 24 14%
Mean* SD
Average business experience 10.8 5.6
Age 40.7 6.8
* based on Anova testing, response means do not significantly differ across treatment levels  
Table 1: Demographic data (n=175) 
 
 Rules-based Principles-based Sign.* 
RC 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RA 0.087 0.108 0.634 
Drs. 41 0.728 0.639 0.204 
MSc 0.435 0.482 0.882 
Other 0.130 0.169 0.408 
Male 0.826 0.904 0.138 
Business experience 10.608 11.000 0.647 
Age 40.272 41.241 0.348 
*Significance is based on comparing the means of the RB and PB treatment levels 
Table 1b: demographic data (n = 175); divided over rules-based and principles-based 
treatment levels  
 
Table 1b shows that no significant differences occur when comparing participants in the rules-
based and principles-based treatment levels. In other words, the demographic results do not 
significantly differ across treatment levels, using Anova testing.  
 
                                                 
41
 Drs. is an abbreviation for doctorandus, which is comparable to the Master of Science degree. 
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For analyzing our experimental results, however, we only use the answers of 140 respondents. 
As a consequence of respondents’ mistakes on the manipulation check questions we excluded 
35 respondents from our experimental sample. We discuss this issue in section 3.1 of this 
chapter. The demographics of the remaining 140 respondents are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Number Percent
Formal Certifications held by participants
RC 140 100%
RA 12 9%
MSc. 104 74%
other: 23 16%
Participants employed as controller/ CFO 100 71%
Male 121 86%
Female 19 14%
Mean* SD
Average business experience 10.8 5,8
Age 40.5 6,6
* based on Anova testing, response means do not significantly differ across treatment levels
Table 2: Demographic data (n=140) 
 
Essentially, our data sample consists of 140 experienced respondents, at least holding a 
‘Register Controller’ title. In addition, most participants (74%) have a masters degree as well. 
The average age of our respondents is 40.5 years and they have an average business 
experience of 10.8 years. 86% of our respondents are male. These results do not significantly 
differ from our total data sample of 175 respondents. In addition to these average results, we 
tested whether our respondents were equally divided among our treatment levels. This is 
important for the internal validity of our experimental results. The demographic results do not 
significantly differ across treatment levels, using Anova testing (see Table 1b).  
 
§ 2.2: Experimental task
42
 
Appendix 1 gives full details of the experimental task. Moreover, we extensively discussed 
the issue of developing our experiment in Chapter 3. The case material asks participants to 
assume they work as CFO for a quoted company for which they have to take two decisions: 
an accounting decision and a transaction decision.
 
Hence, subjects must decide on an 
                                                 
42
 We already discussed the experimental task, design, and procedure in Chapter 3; hence, we shortly reflect on 
these issues improving the readability of this chapter. 
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impairment loss decision (Segovia and Arnold, 2006) and an opportunity to sell short term 
financial assets (Hunton et al., 2006). The impairment loss decision to be taken may vary 
between € 5 and € 15 million, in which the non earnings management decisions is represented 
by the assessed impairment loss as stated by the very renowned and domestic appraiser from 
Appraisal Office A;43 leading to an impairment loss of € 10 million. Secondly, and in line 
with Hunton et al (2006) we ask subjects to decide whether or not to sell short term financial 
assets, in which Portfolio Y holds an unrealized gain of 5 million, and portfolio Z holds an 
unrealized loss of 5 million. By selling this portfolio, subjects are able to either increase or 
decrease net earnings. The non earnings management position is represented by not selling 
any short term financial assets. In total, the non earnings management situation in this 
experimental case is created when subject use the assessment of appraisal office A and do not 
sell short term financial assets; resulting in net earnings of € 40 million.44 
 
§ 2.3: Experimental design 
Comparable to the previous section we only shortly discuss this part as it was already discussed 
in Chapter 3. For our experiment we use a 2x2 between-subjects design, in which accounting 
standards and incentives (as moderating variables) are manipulated. We included either rules-
based or principles-based accounting standards, depending on the treatment level. For our 
impairment loss decision we included an adjusted version of IAS 36 (Impairment of assets). 
The distinction between rules-based and principles-based has been discussed in the previous 
chapter. Moreover, we included a manipulated version of IAS 32 (Financial instruments) to 
comply with for deciding on the opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities. The 
accounting standards, both the original Dutch version and the English translation are included 
in appendix 2 and 3. Furthermore, we emphasized the importance of incentives serving as 
moderating variables for measuring earnings management. In line with Marques (2010) we 
decided to include different analysts’ expectations as incentives, creating a 2x2 between-
subjects design. As € 40 million represents the non earnings management situation we set the 
analysts’ forecast on € 45 (high) and € 35 million (low), which is in line with Hunton et al. 
(2006). This 2x2 design is displayed in Table 3, including the number of participants in the 
particular treatment (140 participants in total). 45 
                                                 
43
 Although this argument can be debated, we verified in our post debriefing analysis whether participants find 
the assessment of Appraisal Office A the most ”objective”. The participants confirmed this statement (74% was 
neutral to fully agreed). 
44 All opportunities were displayed in Table 2 (Chapter 3). 
45
 The original results (n = 175) concerning the operational experimental design are included in Appendix 4. 
 114
 Rules-based (adj IAS 36 
and adj IAS 32/39) 
Principles-based (adj IAS 
36 and adj IAS 32/39) 
Analysts’ forecast 45 31 32 
Analysts’ forecast 35 39 38 
Total 70 70 
Table 3: 2x2 operational experimental design (including number of participants) 
 
§ 3: Experimental results46 
 
§ 3.1: Manipulation check questions 
In state of the art experimental papers, manipulation check questions are asked after the 
provided case. A difference with this study, however, is that we ‘adjusted’ accounting 
standards rather than using existing accounting standards. Consequently, and as explained in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.5), we asked participants to record the correct accounting standards prior 
to taking the accounting and transaction decision. Respondents regularly working with IAS 32 
or 36 may neglect the adjustments in the accounting standards. Since the adjustments made in 
the standards are of importance to distinct between rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards, we cannot face the risk that respondents do not perceive these 
adjustments. Participants were only allowed to continue after a correct assessment of the 
accounting standards that were provided. The results of the manipulation check questions 
concerning the accounting standards are displayed in Table 4a. 
 
Manipulation check questions concerning accounting standards: number and 
percentage correctly answered (first time) 
 PB (45) 
N = 43 
PB (35) 
N = 42 
RB (45) 
N = 42 
RB (35) 
N = 48 
Total 
N = 175  
Impairment loss 
decision 
33 (69%) 35 (83%) 31 (74%) 33 (69%) 132 (75%) 
Security sale 38 (88%) 36 (86%) 38 (90%) 45 (94%) 157 (90%) 
Table 4a: Results manipulation check questions accounting standards 
                                                 
46 The procedure we used for this study was already explained in section 3.5 of Chapter 3. 
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The potential threat of respondent not properly understanding the provided accounting 
standards was confirmed in Table 4a. As the table shows, 25 percent of the respondents (on 
average) failed on correctly indicating their provided accounting standard related to the 
impairment loss decision to be taken. Moreover, 10 percent did not correctly indicate which 
accounting standard they received to comply with related to selling the ‘available for sale’ 
securities. If we would have asked these questions after the experiment, this may have 
resulted in a potential loss of 61 experimental subjects, strongly limiting the internal validity 
of the experiment. No mistakes were found in the second round of the manipulation check 
questions related to both accounting standards. 
In addition to verifying the presented accounting standards (ex ante), we asked three 
questions concerning the case description after the experiment has taken place. The results of 
these manipulation check questions are displayed in Table 4b. 
  
Manipulation check questions: number and percentage correctly answered 
 PB (45) 
N = 43 
PB (35) 
N = 42 
RB (45) 
N = 42 
RB (35) 
N = 48 
Total 
N = 175  
Appraisal office B 35 (81%) 39 (93%) 36 (86%) 42 (88%) 152 (87%) 
Security sale; profit 
and loss 
41 (95%) 42 (100%) 38 (90%) 47 (98%) 168 (96%) 
Analysts’ consensus 
forecast 
42 (98%) 41 (98%) 41 (98%) 45 (94%) 169 (97%) 
Subjects left 32  38 31 39 140 
Table 4b: Results manipulation check questions (other) 
 
First, we verified what the effect would be, if they had chosen to base their impairment loss 
decision on appraisal office B: “If you would follow the assessment of appraisal office B, this 
would imply an impairment loss of 15 million. Yes/ no/ I have no idea.” 87 percent of our 
subjects answered this question correctly. Second, participants were asked to record whether 
the selling of ‘available for sale’ securities provided an opportunity to create both an 
additional loss and/or a gain: “The opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities provided 
an opportunity to create both an additional loss and a gain?  Yes/ no/ I have no idea.” For this 
question even 96 percent of the subjects responded correctly. Third, respondents were asked 
what the analysts’ consensus forecast for 2009 was: “The analysts’ consensus forecast for 
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your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million. Yes/ no/ I have no idea.” 169 of the 175 
experimental subjects correctly understood this part of the experiment. Since on average, 93 
percent of the participants answered the manipulation checks correctly, we deem the 
experimental design successful.  
 These manipulation check questions were used to filter the respondents that had not 
fully understood the experiment. Eliminating these respondents cleans up the data file, leading 
to stronger causal inferences as suggested by Libby and Seybert (2009). Based on the 
mistakes made in answering the manipulation check questions 35 respondents were 
eliminated from the experimental results. The remaining 140 respondents47 do not 
significantly differ from the original 175 respondents in terms of age, gender, education and 
experience, indicating that no structural adjustments were made in the data file. 
 
§ 3.2: Descriptive results 
In section 2 we developed our hypotheses. We expected more accounting decisions in a 
principles-based setting (hypothesis 1a), whereas we expect more transaction decisions in a 
rules-based setting (hypothesis 1b). Moreover, we expect that the magnitude of total absolute 
earnings management is larger for rules-based standards than for principles-based standards 
(hypothesis 2). In this section we start with the descriptive results from our experiment. Our 
elaboration of hypotheses testing follows in the upcoming section. Table 5 presents the 
frequencies of the impairment loss and security sale decisions taken.  
Impairment loss Appraiser A Appraiser B Total
(-10) (-15)
PB (45) 23 0 9 32
PB (35) 32 4 2 38
Total 55 4 11 70
RB (45) 26 0 5 31
RB (35) 34 3 2 39
Total 60 3 7 70
Security sale No sale Z Y Total
0 (-5) (+5)
PB (45) 24 0 8 32
PB (35) 33 2 3 38
Total 57 2 11 70
RB (45) 17 0 14 31
RB (35) 27 7 5 39
Total 44 7 19 70
Neighbours' 
building (-5)
 
Table 5: Decisions (impairment loss and security sale decisions) 
                                                 
47
 One subject in the RB (35) had two mistakes in his or her MC-questions.   
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Table 5 provides an overview of the actual decisions taken by our respondents in the 
experiment. For example, in the treatment level of principles-based accounting standards and 
an incentive to increase financial outcomes (PB 45), 23 respondents followed the assessment 
of appraisal office A; resulting in an impairment loss of € 10 million. Nine respondents from 
this same treatment level (n = 32) decided to consider the sold neighbour’s building, and 
included an impairment loss of € 5 million in their annual report. At the same time this group 
(PB 45) had to take their decision concerning whether or not to sell short term financial assets. 
24 Respondents decided not to sell any assets, whereas eight respondents decided to use 
portfolio Y to manage their earnings upwards with € 5 million. Comparably, the rest of Table 
5 could be read. For instance, in the treatment RB 45, 26 respondents considered an 
impairment loss of € 10 million and five respondents only included an impairment loss of € 5 
million (n = 31). These 31 respondents also decided on selling ‘available for sale’ securities; 
in which 14 respondents decided to sell portfolio Y realizing a € 5 million gain, whereas the 
rest did not engage in earnings management using short term financial assets. In total, 140 
respondents decided on both the impairment loss decision and the decision to sell ‘available 
for sale securities. Table 6a and 6b combine these two decisions and show the aggregate 
earnings management decisions (Table 6a: number and percentages) as well as the average net 
earnings resulting from these two decisions (Table 6b). 
 
 Rules-based Principles-based 
Accounting Decisions 10 (14.29%) 15 (21.23%) 
Transaction Decisions 26 (37.14%) 13 (18.57%) 
Total EM Decisions 36 (51.43%) 28 (40.00%) 
Table 6a: Earnings management decisions (number and percentages) 
 
When we aggregate the results of Table 5, we can come up with Table 6a. Table 6a represents 
the number of earnings management through accounting decisions and transaction decisions 
taken in the experiment. To disclose this table we look back at Table 5. With regard to the 
impairment loss decision we see that 9, 4, and 2, respectively decided to engage in earnings 
management through an accounting decision in the principles-based environment (combining 
PB 45 and PB 35). These 15 out of 70 respondents represent 21.23% of the total subjects 
participating in the principles-based environment. Similarly we see that 5, 3, and 2 
respondents (10 in total: RB 45 and RB 35) engaged in earnings management through 
accounting decisions in the rules-based settings (see Table 5). The same reasoning holds for 
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the opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ financial assets. 8, 2, and 3 respondents, 
respectively, are participating in a principles-based setting engage in earnings management 
through transaction decisions selling a portfolio of short term financial assets, recognizing 
either a loss or a gain. 26 respondents (37.14%) of the respondents in the rules-based 
environment use the transaction decision to manage earnings. In total, 40% (principles-based) 
and 51.43% (rules-based) of the respondents engaged in earnings management either through 
an accounting decision or a transaction decision. 
 
 Rules-based  Principles-based  Effect analysts’ 
forecast 
Analysts’ forecast 45 43.06 (2.48) 42.66 (2.84) 42.85 (2.65) 
Analysts’ forecast 35 39.62 (3.32) 39.87 (2.72) 39.74 (3.02) 
Effect Accounting standards 41.14 (3.42) 41.14 (3.09)  
Table 6b: Net earnings (average and standard deviation) in millions 
 
As shown in Table 2 of Chapter 3, financial outcomes may vary between € 30 and € 50 
million. Table 6b displays the average net earnings and standard deviations, divided over the 
four treatment levels. These results can be deduced from Table 5 as well. RB (45) results in an 
average of € 43.06 million and a standard deviation of 2.48. PB (45), on the other hand, shows 
an average result of € 42.66 million. The total influence of analysts’ forecast (high) results in 
an average of € 42.85, whereas € 40 million represents the non earnings management 
situation. When we consider analysts’ forecast low (€ 35 million), average year end results are 
€ 39.62 (rules-based) and € 39.87 (principles-based), respectively. The total effect of 
accounting standard is equal for both types of accounting standards, although the standard 
deviation in the rules-based area is slightly higher.  
 
§ 3.3: Hypotheses testing 
To test my first hypothesis, related to the expectation that principles-based standards induce 
earnings management through accounting decisions, the number of accounting decisions 
taken between a rules-based and a principles-based setting were compared. Hence, we 
compare the number of participants that either choose € 5 or € 15 million to include as an 
impairment loss compared for both the rules-based and principles-based setting. The results 
from Table 6a show that 15 participants (21.23%) take an accounting decision in the 
principles-based environment, whereas 10 participants (14.29%) take an accounting decision 
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in the rules-based environment. Using a Chi-square test, we verify whether this hypothesis is 
statistically confirmed. The results in Table 7, Panel A show that financial managers more 
often engage in accounting decisions in a principles-based setting compared to a rules-based 
setting. Contrary to expectations, however, the difference between the principles-based and 
rules-based treatment is insignificant (p = 0.135). Hence, we must reject hypothesis 1a. 
 
Panel A (Chi square tests)
χ
2
Sign.
Hypothesis 1a Accounting Decisions:                                                                                     
% of accounting decisions principles-based vs. % of accounting decisions rules-based 
21,23% (PB) > 14,29 % (RB) (one sided t-test) 1,217 0.135
Hypothesis 1b Transaction decisions:                                                                             
% of transaction decisions rules-based vs. % of transaction decisions principles-based 
37,14% (RB) > 18,57% (PB) (one sided t-test) 6,007 0.007**
Total number earnings management decisions:                                                            
51,43% (RB) > 40,00% (PB) (one sided t-test) 2,338 0.063
Panel B (Anova analyses)
Analysts' forecast € 45 million t-statistics Sign.
PB (45) > non EM 40 (one sided t-test) 5.299 0.000**
RB (45) > non EM 40 (one sided t-test) 6.892 0.000**
Hypothesis 2:                                                                                                           
Earnings management rules-based vs. Earnings management principles-based               
RB (45) > PB (45) (one sided t-test) 0.608 0.273
Analysts' forecast € 35 million t-statistics Sign.
PB (35) < non EM 40 (one sided t-test) -0,298 0.384
RB (35) < non EM 40 (one sided t-test) -0,723 0.237
Hypothesis 2:                                                                                                              
Earnings management rules-based vs. Earnings management principles-based                           
RB (35) < PB (35) (one sided t-test) 0.365 0.358
Interaction effect:                                                                                                                 
Rules-based & analysts' forecast vs. principles-based & analysts' forecast                         
RB (45) - RB (35) > PB (45) - PB (35) (two sided t-test) 0.676 0.500
*,** significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively  
Table 7: Chi-square tests and Anova analyses 
 
Comparable to hypothesis 1a, hypothesis 1b is tested by comparing the number of transaction 
decisions taken under both accounting regimes. Hypothesis 1b relates to the expectation that 
rules-based standards induce financial managers to engage in earnings management through 
transaction decisions. Not selling these short term financial assets represents the non earnings 
management decision. Selling either portfolio Y or Z is considered to be an earnings 
management decision; using a transaction decision. The results from Table 6a show that 26 
participants in the rules-based area and 13 participants in the principles-based area (37.14% 
and 18.57%, respectively) decided to take a transaction decision. Using a Chi-square test, 
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significantly more participants under the rules-based treatment decided to take a transaction 
decision compared to transaction decisions taken in the principles-based treatment (p = 
0.007). This result suggests that rules-based standards indeed induce managers to engage in 
earnings management through transaction decisions. Consequently, we accept hypothesis 1b. 
Moreover, the trade-off between accounting and transaction decisions taken is tested; 
not explicitly referring to one of the developed hypotheses, but still reflecting on the potential 
substitution effect between accounting decisions and transaction decisions. Prior research 
(inter alia Nelson et al., 2002; Cohen, 2008) demonstrates the contribution rules-based and 
principles-based standards have on the nature of earnings management decisions. To test 
whether trade-offs made deviate between the rules-based and principles-based treatment level, 
we compare the relative proportions of transaction decisions versus accounting decisions 
taken in the rules-based and principles-based settings. To measure this relative proportion, the 
number of accounting decisions taken is subtracted from the number of transaction decisions 
taken; 26 minus 13 in the rules-based treatment levels, and 10 minus 15 in the principles-
based treatments (see Table 6a). Because more transaction decisions in a rules-based 
environment and more accounting decisions in a principles-based environment were expected, 
the results can be tested one sided; expecting a significantly higher result in the rules-based 
area. The results statistically confirm this expectation (p = 0.011; not in Table). To conclude, 
the results demonstrate that in the rules-based setting, managers tend to take the opportunity 
to sell short term financial assets more, whereas relatively, in the principles-based setting, 
managers more often take impairment loss decisions. 
Based on the accounting and transaction decision taken, it is possible to deduce 
respondents’ net earnings. The results are displayed in Table 6b in which € 40 million 
represents the non earnings management situation. The effect of the analysts’ forecast has a 
larger effect when income increasing incentives are involved compared to the income 
decreasing incentives. When analysts’ forecast is ‘high’ (€ 45 million), the average result of € 
43.06 million (RB) significantly (t = 6.892; p < 0.01) differs from the non earnings 
management position of € 40 million. Consistently, results in the principles-based treatment 
level (PB 45) show that financial managers engaged in earnings management. The average of 
€ 42.66 million significantly deviates from non earnings management (t = 5.299; p < 0.01). In 
other words, neither rules-based, nor principles-based accounting standards are able to fully 
prevent earnings management when provided incentives are sufficient. Surprisingly, however, 
the participants do not significantly engage in earnings management, when they receive 
analysts’ forecast ‘low’ (€ 35 million) as incentive to decrease earnings. The average 
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responses of € 39.62 million (RB 35), and € 39.87 million (PB 35), respectively, do not 
significantly differ from € 40 million (p = 0.237; p = 0.384).48 This latter result is in line with 
capital market literature (e.g. Baik and Jiang, 2006), which suggests that companies either 
meet or beat analysts’ forecast. In this case, not engaging in earnings management was 
sufficient to beat analysts’ forecast in both treatment levels. 
In addition to the earnings management results related to the provided incentives, a 
test of the effect of accounting standards on earnings management is conducted. The average 
results of € 41.14 million when applying either rules-based or principles-based accounting 
standards (see Table 6b) statistically differ from the non earnings management situation of € 
40 million; p = 0.007 (RB) and p = 0.003 (PB), respectively (not included in Table 7). 
 
The more interesting question, however, relates to hypothesis 2. It was hypothesized that 
principles-based accounting standards are better able to reduce the level of earnings 
management compared to the rules-based setting, resulting in one-sided t-test. Results in 
Table 6a indicate that the number of earnings management decisions taken in the rules-based 
setting exceed earnings management decisions taken in the principles-based environment (36 
(51.43%), and 28 (40.00%), respectively. When we compare the number of earnings 
management decisions taken in the rules-based and principles-based treatment levels, using a 
Chi-square test, the expectations are weakly supported at the 10% level (p = 0.063).49 
However, for testing hypothesis 2, reflecting on the total amount of earnings management 
applied, we need to compare the average results found in the experiment. Results in Table 7 
(Panel B) show that there is no significant difference between the magnitude of absolute 
earnings management under a rules-based and principles-based system when analysts’ 
forecast is high; the average result of € 43.06 million (RB) does not significantly exceed the 
average of € 42.66 million in the principles-based environment (p = 0.273; one sided t-test). 
Neither do significant differences occur when income decreasing incentives (AF 35) are 
involved. Although the direction is in line with our hypothesis, expecting a higher level of 
                                                 
48
 In addition to the manipulation check questions the perceived importance of meeting analysts’ forecast is 
explored. Although most respondents choose 4 (partly agree), the average of 2.94 does not significantly differ 
from 3 (p = 0,553). No significant differences were found between the rules-based and principles-based setting 
(p = 0,976). This limited exception of the importance of analysts’ forecast might explain the relatively few 
earnings management decisions taken in the experiment. 
49
 Using one sided testing is used more often in prior literature (for instance Hunton et al., 2006). Turning to the 
statistical significance of the results, the estimates are somewhat imprecise, only reaching significance at the 
10% level. Upshot is that we should take some care not to draw too strong conclusions from these experimental 
findings. These results, however, resonate with the sometimes ambiguous results found in prior research as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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earnings management when rules-based standards are involved, results are insignificant (p = 
0.358; one sided t-test).  Since both tests show insignificant differences between the rules-
based and principles-based treatment levels, we reject hypothesis 2. 
 
Figure 1: Mean net earnings resulting from Impairment loss and Security Sale decision 
 
When further exploring the net outcomes of the rules-based and principles-based treatment 
levels, a potential interaction effect seem to occur between analysts’ forecast and accounting 
standards (see Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that incentives have a stronger effect in a rules-based 
setting than in a principles-based setting. This result is in line with Psaros and Trotman (2004) 
suggesting that incentives have a bigger effect in a rules-based regime. Table 7 (panel B), 
however, shows that this interaction effect is insignificant (p = 0.500). 
Overall, when incentives are sufficient to engage in earnings management, neither 
rules-based, nor principles-based accounting standards are able to eliminate earnings 
management decisions (see Table 7). This confirms expectations from prior research (e.g. 
Libby and Seybert, 2009; Nelson, 2003) suggesting that incentives have a bigger influence on 
earnings management than accounting standards. These results, however, only hold when our 
respondents have an incentive to increase earnings. Furthermore, when standards are precise 
(rules-based), managers tend to search for transaction opportunities to meet analysts’ 
expectations. When standards are imprecise (principles-based), managers more often take 
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accounting decisions, such as impairment loss decisions, to meet their incentives. This latter 
result, however, is insignificant. Regardless the level of incentives, the discretion in the 
standards does not have a significant influence on the level of earnings management managers 
include in the financial report. 
 
§ 4:  Summary and Conclusions  
Recent research indicates that the discretion in accounting standards has an influence on 
earnings management decisions (Libby and Seybert, 2009). By means of an experiment, 
involving 175 Registered Controllers, we test the effects of rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards on earnings management. Confirming prior expectations (Nelson et al., 
2002), managers tend to adjust their decisions based on the latitude given by the accounting 
standards. The results show that participants in a rules-based setting are more likely to use 
transaction decisions, selling ‘available for sale’ securities (confirming hypothesis 1b). 
Although participants in the principles-based setting more often use their impairment loss 
(accounting) decision to engage in earnings management compared to participants in the 
rules-based setting, these results are insignificant. As a result, hypothesis 1a was rejected. 
Furthermore, our results demonstrate that when incentives are sufficient to attempt earnings 
management practices, neither rules-based, nor principles-based accounting standards are able 
to fully eliminate earnings management decisions. These results only hold when the 
respondents have an incentive to increase earnings. When reflecting on hypothesis 2, two 
interesting results occur. When we compare the number of earnings management decisions 
taken in the rules-based and principles-based treatment levels, using a Chi-square test, the 
expectations are confirmed at the 10% level (p = 0.063). However, the nature of the 
accounting standards provided does not have a significant influence on the average absolute 
amount of earnings management that participants included in the financial reports. As a result, 
hypothesis 2 was rejected. Overall, these results suggest that increasing or decreasing the 
flexibility in accounting standards may not be useful to prevent earnings management 
applications and will only result in a substitution effect; creating different types of earnings 
management applications.  
This study contributes in the area of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards, and earnings management. First, and contrary to most prior studies (e.g., Peytcheva 
and Wright, 2010), this study uses financial managers to participate in the experiment rather 
than auditors. Second, we provide respondents with a potential trade-off between an 
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accounting decision and a transaction decision. Although the relationship between rules-based 
and principles-based standards and earnings management was subject in prior studies (e.g. 
Nelson et al, 2002; Cohen et al., 2008), this is the first experimental study testing the potential 
substitution between types of earnings management and accounting standards in one 
experiment. Finally, this study contributes to the question of which type of accounting 
standard is better able to diminish earnings management. Contrary to expectations, the results 
demonstrate that neither rules-based nor principles-based accounting standards are better able 
to reduce earnings management practices.  
This study may be useful to the FASB and IASB. The discussion on rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards became more important after the US debate concerning 
whether to incorporate IFRS for financial reporting (Peytcheva and Wright, 2010). From an 
earnings management perspective, however, the results do not show a significant difference 
between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards in their ability to prevent 
earnings management. Standard setters may contemplate our experimental results when 
discussing the direction they are heading for developing future accounting standards. 
 
§ 5: Limitations   
As a result of decisions made throughout the development of the experiment, this experiment 
faces some limitations. The first three limitations reflect on the design of the experiment. 
First, we provide participants with only limited information to make their accounting and 
transaction decisions. Even though enriching the study might contribute to creating more 
external valid results, leaving participants with a relatively simple design strengthens causal 
inferences. Second, we use only two positions on the rules-based and principles-based 
continuum, whereas intermediary types could have been chosen as well. Such tests could be 
conducted in future research. Finally, and in line with Hunton et al. (2006), respondents were 
provided with only one incentive, whereas in daily practice financial managers have various 
incentives, and respondents were offered only two ways to manage earnings. It is recognized 
that CFOs in practice may have more than two opportunities for earnings management 
attempts and perceive various incentives both to increase and decrease earnings. Future 
researchers may want to include more distinct incentives and earnings management 
opportunities. 
 In addition to these experimental design issues, two limitations result from the 
manipulation check questions. First, we establish that on average 93 percent of our 
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respondents correctly assessed the manipulation check questions after the experiment. And as 
a result we deem the experimental design successful (see section 3.1). However, since 
different respondents over these three questions made mistakes, the cumulative result is that 
we lost 35 experimental subjects, which is 20 percent of the entire population. On the other 
hand, in terms of age, gender and experience, no significant differences occur between the 
dataset of 140 experimental subjects and the entire population of 175. This result suggests that 
no structural adjustments were made in the data file, influencing the experimental outcomes. 
 A second caveat that needs to be noted relates to the manipulation check questions on 
the accounting standards. We deliberately asked these questions before respondents had taken 
their earnings management decisions. And as we showed in section 3.1 of this chapter, this 
decision was necessary to prevent us from losing 61 experimental subjects. However, by 
asking these two manipulation check questions up front, the subjects had insights into the 
‘other’ treatment levels. In other words, by asking these MC questions before assessing their 
earnings management behavior, participants in the rules-based treatment levels may have 
been aware of the wording in the principles-based treatment, and vice versa. Consequently, 
threats occur related to the internal validity of the experiment. Resulting from the opportunity 
to gain insight into the other treatment levels, subjects may have started to ‘guess’ the 
hypotheses and respond accordingly. This insight into both rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards may have created a demand effect on the dependent variable, which is 
an internal validity limitation. As a result, some caution must be applied when we reflect on 
the experimental results.    
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 Appendix 1a: Snilco Case (in Dutch) including post experimental survey 
questions
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Appendix 1b: Snilco Case (English) including post experimental survey 
 
Introduction  
You are about to participate in a research which contributes to a better understanding of the 
decision-making of financial managers. You will be asked to take decisions, for which there 
are no correct or incorrect answers. Although you normally might prefer to receive additional 
information for such decisions, the purpose is to take decisions based on the presented 
information. Try to answer the questions comparable to decisions during common practice, 
i.e., like you would normally do.  
 
This research exists of three parts. In part one a case is described, which you must read 
carefully and thereafter you must answer the two requested decisions. Afterwards you will be 
asked to answer questions directly related to the case and questions concerning individual/ 
personal characteristics. 
 
The total research will last approximately 15 minutes. To thank you for your cooperation, we 
would like to donate € 5, to a charity fund, which you can indicate at the end of the research. 
On behalf of the charity funds and the research group we would like to thank you for your 
participation in advance. The data are treated confidentially and will be used for scientific 
purposes only. 
 
You are the CFO of Snilco Inc. 
 
Snilco Inc. is a quoted company, which, as a subcontractor, supplies companies with 
manufactured steel aid constructions for machinery. The company generally delivers good 
financial results and has a stable stock exchange rate. 
 
It is December 19, 2009, and you are currently working on the preparation of the companies’ 
financial results of 2009. Following current calculations, net profit of Snilco Inc. will be 
approximately € 50 million. However, as Snilco’s CFO you must first manage two issues. 
 
1. First of all, two months ago, you received a bulletin from the municipality which stated that 
Snilco’s building, with a carrying value of € 25 million, stands on polluted ground. After 
consultation with the auditor and in conformity with the accounting standard you decided to 
request an appraisal office to assess the value of the building.  
 
Appraisal office A is very renowned, has a domestic coverage and already looked after 
several projects for Snilco Inc. in the past. They assess the current value of the building and 
ground as € 15 million, which implies an impairment loss of € 10 million. The results will be 
taken very seriously by the Supervisory Board. However, two months ago, you discovered 
that the neighbors’ building, a fairly comparable building that also stands on polluted ground, 
was sold for € 20 million. Moreover, you have asked a less renowned appraisal office B. They 
have assessed that the current value is € 10 million.  
 
Schematically this could be presented as following: 
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(€ in millions) Appraisal 
office A
Appraisal 
office B
Neighbours' 
building
Carrying value € 25 € 25 € 25 
Assessment current 
value
€ 15 € 10 € 20 
Impairment loss € 10 € 15 € 5  
 
2. Beside the impairment loss decision, you can also choose to sell a portfolio of `available for 
to sale' securities. You may choose between portfolios Y or Z. Portfolio Y holds an unrealized 
gain of € 5 million, whereas portfolio Z holds an unrealized loss of € 5 million. Although it 
will have not a significant influence on the company’s financial result, selling available for 
sale securities implies transaction costs. An explicit remark for this purpose is that you do not 
need the released cash from the selling of the securities to create a balance in your liquidity 
budget. In accordance with the accounting standards, one is not obliged to include an 
unrealized loss in the financial statement, if this loss is expected to be of temporary nature. In 
other words, both the unrealized loss and the unrealized gain will be realized at sale. 
 
As a quoted corporation, it is important to meet the analysts’ and investors’ expectations. 
Year after year Snilco succeeded in meeting analysts’ forecasts, leading to a relatively high 
share price for the company. A high share price is important to remain `healthy'.  
 
The analysts’ consensus forecast for your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million [€ 35 
million].  
 
For audit purposes, it is important that you comply with the financial reporting rules. You 
must take decisions in accordance with these rules. You must use the rules as given in the 
appendix. Click on the following link to open your accounting standard:   
 
1. Based on the above given case description and accessory accounting standard, you are 
asked to assess the impairment loss you consider to include in the annual report. Which 
amount will you include as impairment loss? 
• 10 million (similar to the assessment of appraisal office A) 
• 5 million (similar to the sold neighbours’ building) 
• 15 million (similar to the assessment of appraisal office B) 
2. In addition, you have the opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities. Based on the 
above given case description and accessory accounting standard, what decision will you take 
concerning the selling of your portfolio? 
• Sell portfolio Y (5 million additional gain) 
• Sell portfolio Z (5 million additional loss) 
• Don’t sell 
 
This is the end of the case. 
 
In the next part, questions will be asked related to the case. Subsequently, several questions 
will be asked related to your personality. 
 
Answer the following questions, covering issues concerning the case. 
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• If you would follow the assessment of appraisal office B, this would imply an 
impairment loss of 15 million. Yes/ no/ I have no idea 
• The opportunity to sell ‘available for sale’ securities provided an opportunity to create 
both an additional loss and a gain?  Yes/ no/ I have no idea 
• The analysts’ consensus forecast for your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million. 
 Yes/ no/ I have no idea 
 
Concerning the issue of assessing your impairment loss decision, tick the box of the 
accounting standard that was applicable to you. When determining the impairment loss…. 
A. an entity may consider the outcome of an assessment of an expert. 
B. an entity must primarily adopt the outcome of an assessment of a renowned expert. If 
the company decides to deviate from this assessment, an entity must disclose why they 
have chosen this valuation and what the impact was on the financial results. 
C. I have no idea 
Concerning the issue of selling available for sale securities, tick the box of the accounting 
standard that was applicable to you. 
A. If necessary or wishful to enhance the insights of financial statement users, the 
company is allowed to separately disclose the amount that was removed from equity 
and recognized in profit or loss for the period. An entity may disclose material items 
of income in profit or loss or as a separate component of equity. 
B. The company should at least disclose all material items for the amount that was 
removed from equity and recognized in profit or loss for the period. An entity shall 
disclose material items of income in profit or loss or as a separate component of 
equity. 
C. I have no idea 
a. I expect that selling portfolio Y with an unrealized gain of 5 million would result in an 
increased stock price. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
b. Given the applicable accounting standards, I expect most managers would consider the 
assessment of appraisal office A being most objective? fully agree—fully disagree 
(5-points likert scale) 
c. As referred to in the case, it seems very important as financial manager to meet 
analyst’ concensus forecast?  fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
d. The instructions were clear to me. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
e. I was motivated enough to fulfill the requirements of the case. fully agree—fully 
disagree (5-points likert scale) 
f. The case contained a proper reflection of problems CFOs might encounter in common 
practice. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
 
 
You finished the questions related to the case. Our latter part concerns questions considering 
personality issues. 
 
These answers obviously will be used for scientific purposes only and will be treated 
anonymously. 
 
• How would you describe your current function? Assistant controller/ controller/ 
senior controller/ CFO/ differently, namely…. 
• How many years of experience do you have in a controller function? 
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• How old are you? 
• Gender? (M/F) 
• In what country have you lived most of your life? The Netherlands/ US/ Australia/ 
differently, namely…. 
• Which official titles do you hold?  RC/RA/RE/dr./ MSc./ BSc./ differently, 
namely…. 
 
• How much experience do you have with so called ‘principles-based’ accounting 
standards? (PB is disclosed) very much—very little (5-points likert scale) 
• How much experience do you have with so called ‘rules-based’ accounting standards? 
(RB is disclosed) very much—very little (5-points likert scale) 
• Have you recently, in your daily practice, considered impairment loss decisions? 
(Y/N) 
• Have you recently, in your daily practice, considered decisions concerning selling 
‘available for sale’ securities? (Y/N) 
 
We would now like to ask you to respond to the following statements: 
• If earnings management decisions remain within certain boundaries, I don’t consider 
them as a problem. fully agree—fully disagree (5-points likert scale) 
• Do you think earnings management decisions are taken in common practice? (Y/N) 
• If you would engage in earnings management, would you rather use accounting policy 
choices, or real transactions (postpone R&D, adjust contracts) to meet the required 
results? Or don’t you expect any differences? ‘APC/ real transactions/ comparable 
amount for both’ 
• If companies use earnings management techniques, such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, how easy would it be for users of an annual 
report to detect these techniques? Very easy—very hard (5-points likert scale)  
• If companies use earnings management techniques, such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, what would be the effect on the companies’ 
stock price? Decreases enormously -- Increases enormously (5-points likert scale) 
• If companies use earnings management techniques, such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, what would be the effect on the companies’ 
reputation? Aggravates enormously -- Improves enormously (5-points likert scale) 
• Finally, in your expertise as financial manager, would you expect rules-based or 
principles-based accounting standards to be used more in practice to engage in 
earnings management? Or don’t you expect any differences? Rules-based/ 
principles-based/ comparable amount for rules-based and principles-based 
 
This is the end of the research. We would like to thank you again for your cooperation. These 
answers will be used for scientific purposes only. As stated earlier, we would like to donate € 
5, - to a charity fund, which you can indicate below.  
 
On behalf of the charity we would like to thank you for your participation in advance. 
 Clini clowns/ WWF/ Unicef/ Amnesty international/ something else, namely…. 
 
Thank You!! 
You can finish the research by pushing on the ‘send’-box. 
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Appendix 2: Accounting standaard m.b.t. impairment verlies (principles-
based) 
1. Bij de beoordeling of er indicaties zijn die wijzen op een mogelijke bijzondere 
waardevermindering van een actief, dient een onderneming ten minste de volgende indicaties 
in aanmerking te nemen:  
(a) gedurende de verslagperiode is de marktwaarde van een actief beduidend meer gedaald 
dan verwacht zou mogen worden als gevolg van het verstrijken van de tijd of normaal 
gebruik;  
(b) er zijn duidelijke aanwijzingen van economische veroudering van of fysieke schade aan 
een actief.  
2. Wanneer de opbrengstwaarde van het actief kleiner is dan de boekwaarde van het actief 
dient het actief tegen opbrengstwaarde te worden gewaardeerd. Het verschil tussen de 
opbrengstwaarde en de boekwaarde dient als impairment verlies ten laste van het resultaat te 
worden gebracht.  
(a) Als er voor een actief geen bindende verkoopovereenkomst is, noch een actieve markt, 
wordt de opbrengstwaarde gebaseerd op de beste beschikbare informatie om te komen tot het 
bedrag dat een onderneming op de balansdatum zou kunnen verkrijgen. Bij de bepaling van 
deze waarde kan door de onderneming onder andere rekening gehouden worden met een door 
de onderneming geraadpleegd expert ten behoeve van de waardering.  
Accounting standaard m.b.t. 'available for sale' effecten  
1. Indien dit wenselijk of noodzakelijk is voor het inzicht van de gebruiker van de 
jaarrekening kan de onderneming afzonderlijk melding maken van de winsten en verliezen op 
'available for sale' effecten die in het boekjaar door verkoop zijn ontstaan, en daarmee werden 
overgeboekt van het eigen vermogen naar de winst-en-verliesrekening. Afzonderlijke 
presentatie kan geschieden in de winst-en-verliesrekening of op het mutatieoverzicht eigen 
vermogen.  
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Translation: Accounting standard with regard to impairment loss  
 
1. In assessing whether there is any indication that an asset may be impaired, an entity shall 
consider the following situations:  
 
(a) during the period, an asset’s market value has declined significantly more than would be 
expected as a result of the passage of time or normal use;  
 
(b) evidence is available of obsolescence or physical damage of an asset.  
 
2. When the fair value less costs to sell is lower than its carrying amount, the assets must be 
impaired to its’ fair value less costs to sell value. The difference between the fair value less 
costs to sell and its’ carrying amount must be included as impairment loss in the profit and 
loss account.  
 
(b) If there is no binding sale agreement or active market for an asset, fair value less costs to 
sell is based on the best information available to reflect the amount that would arise from an 
arm’s length transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties, after deducting the costs of 
disposal. In determining this amount, an entity may consider the outcome of an assessment of 
an expert. 
Accounting standard with regard to available for sale impact  
1. If necessary or wishful to enhance the insights of financial statement users, the company is 
allowed to separately disclose the amount that was removed from equity and recognized in 
profit or loss for the period. An entity may disclose material items of income in profit or loss 
or as a separate component of equity.  
 
(Principles-based, obviously not mentioned when participating in the actual research) 
 138
Appendix 3: Accounting standaard m.b.t. impairment verlies (rules-based) 
1. Bij de beoordeling of er indicaties zijn die wijzen op een mogelijke bijzondere 
waardevermindering van een actief, dient een onderneming ten minste de volgende indicaties 
in aanmerking te nemen:  
(a) gedurende de verslagperiode is de marktwaarde van een actief beduidend meer gedaald 
dan verwacht zou mogen worden als gevolg van het verstrijken van de tijd of normaal 
gebruik;  
(b) er zijn duidelijke aanwijzingen van economische veroudering van of fysieke schade aan 
een actief.  
2. Wanneer de opbrengstwaarde van het actief kleiner is dan de boekwaarde van het actief 
dient het actief tegen opbrengstwaarde te worden gewaardeerd. Het verschil tussen de 
opbrengstwaarde en de boekwaarde dient als impairment verlies ten laste van het resultaat te 
worden gebracht.  
(a) Als er voor een actief geen bindende verkoopovereenkomst is, noch een actieve markt, 
wordt de opbrengstwaarde gebaseerd op de beste beschikbare informatie om te komen tot het 
bedrag dat een onderneming op de balansdatum zou kunnen verkrijgen. Bij de bepaling van 
de waardering van het actief wordt in beginsel de waarde van een door de onderneming 
geraadpleegd gerenommeerd expert ten behoeve van waardering overgenomen. Bij afwijking 
van deze waarde dient in de toelichting van de jaarrekening te worden uiteengezet waarom 
voor deze waardering is gekozen en wat de impact is geweest voor de jaarrekening als geheel.  
Accounting standaard m.b.t. 'available for sale' effecten  
1. De onderneming dient afzonderlijk melding te maken van de winsten en verliezen op 
'available for sale' effecten die in het boekjaar door verkoop zijn ontstaan, en daarmee werden 
overgeboekt van het eigen vermogen naar de winst-en-verliesrekening. Afzonderlijke 
presentatie geschiedt in de winst-en-verliesrekening of op het mutatieoverzicht eigen 
vermogen.  
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Translation: Accounting standard with regard to impairment loss  
 
1. In assessing whether there is any indication that an asset may be impaired, an entity shall 
consider the following situations:  
 
(a) during the period, an asset’s market value has declined significantly more than would be 
expected as a result of the passage of time or normal use;  
 
(b) evidence is available of obsolescence or physical damage of an asset.  
 
2. When the fair value less costs to sell is lower than its carrying amount, the assets must be 
impaired to its’ fair value less costs to sell value. The difference between the fair value less 
costs to sell and its’ carrying amount must be included as impairment loss in the profit and 
loss account.  
 
(b) If there is no binding sale agreement or active market for an asset, fair value less costs to 
sell is based on the best information available to reflect the amount that would arise from an 
arm’s length transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties, after deducting the costs of 
disposal. In determining this amount, an entity must primarily adopt the outcome of an 
assessment of a renowned expert. If the company decides to deviate from this assessment, an 
entity must disclose why they have chosen this valuation and what the impact was on the 
financial results. 
Accounting standard with regard to available for sale impact  
1. The company should at least disclose all material items for the amount that was removed 
from equity and recognized in profit or loss for the period. An entity shall disclose material 
items of income in profit or loss or as a separate component of equity. 
 
 
 
(Rules-based, obviously not mentioned when participating in the actual research) 
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Appendix 4: Experimental results before elimination (N= 175) 
 
Table 3b: 2x2 operational experimental design (including number of participants) 
 Rules-based (adj IAS 36 
and adj IAS 32/39) 
Principles-based (adj IAS 
36 and adj IAS 32/39) 
Analysts’ forecast 45 44 41 
Analysts’ forecast 35 48 42 
 
Table 4b: Decisions (impairment loss and security sale decisions) 
Impairment loss Appraiser A Appraiser B Total
(-10) (-15)
PB (45) 31 0 10 41
PB (35) 35 4 3 42
Total 66 4 13 83
RB (45) 37 1 6 44
RB (35) 42 4 2 48
Total 79 5 8 92
Security sale No sale Z Y Total
0 (-5) (+5)
PB (45) 28 1 12 41
PB (35) 36 3 3 42
Total 64 4 15 83
RB (45) 27 1 16 44
RB (35) 35 8 5 48
Total 62 9 21 92
Neighbours' 
building (-5)
 
 
 
 
Table 5b: Net earnings 
 Rules-based  Principles-based  Effect analysts’ 
forecast 
Analysts’ forecast 45 42.27 (2.94) 42.56 (2.98) 42.41 (2.95) 
Analysts’ forecast 35 39.47 (3.14) 39.88 (2.81) 39.67 (2.98) 
Effect Accounting standards 40.82 (3.34) 41.20 (3.18)  
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Table 6b: Anova analysis 
 
Panel A
t-statistics Sign.
Accounting Decisions:                                       
20.48% (PB)> 14.13 % (RB) (one sided t-test) 1.111 0.134
Transaction decisions:                                      
32.61% (RB) > 22.89% (PB) (one sided t-test) -1.438 0.076*
Transaction decisions- Accounting Decisions:    
RB > PB (one sided t-test) -1.542 0.053*
Panel B
Analysts' forecast € 45 million t-statistics Sign.
PB (45) > non EM 40 (one sided t-test) 5.496 0.000***
RB (45) > non EM 40 (one sided t-test) 5.120 0.000***
PB (45) > RB (45) (two sided t-test) 0.448 0.655
Analysts' forecast € 35 million t-statistics Sign.
PB (35) < non EM 40 (one sided t-test) -0,274 0.393
RB (35) < non EM 40 (one sided t-test) -1.151 0.128
PB (35) > RB (35) (two sided t-test) 0.636 0.526
*,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively  
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Chapter 5: Results post experimental survey 
 
§ 1:  Introduction 
Resulting from the limitations of experimental methods, Libby and Seybert (2009) suggest 
using a multi-method approach to examine questions related to earnings management. In Chapter 
3 we extensively elaborated on this issue and decided to include a post experimental survey and 
in-depth interviews in addition to the experiment. The survey in particular, complements the 
experiment in two areas: 1) reflecting on personal characteristics such as age, gender and 
experience; providing an opportunity to nuance experimental results found; serving as control 
variables and 2) by asking additional questions directly related to our developed hypotheses. This 
multi-method design contributes to the validity of this study (Libby and Seybert, 2009) (also see 
Figure 1, Chapter 3).  
In this chapter we discuss the results of our post experimental survey. The post 
experimental survey is included in appendix 1 of Chapter 4 (both in Dutch as well as the 
English translation). We start this chapter with the demographic data of our respondents. Then 
we focus on case related experience and case related questions. We continue with verifying 
respondents’ expectations concerning earnings management effects. Section 6 discusses 
respondents’ perception related to the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards on earnings management; reflecting on the developed hypotheses. Section 7 reflects on 
the relationship between the results from the post experimental survey and the experiment: to 
what extent does the post experimental survey adds value to this study. This chapter ends with 
summary and conclusions. 
 
§ 2: Demographic data 
As mentioned before, 175 ‘Register Controllers’ (RC’s) connected to the ‘Vereniging van 
Registercontrollers’ (VRC) participated in our post experimental survey. Combined with our 
experimental results, the survey part contributes to creating more external valid results 
concerning CFO’s actions and perceptions. Of the 175 participants, 124 participants (71%) 
currently work as a controller/CFO. We start with very general questions concerning age, 
experience, gender, current job title, official titles, and country. The demographics of our 
respondents are displayed in Table 1.  
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Number Percent
Formal Certifications held by participants
RC 175 100%
RA 17 10%
MSc. 128 73%
other: 26 15%
Participants employed as controller/ CFO 124 71%
Male 151 86%
Female 24 14%
Mean* SD
Average business experience 10.8 5.6
Age 40.7 6.8
* based on Anova testing, response means do not significantly differ across treatment levels
 Table 1: Demographic data 
 
The data concerning the demographics of our respondents seem clear; 100% of our 
respondents hold a RC-title. We recruited these participants in cooperation with the VRC. 
People can only become a member of the VRC when they graduated as RC. In addition, 10% 
of our respondents have earned a RA title as well. 73% of our respondents graduated at one of 
our universities. From the ‘other’ category often returning titles were ‘Engineering’ titles or 
‘Executive Masters in Finance and Control’ (EMFC). As shown in Table 1, 71% works either 
as controller or as CFO. 43 respondents (25%) currently work as a CFO, whereas 46% hold a 
job as controller or senior controller. Of the remaining 29% often returning answers were 
‘financial consultant’, ‘risk manager’ or ‘CEO’. Concerning the gender division; 86% of our 
respondents were male, and 14% female, respectively.  
In addition to this information we verified our respondents’ experience and age. For 
the post experimental survey we used the same respondents as we did for our experiment.50 
Unless mentioned differently, our post experimental results do not significantly differ among 
(experimental) treatment levels between rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards. 
                                                 
50The respondents used for our post experimental survey are the same subjects that participated in the 
experiment. Based on the mistakes made in answering the manipulation check questions, however, we 
eliminated 35 respondents to analyze our experimental results. The remaining 140 respondents do not 
significantly differ from the original 175 respondents in terms of age, gender, education and experience, 
indicating that no structural adjustments were made in the data file. These demographics are included in Table 
1b (Appendix). 
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The average business experience is 10.8 year, with a relatively high standard deviation 
of 5.6 years. The average business experience is normally distributed, deviating between 1 
minimum and 32 years of experience maximum. We see a comparable division related to age. 
Our respondents differ in age between 25 years old and 63 years old; resulting in an average 
of 40.7 years and a standard deviation of 6.8 years. Age shows a normal distributed 
partition.51 
 
§ 3: Case related experience 
In our previous chapters we explained why it is important to have experiences managers for 
executing our experiment. Our goal is to peer into the minds of CFOs, and experience might 
have a significant influence on the case outcomes (Bonner and Lewis, 1990). After the 
demographic information we therefore examine the case related experience of our 
respondents. These results may contribute to complementing our experimental findings 
providing nuances related to practical experience and experimental outcomes; increasing the 
validity of our study.  
As such, we started asking respondents about their experience with rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards. Moreover, we asked two questions related to their 
recent experience with both impairment loss decisions and selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities. Since we discussed these questions thoroughly in Chapter 3, we now only shortly 
mention the questions and items to improve readability.   
• How much experience do you have with so called ‘principles-based’ accounting 
standards?  
• How much experience do you have with so called ‘rules-based’ accounting standards? 
• Have you recently, in your daily practice, considered impairment loss decisions?  
• Have you recently, in your daily practice, considered decisions concerning selling 
‘available for sale’ securities?  
Results are displayed in Table 2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 For this entire chapter we tested whether there would have been an effect to discuss results based on the n = 
140 batch we used for the experiment. No significant adjustments would occur. Moreover, we discuss the results 
in this chapter as if this batch was totally independent from the experiment. As such, we decided to continue with 
the entire batch of n = 175. 
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Case related experience (n=175)
 
   
 Mean Stand Dev. 
Experience with principles-based standards* 2.66 0.96 
Experience with rules-based standards* 3.39 1.00 
Experience with impairment loss decisions** 0.52 0.50 
Experience with selling ‘available for sale’ securities** 0.11 0.32 
* 1 = very much, 5 = very little  ** 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
Table 2: Case related experience 
 
The first two questions refer to respondents’ experience with rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards. Our respondents have significantly (t = 9.778; p < 0.01) more 
experience with principles-based accounting standards (mean = 2.65) than with rules-based 
standards (mean = 3.39). When we consider the 1 to 5 Likert-scale, rules-based experience 
scores significantly lower than neutral, whereas principles-based experience result in a 
significantly higher than neutral score of 3 (both p< 0.01). As Appendix 2b shows that no 
significant differences were found between respondents in the rules-based or principles-based 
treatment levels; suggesting a proper randomization among treatment levels. 
 The results concerning rules-based and principles-based experience may come as no 
surprise. All respondents were native Dutch and educated in the Netherlands. Dutch people 
have a history of working in a principles-based environment,
52
 in which the ‘true and fair 
view‘ concept and override is embedded in daily auditors’ practice. This override allows 
managers and auditors to deviate from accounting standards, if in their view the financial 
report results in better representation of the generally accepted norms considering capital and 
earnings. Furthermore, original Dutch GAAP as described in the ‘Richtlijnen voor de 
Jaarverslaggeving’ are directives instead of lawful obligations, and Dutch GAAP assumes a 
substance over form view (ter Hoeven, 2005). Dutch auditors and Dutch financial reporting, 
on the other hand, did become more rules-based oriented after the introduction of IFRS in 
2005. 
In addition to respondents experience with rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards, we test their recent experience in the area of ‘impairment loss 
                                                 
52 In addition to the Netherlands, countries like UK and Australia can be mentioned as historically principles-
based. In these countries ‘true and fair override’ and professional judgment are important fundamentals for their 
accounting practice Bennett et al. (2006).  
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decisions’ or selling ‘available for sale’ financial assets. Respondents with recent experience 
may have been less sensitive to the adjustments made in the accounting standards given. 52% 
of our respondents have had recent experience with impairment loss decisions, whereas only 
11% have had recent experience selling available for sale securities. No significant 
differences were found among treatment levels. 
The complementary value of experience (measured in the post experimental survey) in 
relation to the experiment relies in examining the influential effects of recent experience on 
earnings management. The complementary value in particular will be discussed in section 7. 
For now, we have tested the correlations respondents’ experience and their experimental 
results. Our results show no significant correlations between recent experience with 
impairment loss decisions and the impairment loss (accounting) decision in the experiment (p 
= 0.873). Turning to the statistical significance of our correlation between recent experience 
selling ‘available for sale’ securities and the transaction decision in our experiment, we find 
the estimates are somewhat imprecise, only reaching significance at the 10% level (estimate = 
0.136; p = 0.073). This estimate of 0.136 means that subjects with recent experience, more 
often decided to engage in earnings management by selling the portfolio of financial assets.  
 In conclusion, our respondents have significantly more experience with principles-
based accounting standards compared to their experience with rules-based standards. And 
although recent experience might theoretically (inter alia Bonner and Lewis, 1990) have an 
influence on decisions taken in the experiment; there is no significant relation between recent 
impairment loss decisions (in daily practice) and the impairment loss decisions (accounting 
decision) in the experiment. The correlation between recent experience (in daily practice) 
selling financial assets and the transaction decision in the experiment only reaches 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
§ 4: Case related questions 
To further increase insights into our experimental results, and in line with Hunton et al. (2006) 
we analyzed subjects’ beliefs concerning case related questions. These questions examine 
their assumptions influencing their decisions taken in the experiment, such as the importance 
of analysts’ expectations. Since there are no perfect answers, we included a 5-points Likert 
scale rather than a yes/no distinction. The closed answer categories are ‘fully disagree—fully 
agree’ (5-points Likert scale). The questions are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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• Appraisal office A being most objective 
• Important of meeting analysts’ consensus forecast 
• Clearness of instructions 
• Motivation 
• Case as proper reflection of CFO problems 
 
The results are displayed in Table 3. 
Case related questions (1 = fully disagree, 5 = fully agree) 
(n=175) 
  
 Mean Stand Dev. Sign. ª 
Appraisal office A most objective 3.58 1.39 0.000** 
Importance following analysts’ forecast 2.94 1.27 0.553 
Instructions clear 4.33 1.06 0.000** 
Motivation 4.38 0.97 0.000** 
Proper reflection of CFO problems 4.19 0.97 0.000** 
ª Significance is based on comparing the means of the total sample with the neutral 
situation of 3 (one sample t-test). 
*,** significant at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
Table 3: Case related questions 
 
The first question indicates what respondents perceive as ‘economic reality’; to verify the non 
earnings management situation of the case. Since ‘economic reality’ remains socially 
constructed and earnings management refers to deliberately influencing financial outcomes, 
deviating from this economic reality, we enclosed this question to ‘set the norm’. In other 
words, with this question we verify whether our respondents accept the assessment of 
appraisal office A as the non earnings management situation. We statistically tested the 
significance by comparing the result with the average score of 3, using a ‘one sample T-test’. 
Testing the result against the midpoint of the scale is comparably used in the study of Hunton 
et al. (2006).  
Although the mean is significantly higher than the neutral 3, the data is limited 
convincing and needs further investigation. To increase insights into our experimental results, 
we therefore first examine the correlation between the questions whether appraiser A is most 
objective (post experimental survey) and whether respondents decide to take an accounting 
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decision (in the experiment). Our results show a negative correlation of -0.300 (p< 0.01). This 
means that on average, respondents that have a lower acceptance of appraiser A being most 
objective (in the post experimental survey), more often decided to engage in earnings 
management through the accounting decision (in the experiment). One of the explanations 
may be that these respondents do not accept appraisal office A being most objective due to 
‘substance over form’ reasoning. These respondents may argue that the sold neighbours’ 
building may be equally important as indicator of the economic value of the owned building. 
The question then remains whether our respondents engaged in earnings management. 
When the respondents accept appraisal office A being most objective, most often respondents 
decided to take an impairment loss decision of € 10 million, in line with appraisal office A; 
and hence not engaging in earnings management. However, when respondents do not accept 
appraisal office A being most objective, choosing an impairment loss of only € 5 million, in 
line with the sold neighbours’ building, their decision does not reflect respondents’ earnings 
management definition. In other words, if in their view the sold neighbours’ building 
represents ‘economic reality’ rather than the assessment of Appraisal office A, and in this line 
of reasoning these respondents decide to take a decision to incorporate a € 5 million 
impairment loss, the level of earnings management reduces. On the other hand, on average, 
most respondents accept Appraisal office A representing the non earnings management 
indicator. 
 Still interesting, however, is to find out whether there is a significant influence 
between respondents in the rules-based and principles-based settings. These results are shown 
in Appendix 3b. An important difference between both accounting standards is that we 
explicitly include ‘renowned’ in the rules-based standard. This phrase is comparable to the 
case description and emphasizes the ‘form over substance’ discussions previously mentioned 
for rules-based standards. When we examine the results, there is a significant difference of p< 
0.01 between respondents in the rules-based setting (mean = 3.86) and respondents in the 
principles-based setting (mean = 3.28). This means that participants in the rules-based setting 
more strongly accept appraiser A being most objective due to the ‘form over substance’ 
reasoning in their accounting standard, whereas participants in the principles-based setting 
more strongly accept ‘substance over form’ reasoning; hence, this latter group is less likely to 
accept appraiser A as the one correct indication of economic substance. 
 
In addition to this first question, and also to improve insight into the experimental results, we 
then indicate the perceived importance of meeting analysts’ forecast. In the experiment we 
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included analysts’ forecast high (€ 45 million) and low (€ 35 million) to influence subjects’ 
decision making. If respondents do not accept this importance (as measured in the post 
experimental survey), our included incentive (in the experiment) seems less useful. Although 
most respondents choose 4 (partly agree), the average score does not significantly differ from 
3 (see Table 3). No significant differences were found between the rules-based and principles-
based setting (p = 0.976) (see Appendix Table 3b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Libby and Seybert (2009) stress the importance of including appropriate incentives when 
conducting an accounting experiment to increase internal validity. In line with Marques 
(2010), including analysts’ consensus forecast provided us with a neutral yet relevant 
opportunity to influence CFO’s decision making. The description regarding analysts’ 
consensus forecast included in our experiment is presented above. We tried to emphasize the 
importance of analysts’ forecast by mentioning this importance explicitly and change the 
colour of this forecast. The limited average exception (2.94) of the importance of analysts’ 
forecast, however, might explain the relatively few earnings management decisions that are 
taken.  
 Captivatingly here is to test whether results differ between analysts’ forecast € 45 
million (High) treatment levels and analysts’ forecast € 35 million (Low). Our experimental 
results namely suggest that the AF high more strongly worked as stimulus to engage in 
earnings management than AF low. When analysts’ forecast ‘high’ (€ 45 million) is involved, 
the average result of € 42.85 million significantly (t = 8.555; p < 0.01) differs from the non 
earnings management position of 40. On the other hand, our participants do not significantly 
engage in earnings management in the experiment when they receive analysts’ forecast ‘low’ 
(€ 35 million) as incentive to decrease earnings. Surprisingly, however, this difference in the 
extent of earnings management applications cannot be explained by the perceived importance 
of analysts’ forecast as measured in the post experimental survey. The average exception of 
analysts’ forecast in the ‘high’ treatment levels shows an average importance of 3.05, whereas 
the average importance in the ‘low’ treatment reaches to 2.84. These results do not 
significantly differ (p= 0.293). Hence, although earnings management applications differ 
As a quoted corporation, it is important to meet the analysts’ and investors’ expectations. Year 
after year Snilco succeeded in meeting analysts’ forecast, leading to a relatively high share 
price for the company. A high share price is important to remain ‘healthy'.  
 
The analysts’ consensus forecast for your company’s 2009 earnings is € 45 million [€ 
35 million]. 
 
 150
between analysts’ forecast ‘high’ and ‘low’ in the experiment, perceived importance of 
analysts’ forecast is comparable for the post experimental survey.  
 
In addition to these first two questions, we verify whether respondents were motivated 
enough, whether they found the case clear enough and whether or not this was a valid 
example of potential problems CFO’s might encounter. These latter three questions may be 
important to control for, when reflecting on the experimental outcomes. These questions are 
in line with the paper of Hunton et al. (2006), and results are included in Table 3. The three 
questions even have a significantly higher score than 4. Based on these results we believe that 
the case was clear enough, respondents were motivated enough and the case very much seems 
a proper reflection of current CFO problems. For the specific complementary value of these 
questions in relation to the experiment we discuss the correlations in section 7.  
To summarize, in this part we discussed case related questions. These questions are 
important to create a better understanding of the experimental results found. To finish this part 
we may conclude that on average our respondents agree with appraisal office A being most 
objective, which is important to set the non earnings management situation in our 
experimental setting. This result is significantly stronger in the rules-based environment than 
in the principles-based environment, as respondents were influenced by the phrase 
‘renowned’ in the rules-based accounting standard. Moreover, our results suggest that not all 
our respondents deliberately engage in earnings management when deviating from appraisal 
office A; the non earnings management situation. Furthermore, we examine the importance of 
meeting analysts’ forecast. The perceived importance of this incentive was limited, leading to 
a potential explanation of the relatively few earnings management decisions taken in the 
experiment. No problems occurred when measuring the motivation of our respondents, the 
clearness of our case and the validity of our CFO problem. 
 
§ 5: Earnings management effects 
Further complementing the experimental results found, we investigate participants’ beliefs 
underlying their earnings management choices. In their debriefing analysis, Hunton et al. 
(2006) measure effects of earnings management on companies’ reputation, and companies’ 
stock price. Moreover, Hunton et al. (2006) test the detectability of earnings management 
applications. As we expect comparable effects in our study, based on an analogy between 
transparency (Hunton’s study) and rules-based standards in this study, we included these 
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questions in the post experimental survey. We elaborated on this issue in Chapter 3. In short, 
scaled at a 5-points Likert scale, these questions are: 
1. If companies use earnings management techniques such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, how obvious would it be for statement readers 
to detect? (1 = very easy; 5 hardly) 
2. If companies use earnings management techniques such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, what might be the effect on the company’s 
stock price? (1 = strongly negative; 5 strongly positive) 
3. If companies use earnings management techniques such as selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or impairment loss decisions, what might be the effect on the company’s 
reputation? (1 = strongly negative; 5 strongly positive) 
 
Table 4a displays the results for these questions. 
Earnings management effects (n=175)   
 Rules-based Principles-based Sign.* 
Earnings management and detection 3.25 3.42 0.242 
Earnings management and company’s 
stock price 
2.99 2.98 0.915 
Earnings management and company’s 
reputation 
2.58 2.69 0.382 
*Significance is based on comparing the means of the rules-based and principles-based 
treatment levels 
Table 4a: earnings management effects 
 
In line with Hunton et al. (2006) we decided to compare respondents between rules-based and 
principles-based settings, rather than compare results with the neutral average of three. We 
come back to the average results later on in this section. Contrary to our expectations, 
however, and differing from the results of Hunton et al. (2006), our results do not show 
significant differences between respondents in the rules-based and the principles-based 
environment. And also when using a simple univariate analysis, no significant results were 
found in relation to both types of accounting standards, analysts’ forecast or interaction 
effects (not included in the table). We can come up with three distinct explanations 
concerning the differences between Hunton’s (2006) study and our post experimental results.  
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First, drawing on the theoretical concepts of ‘transparency’ versus ‘rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards’, we can conclude that this relationship is definitely not 
1-on-1; in other words, studying types of accounting standards is more comprehensive and 
complex than solely focusing on transparency. Although we expect rules-based standards to 
create more transparent reports resulting in a better detectability of earnings management 
(Hunton et al, 2006), the complexity of rules-based standards (Nelson, 2003) might even 
reduce transparency of annual reports; resulting in a decreased detectability of earnings 
management. Second, the results in our experiment were less strong than in Hunton’s 
experiment. For instance, we did not find significant differences between rules-based and 
principles-based and the level of earnings management (see Chapter 4) in the experiment, 
whereas Hunton finds significant differences when comparing the transparency formats. 
Consistently, we do not find significant differences between participant in the rules-based and 
principles-based treatment levels when reflecting on earnings management effects in the post 
experimental survey. Finally, we use the post experimental survey as a relatively autonomous 
part of the study, whereas the questions in Hunton’s 2006 study were part of the debriefing 
analysis. Hence, the questions in Hunton’s study were asked directly after the experiment, still 
strongly influenced by the experiment. The questions in our survey, on the other hand, were 
asked at the end, and consequently the relationship with the experiment is less strong. 
Since no significant differences were found between respondents in the rules-based 
and principles-based settings, we autonomously discuss the results of these items, based on 
the means of our entire population (N = 175). These results are displayed in Table 4b. 
 
Earnings management effects (n=175)   
 Mean Stand Dev. Sign. ª 
Earnings management and detection (1 = very 
easy, 5 hardly) 
3.33 0.97 0.000** 
Earnings management and company’s stock 
price (1 = strongly negative; 5 strongly positive) 
2.98 0.82 0.782 
Earnings management and company’s reputation 
(1 = strongly negative; 5 strongly positive) 
2.63 0.83 0.000** 
ª Significance is based on comparing the means of the total sample with the neutral 
situation of 3 (one sample t-test). *,** significant at the 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
Table 4b: Earnings management effects  
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The first question refers to the detectability of impairment losses and selling ‘available for 
sale’ securities for engaging in earnings management. The average score of 3.33, with a 
standard deviation of 0.97, results in a significant difference of p < 0.01 compared to the test 
value of 3. This result shows that our respondents believe that detecting earnings management 
is relatively hard when practitioners either use a technique of selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities or using impairment loss decisions to engage in earnings management. Our second 
question relates to the influence of earnings management on companies’ stock price. Our 
respondents believe that if companies use earnings management techniques, such as selling 
‘available for sale’ securities or impairment loss decisions, this would have a limited effect on 
stock price. The average result of 2.98 with a standard deviation of 0.82 does not significantly 
differ from our test value of 3 (p = 0.782). Our third question in this part tests whether 
earnings management techniques, such as impairment loss decisions and selling ‘available for 
sale’ securities, have an influence on companies’ reputation. The average mean for this 
question is 2.63 with a standard deviation of 0.83; resulting in a significant difference of p < 
0.01 compared to the neutral test value of 3 (see Table 4b). This means that our respondents 
believe that applying earnings management would most definitely harm companies’ 
reputation.  
Essentially, in line with Hunton et al. (2006) we expected that the nature of accounting 
standards, combined with earnings management, would have an effect on detectability, 
companies’ reputation and companies’ share price. Since no significant differences occurred 
between respondents in the rules-based and principles-based environment (see Table 4a), we 
discussed our results based on the entire population (N = 175). Our respondents believe that 
applying earnings management could harm companies’ reputation. Consequently, respondents 
may anticipate, not engaging in earnings management (in the experiment) to overcome 
reputation problems. On the other hand, our respondents also believe that using earnings 
management techniques, such as impairment loss decisions are relatively hard to detect by 
external stakeholder; which, contrary to the reputation influence, might motivate CFOs to 
engage in this type of earnings management. Finally, our respondents believe that earnings 
management has limited influence on companies’ stock price.  
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§ 6: Accounting standards and earnings management 
In Figure 1 (Chapter 3) we included a green block and green lines to mirror the contribution 
of our post experimental survey. The green block refers to the case related questions, 
demographic questions and subjects’ beliefs underlying their choices as we discussed in the 
previous four sections. These questions contributed to improving insights among the 
experimental results. We also further explore these results in section 7 when discussing the 
complementary value of the post experimental survey in relation to the experiment. In 
addition, the green lines in Figure 1 (Chapter 3) refer to autonomous questions measuring the 
influence of accounting standards on earnings management. These questions are not directly 
related to the experiment, but autonomously improve our insights with regard to the 
hypotheses. The multi-method design contributes to creating more external valid results as 
suggested by Libby and Seybert (2009). When the experimental results and post experimental 
results lead to similar conclusions, this multi-method approach would strengthen the 
expectation that the experimental results hold in the ‘real’ world. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the questions are as follows, measured at a 5-point Likert scale ‘fully agree—fully disagree’: 
1. Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management with unstructured 
transactions53 in a principles-based setting than in a rules-based setting. (1 = fully 
agree; 5 = fully disagree) (H1a) 
2. Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management with structured 
transactions54 in a rules-based setting than in a principles-based setting. (1 = fully 
agree; 5 = fully disagree) (H1b) 
3. Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management in a rules-based setting 
than in a principles-based setting. (1 = fully agree; 5 = fully disagree) (H2)  
 
Appendix Table 5b shows that no significant differences appeared between our rules-based 
and principles-based subject groups, using independent samples t-tests. We therefore again 
discuss the answers to these questions based on the average results of entire population. These 
results are included in Table 5. 
 
 
                                                 
53 * examples of unstructured transactions are: estimates, substance over form reasoning, convince the auditor 
the validity of management’s interpretation (Gibbins, 2002). 
54 * examples of structured transactions are: not shipping a product that is available for shipment because the 
quarter had already reached budgeted level; writing contract for revolving credit facility to avoid current liability 
recognition; hastening delivery of materials  (Nelson et al., 2002). 
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Earnings management and accounting standards (n=175) 
(1 = fully agree, 5 = fully disagree) 
  
    
 Mean Stand Dev. Sign. ª 
Accounting decisions and principles-based 
standards 
2.65 1.15 0.000** 
Transaction decisions and rules-based standards 2.66 1.02 0.000** 
More earnings management in rules-based 
environment 
3.17 1.10 0.035* 
ª Significance is based on comparing the means of the total sample with the neutral 
situation of 3 (one sample t-test). 
*,** significant at the 5%, 1% level, respectively 
Table 5: Earnings management and accounting standards  
 
The results found on our first two questions statistically confirm our expectations. Firstly, 
related to hypothesis 1a and in line with Nelson et al. (2002), our empirical results show that 
principles-based accounting standards induce managers to apply accounting decisions for 
engaging in earnings management. Our empirical average of 2.65 significantly deviates from 
3; in line with hypothesis 1a. With relatively vague standards, excluding bright line thresholds 
and extensive disclosure, our respondents believe this would induce opportunities to discuss 
substance over form, or accounting estimates with their auditor to engage in earnings 
management. Only 8% of our subjects fully disagree with the assumption that accounting 
decisions may be used more often in a principles-based environment. Nevertheless, these 
results strongly confirm our theoretical expectation of hypothesis 1a. 
For the second item we find comparable results. Hypothesis 1b discusses the premises 
that rules-based accounting standards induce managers to engage in earnings management 
through transaction decisions. Table 5 shows an average result of 2.66 and a standard 
deviation of 1.02. This result is significantly different (p<0.01) from 3; suggesting that our 
post experimental survey results confirm our experimental results found. Only 6 percent of 
our respondents fully disagree with our premises that managers are more likely to use 
transaction structuring opportunities in a rules-based setting than in a principles-based setting. 
Hence, our respondents are convinced that adding requirements and bright line thresholds 
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improves the opportunities to use transaction decisions such as contract adjustments for 
engaging in earnings management.  
Our final question in the post experimental survey relates to hypothesis 2: Managers 
engage more in earnings management in a rules-based environment than in a principles-based 
environment. In our post experimental survey we measure this premises by asking 
respondents whether they expect more earnings management in a rules-based environment. 
The result of 3.18 significantly differs from our neutral test value of 3 (using a 5-point Likert 
scale). This means that our respondents, on average, do not agree with the proposition that 
rules-based standards induce earnings management compared to principles-based accounting 
standards. Based on this question, however, we cannot conclude whether this means they 
actually prefer a rules-based environment for diminishing earnings management. To draw this 
conclusion, we must have included an analogous question referring to the principles-based 
environment; ‘Managers are more likely to attempt earnings management in a principles-
based setting than in a rules-based setting (1 = fully agree; 5 = fully disagree)’ Another 
opportunity would have been asking respondents which type of accounting standards in their 
view would induce earnings management, using a Likert scale from ‘fully rules-based’ to 
‘fully principles-based’. 
The question now remains what the average result on this item means. The measured 
outcome may only result from the respondents’ primary rejection of our second hypothesis. In 
other words, our respondents solely disagree with the statement that rules-based standards 
lead to more earnings management. A complementary explanation, however, may prompt 
from respondents’ belief that instead of a rules-based setting, principles-based standards 
induce earnings management. As explained in the previous paragraph, we cannot verify this 
latter statement without asking an additional question.  
 
§ 7: Contribution of post experimental survey 
 
§ 7.1: Correlations of post experimental survey and earnings management 
An important reason for including this post experimental survey was to increase the validity 
of this study by complementing the limitations of experiments. The first part (sections 2 to 5) 
had to complement to the experiment by testing personal characteristics, experience and 
autonomous views on earnings management (green block Figure 1 of Chapter 3). The second 
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part reviews respondents view with regards to our hypotheses (green lines Figure 1 Chapter 
3). We discuss this latter part in the section 7.2. 
 
Correlations post experimental survey and earnings management.
Correlation with earnings management Coefficient Sign.
Appraisal office A most objective - 0.148 0.081
Importance of analysts' forecast 0.147 0.082
Clearness of Instructions 0.132 0.120
Motivation 0.105 0.218
Case proper reflection of CFO problems 0.194 0.021*
Job description 0.100 0.240
Experience 0.041 0.627
Age -0.004 0.967
Gender 0.075 0.375
Experience with impairment loss decisions 0.095 0.173
Experience with selling financial assets 0.173 0.041*
Earnings management detection -0.052 0.542
Earnings management and stock price 0.109 0.199
Earnings management and companies reputation 0.004 0.959
*Significant at the 5%-level  
Table 6: correlations between post experimental survey and earnings management 
 
Table 6 shows the correlations between the elements in the post experimental survey and the 
decision to engage in earnings management, in which earnings management is the 
combination of both the accounting decisions and the transaction decision. 55 When we have a 
brief look at the table, we only find two significant numbers: 1) related to whether or not 
respondents find the case a proper reflection of CFO problems in practice and 2) related to 
prior experience with selling available for sale’ securities. Turning to the statistical 
significance of our correlation between Appraisal office A and earnings management, and 
analysts’ forecast and earnings management, we find the estimates are somewhat imprecise, 
only reaching significance at the 10% level. The other items do not show a significant with 
the earnings management decisions. 
                                                 
55 Due to the limitations in the experiment, as we discussed in Chapter 4, some caution is needed when reflecting 
on these relationships. However, since only two items are significantly correlated to earnings management in the 
experiment, this problem is limited. 
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 Although we find very few significant correlations, it is still important to discuss 
issues not significantly related to earnings management and reflect on the results found. The 
first two items refer to the clearness of the case and the motivation among participants. We 
discussed the descriptive scores in section 4. For these two questions it is indeed important 
that no significant differences occur, because it validates the experimental results to a certain 
degree. For instance, when respondents without motivation would have engaged in earnings 
management, we should the validity of the experimental results. Turning to job description, 
experience, age and gender we do not find significant differences either. These results 
contribute to the societal relevance meaning that the earnings management decisions do not 
significantly change through these items, which might be of interest to standard setters.  
When reflecting on earnings management detection, the effect on stock price and the 
effect on companies’ reputation, the correlations are somewhat disappointing. Contrary to the 
results found in the study of Hunton et al. (2006), we do not find any significant correlations 
between these three questions in the post experimental survey and the actual earnings 
management decisions in the experiment. We expected to find at least some influences of 
respondents’ prior beliefs concerning earnings management and their actions taken in the 
experiment. When respondents believe that earnings management would harm companies’ 
reputation, we expected that this would prevent respondents from engaging in earnings 
management in the experiment. On the other hand, these result might also suggest that the 
experiment was not over the top, not directly emphasizing the research questions related to 
earnings management; hence, the experimental subject autonomously decided on their 
experimental questions without directly perceiving these questions being related to earnings 
management. 
Contrary to these insignificant results, we also find some (limited) significant results. 
In section 4 we already reflected on the objectiveness of appraisal office A being most 
objective and the role of analysts’ forecast. We see a negative correlation between appraisal 
office A being most objective and the earnings management decisions taken in the 
experiment. This relationship is even stronger when we only correlate this question to the 
accounting decision in the experiment (estimate -0.300; p < 0.01). One of the explanations 
may be that these respondents do not accept appraisal office A being most objective due to 
‘substance over form’ reasoning; suggesting that respondents did not deliberately engaged in 
earnings management. The result is logically stronger in principles-based area, based on the 
substance over form reasoning. We also elaborated on the influence of the importance of 
analysts’ forecast on earnings management in section 4. In short, whenever respondents 
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perceive more pressure from the analysts’ forecast, they are more likely to meet this incentive; 
and hence engage in earnings management. 
In addition, two items are showing a significant correlation with earnings 
management: 1) whether or not respondents find the case a proper reflection of CFO problems 
and 2) related to prior experience with selling available for sale’ securities. The first item is in 
line with the argument of Libby et al. (2002) that the case must be interesting enough for 
practitioners to use their tacit knowledge in the experiment. Our results suggest that the more 
our respondents were triggered to use their professional knowledge, the more earnings 
management they engaged in. Secondly, we find a significant correlation with respect to 
selling ‘available for sale’ securities and earnings management. This result suggests that 
subjects with recent experience in selling financial assets (in the post experimental survey) 
more often decided to engage in earnings management by selling the portfolio of financial 
assets in the experiment. 
On the other hand, an insignificant result occurs when reflecting on recent experience 
with impairment loss decisions and earnings management. This difference might be due to a 
size effect for two reasons. Firstly, because 52 percent of our respondents have recent 
experience with impairment loss decisions, whereas only 11 percent recently was engaged in 
selling short term financial assets. Secondly, more financial assets (transaction decisions) 
were sold in comparison to the accounting decisions taken in the experiment. In other words, 
too limited accounting decisions were taken in the experiment to create significant results in 
terms of correlations. On average, however, we see that the more recent experience 
respondents have had with earnings management decisions in practice, the more likely the 
person is to engage in earnings management in the experiment.  
 
§ 7.2: hypotheses in the post experimental survey
56
 
The final part of the post experimental survey directly reflects on the hypotheses of this study. 
These questions autonomously contribute the verifying whether the experimental results seem 
plausible; and hence complement to the experiment creating more valid results. We start by 
reflecting on hypothesis 1a: whether CFOs in a principles-based environment are more likely 
to engage in accounting decisions. The post experimental survey confirms this expectation as 
                                                 
56 For this section we tested whether correlations occurred between the earnings management decisions in the 
experiment and the questions in the post experimental survey examining the hypotheses; hence both related to 
our developed hypotheses. No significant results were found. Consequently, and although the sample is not 
independent, we use the gathered data of the post experimental survey independently, since the experiment did 
not influence the post experimental results. Hence, the results suggest that no ordering effect occurred. 
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discussed in section 6. Interestingly, however, is that this result (partially) contradicts with our 
experimental results. Although 15 participants (21.23%) in the experiment take an accounting 
decision in the principles-based environment, whereas only 10 participants (14.29%) take an 
accounting decision in the rules-based environment, the results are statistically insignificant (p 
= 0.135). In the previous chapter we discussed that the incentives might have been too weak 
in the experiment to confirm our hypothesis. Results from this chapter confirm this 
expectation, among others, by showing that analysts’ forecast only causes a small pressure for 
respondents to engage in earnings management.  
Drawing on the limitations of the experiment we should take some care not to draw 
too strong conclusions related to the experimental results of hypothesis 1a. The experiment, 
results reject the expectation that principles-based standards increase the number of 
accounting decisions taken. Our post experimental survey, on the other hand, significantly 
shows that principles-based accounting standards induce accounting decisions. The post 
experimental results, combined with earlier empirical results found (e.g. Nelson et al., 2002; 
Cohen et al., 2008), at least partially suggest that the nature of accounting decisions has an 
influence on the number of earnings management through accounting decisions taken; 
principles-based standards, to a certain degree, induce accounting decisions. 
Comparably we could reflect on the complementary contribution of our post 
experimental survey regarding to hypothesis 1b. Our experiment significantly (p<0.01) shows 
that financial managers in a rules-based setting more often engage in earnings management 
through transaction decisions than managers in a principles-based environment. However, 
some caution is needed when interpreting these results. On the other hand, the result from our 
post experimental survey significantly confirms this expectation showing that rules-based 
standards induce transaction decisions. Consequently, we may conclude that hypothesis 1b is 
confirmed in both the experiment and post experimental survey; rules-based accounting 
standards induce earnings management through transaction decisions. 
 Finally, we discuss the contribution of our latter question in the post experimental 
survey related to hypothesis 2. This hypothesis assumes that rules-based standards are more 
likely to induce earnings management. The result on our final survey question is only to a 
certain degree in line with our experimental result. Both the experiment and the post 
experimental survey reject hypothesis 2. The direction, however, is different for both 
methods. The discretion in accounting standards in our experiment is found to have a small, 
statistically insignificant impact on the level of earnings management subjects include in their 
financial report. Although insignificant, the number of earnings management decisions taken 
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in the experiment, to a certain degree, suggests that rules-based standards may cause a higher 
occurrence of earnings management decisions. Since the results are insignificant, hypothesis 2 
was rejected. Continuing to the post experimental survey outcomes, these results show a 
direct and statistically significant rejection of hypothesis 2. Essentially, however, our 
conclusion remains similar for both the experiment and post experimental survey, i.e. that 
hypothesis two 2 is rejected. On the other hand, this does not allow us to conclude that 
principles-based accounting standards induce earnings management either. 
To recapitulate, we asked three questions related to the influence of rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards on earnings management. These questions were 
included to autonomously measure our developed hypotheses. As a consequence, combining 
the results of the experiment and post experimental survey result allows us to have a more 
valid evaluation of our assessed hypotheses. Our post experimental survey results confirm 
hypothesis 1a and 1b; according to these survey outcomes it appears that managers are more 
likely to engage in earnings management through transaction decisions in a rules-based 
setting, and similarly that principles-based accounting standards induce accounting decisions. 
Our respondents disagree with the statement that rules-based accounting standards might 
cause more earnings management, which refers to hypothesis 2. No significant differences 
were found between respondents in the rules-based and principles-based treatment level. 
Combined with our experimental results and earlier empirical results found we conclude that 
principles-based accounting standards, at least to a certain degree, cause financial managers to 
engage in earnings management through accounting decisions. Both the experiment and the 
post experimental survey confirm that rules-based accounting standards induce earnings 
management through transaction decisions. Our premises that managers in a rules-based 
environment more often engage in earnings management was rejected by both the experiment 
and post experimental survey. 
 
§ 7.3: Reflection on contribution post experimental survey 
One of the aims of the post experimental survey was to contribute to creating more external 
validity among the experimental results by complementing the limitations of experimental 
methods. Therefore, we included questions to measure influencing variables having an 
influence on the experimental results. Moreover, we autonomously asked questions directly 
referring to the hypotheses; creating insights related to our hypotheses from a different angle. 
When reflecting on the first part we must conclude that the contribution of the post 
experimental survey to improve insight among experimental results of interest to standard 
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setters is limited. Table 6 shows the correlations between the questions included in the post 
experimental survey and the actual earnings management decisions taken in the experiment. 
Only two items are significant at the 5% level: regarding the suitability of the case reflecting 
CFO problems and related to prior experience with selling short term financial assets. 
Personal characteristics, such as age, gender, experience and job description do not have a 
significant influence on the earnings management decisions. Essentially, these results suggest 
that the outcomes regarding earnings management are not depending on personal 
characteristics. This result can be useful for standard setters to consider. 
 When we reflect on the second part of the post experimental survey complementing 
the experiment, results indeed contribute to creating more external valid results. Although the 
experimental results do not significantly confirm hypothesis 1a
57
, we believe, based on the 
results from the post experimental survey as well as prior empirical studies (e.g. Cohen et al., 
2008) that principles-based standards, at least to a certain extent, induce earnings management 
through transaction decisions. The insignificance of experimental results might be due to the 
limited perceived strength of incentives included in the experiment, whereas the question 
related to hypothesis 1a in the post experimental survey is strongly confirmed at the 1%-level. 
For hypothesis 1b, the post experimental survey confirms the results found in the experiment. 
Consequently, we are convinced that rules-based accounting standards induce earnings 
management through transaction decisions in common accounting practice. Our premises that 
managers in a rules-based environment more often engage in earnings management was 
rejected by both the experiment and post experimental survey. As such, we are not convinced 
that rules-based standards are more likely to induce more earnings management. We therefore 
emphasized this latter part during the in-depth interviews (Chapter 6). Essentially, we believe 
that the post experimental survey indeed contributed to complement to the limitations of the 
experiment and hence created more valid results.  
 
§ 8: Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter discussed the results of our post experimental survey to contribute to answering 
our research question complementing the experiment. As elaborated in the introduction and 
methodological chapter, our multi-method approach serves two goals in relation to our research 
question. First, questions related to age, gender, prior experience with rules-based and 
                                                 
57 And some caution must be applied when interpreting the results, due to the limitations in the experiment.  
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principles-based accounting standards, and recent experience with either impairment loss 
decisions or selling financial assets contribute to creating a better understanding of 
influencing variables. Second, our post experimental survey includes additional questions 
autonomously measuring our developed hypotheses; contributing to the validity of this study. 
The aim of this study is to improve our understanding of CFO’s decision making, in 
which the relationship between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on the one 
hand and earnings management on the other hand is the object of focus. Therefore, to peer into 
the minds of experienced financial managers, we used Registered Controllers related to the VRC. 
In section 2 we discussed the demographic data of these respondents. Our respondents have an 
average experience of more than ten years and hold different scientific and practical diplomas.  
In addition, Section 3 discussed respondents’ prior experience with rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards, as well as their experience with impairment loss 
decisions, or decisions selling available for sale securities. These responses were expected to 
have an influencing effect on earnings management decisions taken in the experiment (inter 
alia Bonner and Lewis, 1990; Chang and Ho, 2004). The results from section two and three 
contribute to improve insights among our experimental findings useful to standard setters 
related to experience, age and gender; increasing the validity of our study. Our respondents 
have significantly more experience with principles-based accounting standard. Moreover, over 
50% of our respondents were recently involved in taking impairment decisions. 
In section 4 we discussed some case related questions. These results also contributed to 
creating fine distinctions among results found in our experiment. Interestingly was to find out 
that respondents’ believe concerning which assessment is most objective significantly depends 
on the experimental treatment level they were in. Respondents in a rules-based treatment level 
more strongly believed that the assessment of the ‘renowned’ appraisal office was most 
objective. Moreover, in this section we measured the perceived importance of meeting analysts’ 
forecast. Although most respondents choose 4 (partly agree), the average of 2.94 does not 
significantly differ from 3 (p = 0.553). This limited exception of the importance of analysts’ 
forecast might explain the relatively few earnings management decisions taken in our 
experiment.  
Section 5 tested the perceived relationship between earnings management, the 
detectability of earnings management, companies’ reputation and companies’ stock price. 
This section was included to measure respondents believe underlying their choices, and was 
in line with the study of Hunton et al. (2006). Contrary to our expectations, no significant 
differences were found between respondents in the rules-based and principles-based 
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environments. Using average results of 175 respondents, they believe that earnings 
management has limited influence on companies’ stock price. Moreover, our respondents 
believe that applying earnings management could harm companies’ reputation, yet they are 
not convinced that external stakeholders are actually able to detect earnings management 
techniques, such as impairment loss decisions. In other words, as long as stakeholder are not 
aware of the fact that companies use earnings management, it will not harm companies’ 
reputation or stock price either. 
Our latter three questions in the post experimental survey directly measure our 
developed hypotheses. Section 6 elaborates on the results found in this part. Our post 
experimental survey results show that managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management through accounting decisions in a principles-based setting, and similarly that 
rules-based accounting standards induce transaction decisions. Finally, our respondents in our 
post experimental survey do not agree with the proposition that rules-based standards induce 
more earnings management, which refers to hypothesis 2.  
Finally, in section 7 we reflected on the contribution of the post experimental survey 
complementing to the limitations of the experiment. As a result of relatively poor results in 
the experiment, only two items in the post experimental survey were significantly correlated 
to the earnings management decisions in the experiment. Second, our post experimental 
survey includes additional questions autonomously measuring our developed hypotheses, 
through which we were better able to reflect on these hypotheses. Based on the results from 
the post experimental survey as well as prior empirical studies (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008) we 
believe that principles-based standards, at least to a certain extent, induce earnings 
management through accounting decisions (hypothesis 1a). Both the experiment and the post 
experimental survey confirm that rules-based standards induce earnings management through 
transaction decisions more strongly than principles-based standards (hypothesis 1b). Finally, 
our premises that managers in a rules-based environment more often engage in earnings 
management was rejected by both the experiment and post experimental survey (hypothesis 
2). We can conclude that the post experimental survey sufficiently contributed to the validity 
of our study.
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Appendix 
 
Table 1b: demographic data (n = 140) 
Number Percent
Formal Certifications held by participants
RC 140 100%
RA 12 9%
MSc. 104 74%
other: 23 16%
Participants employed as controller/ CFO 100 71%
Male 121 86%
Female 19 14%
Mean* SD
Average business experience 10,8 5,8
Age 40,5 6,6
* based on Anova testing, response means do not significantly differ across treatment levels  
 
 
Table 2b: Case related experience   
 Rules-based Principles-based Sign.* 
Experience with principles-based 
standards 
2.620 2.699 0.586 
Experience with rules-based standards 3.337 3.446 0.476 
Experience with impairment loss 
decisions 
0.576 0.458 0.119 
Experience with selling ‘available for 
sale’ securities 
0.130 0.096 0.482 
*Significance is based on comparing the means of the rules-based and principles-based 
treatment levels 
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Table 3b: Case related questions   
 Rules-based Principles-based Sign.* 
Appraisal office A most objective 3.859 3.277 0.006** 
Importance following analysts’ forecast 2.946 2.940 0.976 
Instructions clear 4.326 4.337 0.944 
Motivation 4.359 4.410 0.729 
Proper reflection of CFO problems 4.109 4.289 0.220 
*Significance is based on comparing the means of the rules-based and principles-based 
treatment levels (** significant at the 1% level) 
 
 
Table 5b: earnings management and accounting 
standards 
  
 Rules-based Principles-based Sign.* 
Accounting decisions and principles-
based standards 
2.67 2.63 0.787 
Transaction decisions and rules-based 
standards 
2.66 2.65 0.936 
More earnings management in rules-
based environment 
3.21 3.12 0.613 
*Significance is based on comparing the means of the rules-based and principles-based 
treatment levels 
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Chapter 6: Results in-depth interviews 
 
§ 1: Introduction 
In addition to the experiment and the post experimental survey, we include in-depth interviews in 
our study. Libby and Seybert (2009) argue that both experiments and surveys to a different 
degree face the risk that participants respond differently from their actions taken in the natural 
environment. Therefore, and in addition to our experiment and the post experimental survey we 
add in-depth interviews to this study as discussed in Chapter 3. The interviews held must 
contribute to our study in three distinct ways (also see Figure 1, Chapter 3): 1) discussing 
results from the experiment and post experimental survey 2) discussing other prior research 
related to earnings management through accounting decisions and transaction decisions and 3)  
exploring unexposed areas of additional importance to this study. In this way, the in-depth 
interviews contribute to improving the external validity of the study. 
 The remainder of this chapter is as following. We start with a short introduction of our 
interviewees and the procedures we considered. In section three we describe interviewees’ 
argument regarding our earlier results found. Section four discusses other prior research; to 
what extent are different accounts are being used to engage in earnings management? Section 
five overviews unexposed areas mentioned by our interviewees. We include a reflection of the 
contribution of the in-depth interviews complementing the experiment and post experimental 
survey in section 6. We finish this chapter with a schematic overview of the results found. 
 
§ 2: Procedure and Interviewees 
 
Expertise of interviewees 
One of the aims of our study is to create a better understanding of CFO decision making. To 
contribute to our experimental and survey results, we asked 6 (former) CFO’s to discuss the 
relationship between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings 
management. Based on their prior experience being a CFO in a multinational environment 
that includes application of both rules-based and principles-based accounting standards, these 
interviewees are all considered to be an expert in this area. We now shortly discuss their 
experience. We deliberately did not chronologically match the description of the interviewees 
in this part and the elaboration in the remainder of this chapter. In this way we fulfill the 
request of our interviewees staying anonymous. 
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1. This first interviewee started his career in auditing. In 2000 he became the CFO of a 
multinational auditing firm, and from 2006 to 2009 he worked as a CEO for this company.  
This interviewee currently works as a CFO of a big multinational insurance company. Since 
this company holds a stock market quotation in Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London and the US, 
the interviewee has proven experience with principles-based accounting standards and rules-
based accounting standards. 
2. This interviewee has a slightly different position. He currently works as ‘Senior 
Accounting Officer’ at a multinational company for five years now. In his current position 
this interviewee prepares financial statements and strongly helps his CFO with issues related 
to financial accounting. Prior to this job, he had a comparable function at another multi-
national company with a quotation in both the US and the Netherlands. For this latter 
company he guided the transition from US GAAP to IFRS. Moreover, this interviewee is an 
expert in the area of standard setting. Among others, he is a member of the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group, is a member of ‘consistent application of IFRS’ and he 
holds a position of full professor at a Dutch University. Although slightly different than the 
other interviewees, this interviewee has in-depth experience with principles-based accounting 
standards (Dutch GAAP, IFRS and standard setting) and rules-based accounting standards 
(US GAAP). 
3. This interviewee has had recent experience being a controller and financial director 
at an engineering company. He finished his study as ‘Register Controller’. From 2004 
onwards, he works for a multinational company, and since 2005 he holds the position of CFO. 
This company had a quotation at the NASDAQ, New York and Amsterdam. In 2007, the 
company was delisted in the US after becoming SOX-compliant. In this way this interviewee 
has sufficient proven experience with both rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards. 
4. In this interviewee we found an extremely experienced former CFO being a CFO 
from 1986 to 2009. In one way or another, he worked his entire career at a multinational 
insurance company quoted in Amsterdam, New York and London. Drawing on ten years of 
experience being the CFO of the holding company, this interviewee has in-depth experience 
with principles-based accounting standards (Dutch GAAP and UK GAAP prior to 2005; IFRS 
after 2005) and rules-based accounting standards (US GAAP). 
5. This interviewee first has had 15 years of experience at a multinational trading 
company for food, hygiene and personal care. Then he started working as a CFO for a quoted 
company, committed to making ‘easy to buy’ office products, including supplies, technology, 
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furniture and business services. This company received its first quotation at the Amsterdam 
Stock Market in 1999. In 2001, this company was first quoted in New York. With this 
experience, including two reviews from the SEC, this interviewee also has proven experience 
with principles-based accounting standards (Dutch GAAP prior to 2005; IFRS after 2005) and 
rules-based accounting standards (US GAAP, from 2001 onwards).  
6. In addition to other financial management functions and CFO experience, this 
interviewee worked as a CFO for a Dutch advisory and engineering company. This service 
company holds projects all over the world related to infrastructure, maintenance, environment 
and communication. In addition to a quotation at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
(www.euronext.com), this company was quoted at the NASDAQ until 2007. Therefore, this 
interviewee has proven experience with principles-based accounting standards (Dutch GAAP 
prior to 2005; IFRS after 2005) and rules-based accounting standards. 
 
Procedure 
After explaining our interviewees the procedure we follow, and the contribution these 
interviews have in relation to the experiment and post experimental survey, we start our 
interview. For all interviews, we used the exact same interview guide, which is included in the 
appendix of this chapter. 
- Our first interview was held at December 7, 2009 and lasted approximately two hours.  
- Our second interview was held at January 15, 2010 and lasted approximately one and a half 
hours. 
- Our third interview was held at January 28, 2010 and lasted approximately one hour and 
fifteen minutes. 
- Our fourth interview was held at March 24, 2010 and lasted approximately one hour and 15 
minutes. 
- The fifth interview was held at April 7, 2010; lasting one hour and fifteen minutes. 
- Our final interview was held at April 27, 2010, and lasted approximately one hour.  
 
All interviews started with shortly discussing important definitions used in our study. To 
overcome ‘language’ problems we started discussing the notions rules-based and principles-
based accounting standards, earnings management, accounting decisions and transaction 
decisions. The prevalent feeling was that the notions and definitions were clear. Interviewee F 
suggested to include the concepts of ‘prudence’ and ‘matching/ accrual’ in the definition of 
principles-based accounting standards. However, since prudence is no longer of primary focus 
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according to the IASB and FASB (IASB 2008; FASB, 2008), and the assumptions of 
matching/ accrual are similarly used in a rules-based setting, we decided not to adjust the 
definition of principles-based accounting standards. 
In addition, however, interviewee A wondered whether the definition of earnings 
management was comprehensive. ‘All deliberate and purposeful interventions in the financial 
reporting process, so as to influence stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on the financial report, within the boundaries of GAAP’. A limitation of this 
definition is that it lacks a direct relationship to engage in earnings management through 
transaction decisions. Therefore, we included his comment and continued with the following 
definition of earnings management: 
 
‘All deliberate and purposeful interventions in the financial reporting process or actions 
affecting earnings, so as to influence stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on the financial report, within the boundaries of GAAP’. 
 
Interview E accepts this definition but admits that his connotation of earnings management is 
more negative (‘black’) than the ‘grey’ definition used in our study
58
. In addition, interviewee 
D shows a preference for ‘accounting and reporting decisions’ rather than solely ‘accounting 
decisions’. In his view namely, disclosure requirements have a big influence on decision 
making. In our view, however, the way to disclose does not directly influence financial 
outcomes; hence, is beyond the scope of this study.  
For the rest, no fundamental problems occurred discussing our definitions. A few days 
after the interviews held, we sent our elaboration to the interviewees to find out whether the 
information was correctly interpreted and correctly incorporated in the report. No 
fundamental issues were raised by our interviewees. 
 
§ 3: Verifying experimental and post experimental survey results 
One of the aims of these interviews is to verify whether these experts agree on the empirical 
results found. The results of our experiment show the following: 
 
 
                                                 
58 for a review, see Chapter 2 
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Experimental results 
1. Participants in the principles-based setting more often use their impairment loss 
(accounting) decision to engage in earnings management than participants in a rules-
based environment. These results, however, are insignificant. 
2. Participants in a rules-based setting are more likely to use transaction decisions, selling 
‘available for sale’ securities, to engage in earnings management compared to 
participants in a principles-based environment. 
3. Neither rules-based, nor principles-based accounting standards are able to fully 
eliminate earnings management decisions. 
4. The extent of discretion in the standards is found to have a small, statistically 
insignificant impact on the average amount of earnings management participants include 
in their financial report. 
5. These results suggest that changing the discretion in accounting standards may affect 
the nature of earnings management, but is unlikely to prevent earnings management 
applications. 
 
Moreover, the in-depth interviews contribute to verifying the post experimental survey results 
Our post experimental survey results statistically confirm the premises of hypothesis 1a and 
1b; managers are more likely to engage in earnings management through transaction decisions 
in a rules-based setting, and similarly that principles-based accounting standards induce 
accounting decisions. Our respondents in the post experimental survey disagree with the 
statement that rules-based accounting standards might cause more earnings management, 
which refers to hypothesis 2. 
Although we accept the importance of verifying these experimental and post experimental 
results, we stress the importance of having and an open and unaffected interview. Therefore, 
and as discussed in section 5.3 (Chapter 3), we asked the following questions: “What is the 
influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on earnings 
management?” 
- Type of accounting standards in relation to the nature of earnings management 
decisions (either accounting decisions or transaction decisions)  
- Level of earnings management related to the accounting standards 
- Preference for future developments of accounting standards (based on earnings 
management) 
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Accounting decisions and principles-based accounting standards 
The first hypothesis we tested in our experiment was whether a principles-based setting 
induces earnings management through accounting decisions. Although financial managers 
engage in accounting decisions more often in a principles-based setting compared to a rules-
based setting, these results are insignificant. On the other hand, our post experimental survey 
results strongly confirm (p < 0,01) hypothesis 1a. Therefore, we concluded in the previous 
chapter that combined results of the experiment, post experimental survey and prior empirical 
studies (e.g. Nelson et al., 2002) suggest that the nature of accounting standards has an 
influence on the number of earnings management through accounting decisions taken; 
principles-based standards, to a certain degree, induce accounting decisions. 
The contributions of our in-depth interviews in this area are twofold. First, the 
interviews contribute to the question whether they would expect more accounting decisions in 
a principles-based setting. Second, the interviews complement to our experimental results 
helping to finding reasonable explanations for the lacking statistical confirmation in our 
experiment, which was contrary to our expectations.  
 Interviewee A and B were quite clear on this matter. They expect managers to engage 
more in earnings management through accounting decisions in a principles-based setting. 
Interviewee B refers to discussions with the auditor concerning the economic content of the 
transaction. ‘What is the exact economic value of an asset or liability?’ Similarly, interviewee 
A argues that principles-based accounting standards allow for more flexibility in financial 
reporting decisions to take. This flexibility provides CFOs with the opportunity to take 
accounting decisions in a principles-based environment. On the other hand, CFOs still are 
obliged to discuss the ‘true and fair view’ of their financial report. In line with the ‘true and 
fair view override’, hiding behind the accounting standards seems hardly possible in a 
principles-based environment.  
Interviewee D confirms these premises, discussing the relationship between the nature 
of accounting standards and ‘accounting decisions’ in line with hypothesis 1a. Interviewee D 
discloses his argument referring to two issues. First, he accepts the fact that earnings 
management in this area is possible under both rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards. In his view, however, applying accounting decisions is easier in a principles-based 
environment. He provides an example concerning the estimations of provisions. The 
requirements in a principles-based setting to incorporate provision are more limited, whereas 
disclosure requirements under rules-based standards are higher, resulting in a more difficult 
application of earnings management in a rules-based environment. 
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Interviewee F holds a position in the middle, yet on average accepts this premise. On 
the one hand he accepts that principles-based accounting standards have a higher level of 
flexibility, and this flexibility may be used to engage in earnings management through 
accounting decisions. Contrary, however, he argues that CFOs may search for new situations 
not included in the accounting standards yet. When we then consider a principles-based 
environment, CFOs should still reflect on the fundaments. In a rules-based environment, 
lacking standards result in the ultimate freedom, in which CFOs can take almost any decision; 
including accounting decisions. In a regular environment, however, he admits that principles-
based accounting standards would induce earnings management more strongly than rules-
based standards. 
Interviewee C disagrees with the proposed premises for this matter related to 
hypothesis 1a. He thereby refers to his own practice. In his multinational insurance company 
with a quotation in the US, England and the Netherlands, they started preparing a US financial 
report; complying with rules-based accounting standards. Afterwards, they copied the 
financial report to an IFRS setting and wondered whether this would be acceptable, given the 
boundaries of IFRS and CFOs personal integrity. As a result, in this cross-listed situation, 
IFRS served as an extra boundary in addition to the rules-based standards. Therefore, he was 
convinced that rules-based standards induce more earnings management through both 
transaction decisions and accounting decisions compared to principles-based standards. A 
nuance included by interviewee C refers to situations in which CFOs only deal with 
principles-based standards. When a company holds a quotation in only one principles-based 
country, principles-based accounting standards provide more flexibility than rules-based 
standards which may result in more accounting decisions. 
Interviewee E fully disagrees with our hypothesis 1a. Although it sounds paradoxical, 
he strongly feels that rules-based standards leave more room for accounting decisions. Before 
he starts his argument, he points out that there are relatively few accounting decisions to take. 
Although in theory there are, in practice you only decide on accounting policies once, leaving 
hardly any room to adjust this decision each year. Furthermore, he discusses the extensive 
guidance of rules-based standards. As a result of this guidance, practitioners are better able to 
search for the boundaries. In a rules-based area he argues, ‘hiding’ behind these requirements 
is much easier. Accounting decisions in a principles-based environment depend on people’s 
norms and their own judgment. So when outsiders discuss the earnings management through 
accounting decisions applied, preparers in a rules-based setting may hide behind the 
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accounting standards, whereas in a principles-based environment external stakeholders will 
discuss preparers’ personal judgment and expertise. 
 
Limited statistical support hypothesis 1a
59
 
In addition to directly discussing the relationship between rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards and earnings management through accounting decisions, we discussed 
with our interviewees why our expectations may not be confirmed statistically. Drawing on 
these interviews we may come to four embedded explanations. The first relates to the ‘true 
and fair view override’ used in principles-based settings. Resulting from this override, CFOs 
think beyond the boundaries of GAAP and verify the economic reality of their transactions. 
Since CFOs cannot ‘hide’ behind strict standards, they use their own integrity to verify 
whether the prepared financial report is acceptable. If not, CFOs may withhold from engaging 
in earnings management through accounting decisions. As our experimental subjects all hold 
a RC-title, this limitation related to hiding prevails even stronger, because they must consider 
their code of conduct. 
 A second argument given in the in-depth interviews relates to the question how often 
CFOs actually engage in earnings management. In our experiment, in both the principles-
based and the rules-based treatment levels, respondents relatively limited decided to take 
accounting decisions. This is in line with interviewee B; stressing that ‘the general audience’ 
probably expects more earnings management than actually takes place. A difference between 
accounting decisions and transaction decisions is that these latter decisions may be taken 
throughout the year during regular operations. Accounting decisions, on the other hand, are 
taken when preparing the financial report. Consequently, these accounting decisions are taken 
after extensive and careful deliberation; therefore, it may seem that more accounting decisions 
are taken. In practice, however, the difference is limited. Interviewee E even states that there 
are far less opportunities to engage in accounting decisions than in transaction decisions. 
 Thirdly, we may consider the argument being used by interviewee F. He argues that 
when new situations occur that are not (yet) included in the accounting standards, rules-based 
standards even leave more freedom to take earnings management through accounting 
decisions. When new situations occur, CFOs and auditors in a principles-based environment 
                                                 
59 Due to the limitation of the experiment as discussed in Chapter 4, some caution must be applied when 
interpreting the results of the experiment. This part, however, does not directly discusses the non-significant 
experimental results, but more generally explores potential influencing variables why principles-based 
accounting standards in practice not always induce more earnings management through accounting decisions 
compared to rules-based standards. 
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still require and incorporate substance over form reasoning. In a rules-based environment, 
normally requesting to follow the letter of the law, lacking rules lead to the ultimate freedom 
to incorporate items in the annual report. 
 A fourth and final argument comes from interviewee C, who argues that in a cross-
listed situation principles-based standards may serve as extra boundaries for preparing 
financial statements. Following his line of reasoning, rules-based and principles-based 
standards may either have comparable opportunities to engage in accounting decisions, or 
rules-based standards induce even more earnings management through accounting decisions. 
 
Transaction decisions and rules-based accounting standards 
In addition to discussing hypothesis 1a we discussed the relationship between the nature of 
accounting standards and transaction decisions. Notice that this premise was statistically 
confirmed in both the experiment (see Chapter 4) and post experimental survey (see Chapter 
5). Apart from interviewee E and F, all interviewees strongly felt that rules-based standards 
induce managers to engage in earnings management through transaction decisions; 
confirming our expectation. Through different examples, interviewee A, B, C and D all come 
up with a similar conclusion: in a rules-based environment, such as the US, ‘smart guys’ are 
always able to find gaps in the system and use these gaps to meet financial expectations. 
These smart guys, such as attorneys, try to find clauses or conditions that meet (or deliberately 
do not meet) the pre-set criteria in the accounting standards. With the help of attorneys, CFOs 
may still hold opportunities to engage in earnings management, even when the accounting 
standards lack discretion.  
 Within this line of reasoning, the interviewees refer to different examples used in 
practice. Interviewee C, for instance, refers to the strict criteria related to ‘off balance 
financing’. Although the intentions of ‘off balance financing’ may be clear, and hence could 
be prevented by standard setters, in the US it remains possible to find new opportunities to 
deliberately make an off balance contract. Interviewee C also refers to the perspective in the 
US: “tell me where it says I can’t”. In other words, everything is allowed, until it is forbidden. 
Therefore, if you find any new constructions not described in the accounting standards (yet), 
this construction is allowed. As a result, annual reports display ‘form’-outcomes rather than 
showing economic substance.  
In line with interviewee C, interviewee A draws his line of reasoning using sale and 
leaseback transactions for fixed assets. This transaction decision opportunity is used in several 
prior studies (e.g. Jamal and Tan, 2010; Maines et al., 2003). The crux of a sale and leaseback 
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transaction concerns the distinction between operational and financial lease. If a lease contract 
will be defined as financial lease, the asset should be presented on the balanced sheet. 
However, an operational lease will not be recognized on the balance sheet, and hence results 
in ‘off balance financing’. ‘75 percent or more of the estimated economic life’ and ‘equals or 
exceeds 90 percent of the excess of the fair value’ are very clear (rules-based) statements with 
numerical thresholds, which are included in SFAS No. 13. Interviewee A states that contracts 
are adjusted to comply with this accounting standard to ‘create’ operational leases. Given the 
90 percent criterion, lease contracts including 89 percent of excess of fair value will be 
recognized as operational lease. Anyone with ‘common sense’ understands that this 
transaction, when reflecting on its economic reality, actually represents a financial lease, 
which should be included on the balance sheet. Drawing on this rules-based system, however, 
CFOs may hide behind the accounting standards. Moreover, rules-based standards do not 
allow for a ‘true and fair view override’ resulting in the opportunity to blame the accounting 
standards. 
Interviewee B and D fully agree with both interviewee A and C. Interviewee B also 
shortly refers to the lease example. He stated that contracts were created to fulfill the 
requirements of a certain ‘bucket’. Products and contracts are simply being packet depending 
on the given accounting standard. Interviewee D also fully agrees with hypothesis 1b. He 
argues that as a result of the accounting standards annual reports may differ from economic 
reality in a rules-based environment. To improve a faithful representation, companies may 
decide to take transaction decisions, such as using swaps, to improve the transparency of the 
financial report. These are unnecessary adjustments in a principles-based environment. 
Interviewee E only partly agrees with the other interviewees. In his view transaction 
decisions are primarily operational decisions, independently taken from the accounting 
standards. Comparably to interviewee A he refers to ‘sale and leaseback’ decisions. First, as a 
company you must decide whether or not to enter into a sale and leaseback transaction. This is 
an operational decision. Then after having decided to sell your assets you will adjust the 
contract in line with the accounting standards. Whether these accounting standards are rules-
based or principles-based does not have an influence on the decision to sell the asset. 
Similarly, interviewee E discusses disposing financial participations and when to recognize 
these gains in your financial statement. The decision to dispose this participation is taken 
independently from the accounting standards. The timing of recognizing this disposition, and 
hence referring to the earnings management part, will therefore be comparably in both a rules-
based and a principles-based environment. 
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Interviewee F disagrees with our premise of hypothesis 1b. To disclose his argument 
he draws on earnings management through transaction decisions related to ‘timing’. 
Interviewee F argues that the flexibility in principles-based accounting standards to 
incorporate and adjust the timing of recognizing a transaction opens up for opportunities to 
engage in earnings management through transaction decisions. Rules-based standards leave 
limited room for adjusting loss and gain recognition. Moreover, adjusting contract to comply 
with the accounting standards is possible under both rules-based standards and principles-
based standards. As you need another party to accept these adjustments, it is harder to apply 
this type of earnings management. Essentially, interviewee F therefore believes that 
principles-based standards leave more room for engaging in earnings management through 
transaction decisions. 
 
Rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings management 
One of the overarching research questions for this study was: ‘Which type of accounting 
standards are likely to be more effective in diminishing earnings management?’ In Chapter 2 
we therefore developed our second hypothesis: Managers are more likely to attempt earnings 
management in a rules-based setting than in a principles-based setting. As discussed in 
previous chapters, the experiment and post experimental survey both reject this hypothesis.  
 In our interviews we discuss the influence of rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards on the level of earnings management. Similar to the experiment and post 
experimental survey we see different views regarding this topic. Interviewee A and B did not 
show a strong preference towards either type of accounting standards. Interviewee B stresses 
that in a principles-based environment the level of earnings management may seem higher. 
He draws his conclusion based on the premises that for engaging in earnings management 
through accounting decisions in a principles-based environment, internal meetings are 
necessary for taking these accounting decisions. In a rules-based setting, transaction decisions 
may very well be structured throughout the year. Although the intent and purpose are 
comparable for both types of decisions, external stakeholders probably perceive less earnings 
management applications in a rules-based environment. Interviewee B ends, however, with 
his conclusion that in practice the level of earnings management under both accounting 
systems will be fairly comparable. 
 Interviewee A confirms this indifference in opinion. Both rules-based and principles-
based standards leave opportunities to engage in earnings management. A fundamental 
difference, however, is that rules-based standards may be used to hide behind the rules. In a 
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principles-based environment, hiding seems hardly possible and the financial report must be 
legitimate; “do you agree with the numbers yourself?” A limitation for both systems relates to 
the distinction between economic reality (true and fair view) and the requirements from the 
accounting standards. Interviewee A argues that accounting standards may even prevent 
CFOs presenting economic reality. 
Interviewee C, E and F, on the other hand, state that rules-based standards induce 
earnings management. Interviewee C was most clear on this matter. In his view, rules-based 
standards cause a stronger earnings management attempt. He starts his argument with a 
reflection on the US system that everything is allowed until it is forbidden. At all times this 
leaves opportunities to engage in earnings management. In a principles-based environment 
you should at least reflect on your own integrity; whether this is an acceptable representation 
of the economic value. Moreover, interviewee C emphasizes his conclusion drawing back on 
the opportunities (left) at his cross-listed company. As stated earlier, they start with their US 
GAAP report and then verify whether this would be acceptable in an IFRS setting. IFRS then 
holds an extra check rather than providing additional opportunities. 
Interviewee E, in his argument, consigns to the ‘hiding’ opportunities; leaving auditors 
with less room to challenge these decisions. When CFOs deliberately seek out for 
opportunities to engage in earnings managements in a rules-based environment by searching 
for the boundaries, auditors only have limited ability to withhold CFOs in a rules-based 
environment. In a principles-based environment auditors may discuss the economic substance 
of transactions. Whether this opportunity actually results in more earnings management, is 
another discussion. In the view of interviewee E this more strongly depends on the 
enforcement regime CFOs are working in rather than the applied accounting standards. 
Interviewee F also concludes that rules-based standards leave more opportunities to 
engage in earnings management. Although he starts his argument from a neutral and 
indifferent perspective, he concludes that more earnings management is even necessary in a 
rules-based environment to overcome fluctuations and engage in earnings ‘smoothing’. In a 
principles-based environment, using the flexibility of the standards and substance over form 
reasoning, long term results are easier to smooth; even without additional earnings 
management decisions. 
Contrary to Interviewee C, E and F, interviewee D concludes that principles-based 
standards may better induce earnings management. The flexibility in accounting standards can 
be easily used to engage in earnings management. Combined with limited controls, 
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interviewee D is therefore convinced that principles-based standards result in more earnings 
management applications. 
   
Preference rules-based and principles-based accounting standards 
Although our empirical findings until this far do not show a clear preference regarding 
accounting standards and earnings management, the prevalent feeling was that most 
interviewees have a strong preference for principles-based accounting standards.60  
Interviewee A ratifies this statement referring to the ‘true and fair view override’. This 
override is lacking in rules-based standards. CFOs may hide behind the accounting standards. 
A principles-based environment incorporates this override. Consequently, the least 
requirement in a principles-based environment is whether the prepared financial statement is 
in line with the economic reality. On the other hand, interviewee A admits that due to the 
information asymmetry CFOs can easily convince auditors on the appropriateness of their 
assessment. 
 Interviewee B emphasizes the importance of norms and in-depth understanding of 
fundamentals in accounting that could be learned at universities rather than simply learning 
rules; resulting in a preference for principles-based standards. These norms are embedded in 
codes of conduct and must be used in discussions concerning the content of the financial 
report. Another limitation of rules-based standards is the complexity. The number of pages in 
a rules-based environment (in US approximately 25.000 pages) is too large. In general, CFOs 
are not able to cope with this complexity. As a result (and as a joke), interviewee B suggests 
that in a rules-based environment, their auditor could even prepare their financial statement, 
since no discretion is left to discuss about. 
  Regarding this complexity matter, interviewee C agrees with interviewee B. In his 
view, only extremely experienced auditors remain able to fully understand financial reports. 
Even when he considers IFRS as more principles-based than US GAAP, the disclosure 
requirements under IFRS are very high and hardly interpretable for non experts. In general, 
his expectation is that rules-based standards leave more room for earnings management. 
When a CFO is extremely integer, however, he believes that US GAAP hardly leaves room 
for earnings management due to the limited discretion. Interviewee C does not explicitly 
mentions to have a preference for either rules-based or principles-based accounting standards. 
                                                 
60 In general, our interviewees graduated at Dutch Universities and are used to work in a principles-based 
environment. Upshot is that we should take some care not to draw too strong conclusions from these in-depth 
interviews related to their preferences concerning the accounting standards. 
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 Interviewee D has a preference for rules-based accounting standards. In his view, 
IFRS is rules-based. The advantage of rules-based standards is that it provides less freedom 
and opportunities to engage in earnings management. Intensive debates are no longer 
necessary under rules-based standards, because the standards already include extensive and 
sufficient examples of how to comply with the standards, excluding CFOs own opinion. In his 
view, rules-based standards improve transparency. And although principles-based accounting 
standards have an opportunity to use the ‘true and fair view override’, the opportunities in 
practice are limitedly used, due to the stringency of the supervisory board (AFM in the 
Netherlands). 
 Interviewee E has a strong preference for principles-based accounting standards. 
Principles-based accounting standards better contribute to creating more decision useful 
financial reports. When standards are too rules-based, this very often leads to reports, of 
which the results are difficult to explain. Investors or other stakeholders may not be able to 
understand why results deviate from their expectations, decreasing the usefulness of these 
reports for their economic decision making.  
Finally, interviewee F has a preference for principles-based accounting standards. In 
his view, annual reports should start from the point of view trying to incorporate economic 
reality into the financial report; resulting in a substance over form reasoning. In his view, a 
limitation of rules-based standards is that it requires following the detailed rules one by one, 
in which the rules (read: form over substance) rather than the ‘true and fair view’ dominates. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this part of the interview we discussed the results found in our experiment and post 
experimental results. This part therefore contributes to creating more nuanced insight into the 
research area, an issue we will reflect on in section 6. When we draw back on hypothesis 1a 
we must conclude that four interviewees accept the statement of principles-based standards 
inducing accounting decisions. On the other hand, interviewee C and E disagree with this 
statement. In general, all interviewees agree that the flexibility in accounting standards 
provide better opportunities to use this flexibility engaging in earnings management through 
accounting decisions. This result is in line with our expectations. For our non statistical 
confirmation of hypothesis 1a, we found four potential explanations: 1) true and fair view 
override 2) the level of earnings management in general and accounting decisions in particular 
3) lacking rules in a rules-based environment provide the ultimate freedom and 4) IFRS may 
even serve as an extra boundary to prevent earnings management. 
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 Related to hypothesis 1b, the interviews lead to sufficient confidence that the 
conclusions drawn from our experiment and post experimental survey are correct; rules-based 
standard induce earnings management through transaction decisions. Only one of our 
interviewees disagrees with this premises pointing at the opportunities of principles-based 
standards to vary timing decisions; resulting in better opportunities to engage in earnings 
management through a transaction decision. Hypothesis 2 was already rejected in our 
experiment and post experimental survey. And also after having executed the interviews, 
results remain ambiguous. The overarching research question for this study was to have better 
insights which type of accounting standard is better able to diminish the amount of earnings 
management. However, there is no mutual agreement among interviewees which type of 
accounting standards more strongly induce earnings management. The prevalent feeling was 
that earnings management is possibly in either a principles-based or rules-based environment.  
 Turning to the preference of our interviewees we may conclude that most interviewees 
prefer a principles-based system. Principles-based accounting standards provide the flexibility 
to better represent economic reality; leading to more decision useful financial reports. On the 
other hand, rules-based standards incorporate disclosure requirements; hence improving the 
transparency of annual reports.  
 
§ 4: Other prior research 
In 2005, Graham et al. survey and interview more than 400 executives to determine factors 
influencing earnings management decisions. Interestingly, these accounts and opportunities 
refer to either  earnings management through transaction decisions (TD) or accounting 
decisions (AD), providing us a more thorough insight into our proposed hypotheses 1a and 1b 
(Also see Figure 1, Chapter 3). In line with Graham at al. (2005), we asked our interviewees 
to respond to the following question: ‘Near the end of the quarter, it looks like your company 
might come in below the desired earnings target. Within what is permitted by GAAP, which 
of the following choices might your company make?’ (Graham et al., 2005, pp. 35) We 
distinguish between ‘probably not, perhaps and most likely’.  
- Decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, advertising, maintenance, etc.) (TD1) 
- Delay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in value (TD2) 
- Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if justified in either quarter) (AD1) 
- Provide incentives for customers to buy more products this quarter (TD3) 
- Draw down on reserves previously set aside (AD2) 
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- Postpone taking an accounting charge (AD3) 
- Sell investments or assets to recognize gains this quarter (TD4) 
- Repurchase common shares (TD5) 
- Alter accounting assumptions (e.g. allowances, pensions) (AD4) 
 
More than in Graham’s (2005) study, we stressed the importance of the relationship with 
rules-based and principles-based accounting standards. In section 7 we include an overview 
providing a short summary of our results found. 
 
Transaction decision 1- Decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, advertising, 
maintenance, etc.) 
The prevalent feeling among interviewees is that this operational decision was used quite 
often in practice, but that there is no difference between rules-based and principles-based 
accounting environments. Interestingly, interviewee A, B and C relate this issue to short run 
and long run decision making. Some decisions may cause diminishing returns in the long run, 
yet are inevitable in the short run. To disclose this issue we start with interviewee B. 
Interviewee B discusses that decreasing discretionary spending is insurmountable in times of 
recession. To overcome problems, such as violating debt covenant (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986), this type of short term decisions is necessary to remain ‘healthy’. Interviewee A 
emphasizes that he would never use this type of earnings management when there would be a 
lack of congruence with regular operations. Interviewee C agrees on this matter, stressing that 
a minimum level of investment is required. Postponed investments could have a negative 
influence on future company performances. Interviewee C finds this type of earnings 
management acceptable when done to protect companies’ cash flows. He stresses, however, 
that most often analysts see through these types of earnings management practices.  
Interviewee D and E both accept that it is most likely that managers will use 
discretionary spending to influence financial results. Interviewee D, however, wonders 
whether it actually is an earnings management application. In his view this decision primarily 
is an operational decision not directly referring to earnings management. Interview E, above 
all, wonders how much room there is left to take these decisions, but that in general most 
companies are likely to engage in this type of earnings management decisions to improve 
financial outcomes. Interviewee F disagrees with the other interviewees. In his line of 
business, very little adjustments are made throughout the year; leaving relatively few 
‘surprises’ to cope with.  
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Transaction decision 2- Delay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice 
in value 
Most interviewees agree that this transaction decision is in line with the previously discussed 
discretionary spending; our interviewees strongly believe that this operational decision was 
taken quite often. On the other hand, they do not believe there is a strong difference between 
rules-based and principles-based accounting standards. Only interviewee F points at 
differences between rules-based and principles-based standards. Rules-based standards, in his 
view lead to increased fluctuation. To better smooth year end results, he argues that 
transaction decisions are taken to dampen fluctuations. The other interviewees only discuss 
the transaction decision itself without pointing at differences between rules-based and 
principles accounting standards. 
Interviewee D confirms that projects indeed may be postponed, because companies’ 
stakeholders expect good performances. Interviewee B, however, points out that the current 
recession may also cause public companies to accelerate new projects rather than postpone 
them. Analysts and investors simply require companies to take action. For a public company, 
this pressure is confined. Interviewee C admits that these types of decisions are taken quite 
often to protect free cash flows. Grippingly, however, he points out that projects may become 
more valuable as a result of the recession. Although the cost of capital rose as a result of 
increased interest rates, cost of labour decreased during the financial crisis; resulting in more 
valuable projects. Interviewee C adds that one cannot always directly say whether this refers 
to earnings management, since the assessment of future cash flows is very subjective. 
Interviewee E questions whether this application of earnings management is internally 
manageable. When project teams come up with new and sufficiently profitable products, it 
may be hard to reject the proposals. As a companies’ board, you do not want to communicate 
that the employee needs to postpone the project due to ‘earnings management considerations’. 
 
Accounting decision 1- Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if justified in either 
quarter) 
Our interviewees largely agree on most issues discussed. Their opinion concerning this first 
accounting decision, however, is divers. Interviewee A, B and D believe that applying 
earnings management through accruing revenues is used limited. Interviewee A relegates to 
consistent financial reports. He would only accept this type of earnings management when 
consistently applied in the upcoming periods. Interviewee B refers to the accrual and 
matching principle used for preparing annual reports. He points out that additional gain in this 
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period ends up in an additional loss in upcoming periods. In his view, it does not serve a 
useful purpose. Interviewee D fully agrees with interviewee A and B and refers to their 
project-based structure. He argues that only within projects, revenues may be slightly 
postponed or accrued. On corporate level, however, this type of earnings management hardly 
has an influence on consolidated financial figures. 
 Interviewee C, E and F on the other hand, are convinced that these types of earnings 
management decisions are taken quite often. Interviewee C believes that this strategy is 
applied frequently, especially at the level of subsidiaries. He refines this explicit statement 
referring to two issues. First, in many situations the question remains when, rather than if they 
are allowed to include this revenue in their financial statement. The only question then left 
concerns the period when to recognize the revenues. And sometimes it is better to accrue 
these revenues. Interviewee C stresses that he will only accept this behavior when it does not 
have an influence on the risk status (such as triple A for Rabobank) of a company. When a 
company crosses a risk boundary as a result of accruing revenues, he will never allow it.  
Although interviewee E is convinced on his ‘most likely’ assessment of earnings 
management through revenue recognition, he wonders whether this is actually earnings 
management. When applied systematically, earnings management is hardly possible, because 
CFOs cannot change their accounting policy each year. These policies are incorporated in 
accounting systems and therefore are deeply entered in the company. Interviewee F argues 
that it depends on transactions ‘in the pipeline’ which might be postponed or antedated.  
Some of the interviewees see a difference between rules-based and principles-based 
environments regarding the revenue recognition issue. Interviewee E points out that rules-
based standards are much more precise in specifying their recognition criteria, leading to 
improved opportunities to manipulate. Moreover, he argues that most ‘fraud’ cases in this area 
come from the rules-based US environment. Interviewee F, in addition, argues that rules-
based standards force CFOs more deliberately deciding due to these strict rules. For 
smoothing financial results, decisions throughout the year are already necessary to adjust 
these fluctuations.  Interviewee D, on the other hand, does not believe there is a significant 
influence of accounting standards, except for documenting revenue recognition, which is 
more strongly developed in rules-based countries. 
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Transaction decision 3- Provide incentives for customers to buy more products this 
quarter 
To engage in earnings management through ‘providing incentives’ may be useful in the short 
run, yet may result in extra losses for companies in the future. This is the definite opinion of 
interviewee C. He believes that providing incentives seem ‘a final handle’. He discusses two 
examples, in which he states that it largely destroys companies’ future perspective. The 
question companies should ask themselves is whether these customers will not become 
customers without additional discount. 
 Interviewee B totally disagrees with interviewee C and believes that this transaction 
decision is taken relatively often. He discloses this issue referring to sales targets. These 
targets must be met; resulting in additional sales performances during the near end period. He 
agrees with interviewee C that this leads to increasing discounts. Interviewee A has doubts 
whether these are actually earnings management decisions. In his view, these policy decisions 
are taken more operationally rather than purely for influencing financial reporting outcomes. 
 Contrary, interviewee D, E and F are not at all convinced that this type of earnings 
management is applied frequently. Referring to the company of interviewee D, this type of 
earnings management is simply inapplicable. Interviewee F holds the same line of reasoning. 
In the business of interviewee E it may be applicable, but results are limited. Interviewee E 
elaborates that during the financial crisis products were hardly sold, with or without 
incentives. Furthermore, interviewee E has doubts on the strategy of applying earnings 
management entangling third parties. No specific distinctions between rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards were mentioned.   
 
Accounting decision 2- Draw down on reserves previously set aside 
Although using different words, the prevalent feeling was that this type of earnings 
management behaviour is applied regularly. Both interviewee D and E believe that principles-
based standards leave more room to engage in this type of earnings management. Interviewee 
D has a preference for rules-based standards, since the requirements of drawing down are 
stricter than in a principles-based environment. Interviewee E more strongly refers to the 
input, stressing that principles-based standards have less requirements to start provisions or 
comparable accounts. In his view, the difference concerning releasing a provision between 
rules-based and principles-based accounting standards is limited.   
In addition, and to support his argument, interviewee B draws back on earlier 
accounting standards in the Netherlands in which many opportunities were included to engage 
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in this type of ‘smoothing’. After the introduction of IFRS in 2005 this discretion became 
limited. Moreover, interviewee B believes that subjective accounts have become more 
objectified, resulting in even less discretion. Interviewee F also points at the history of 
financial reporting in the Netherlands, fully agreeing with interviewee B. 
Interviewee C wonders whether drawing down on reserves is indeed permitted. He 
refers to this issue questioning the ‘richness’ of these reserves. When these reserves are too 
rich, CFOs may decide to draw down on these reserves. When still necessary for a company 
to execute their regular operations, he finds this unacceptable to apply. Interviewee C believes 
that it might be acceptable in a rules-based environment, but absolutely unacceptable in a 
principles-based environment. Moreover, he strongly supports (voluntary) disclosure when 
reserves are being used to adjust financial outcomes. 
 
Accounting decision 3- Postpone taking an accounting charge 
Our experts disagree on the application of this earnings management decision. Interviewee A 
believes this strategy will most likely be applied, because it is relatively easy and difficult to 
detect. Interviewee C totally disagrees and calls it a ‘deadly sin’. He will only accept an 
adjustment in value, when the economic reality strongly deviates from the accounting value. 
In all other cases, he believes it is inconceivable and he does not believe CFOs use this for 
earnings management practices. Interviewee B holds a position in the middle. He points at the 
subjectivity of future cash flows and interest assessments. On the other hand, in his view, 
these accounts are only limitedly used to engage in earnings management. 
 Interviewee D and E are quite convinced that this type of behavior is applied in 
practice. As an example, interviewee D refers to an invoice that is not yet received and 
therefore deliberately left ‘out of the picture’. Interviewee E answers between perhaps and 
most likely. In his view, postpone taking an accounting charge also depends on which 
quarterly report we are discussing. Postponing accounting charges is probably easier in the 
first two quarters than in the latter quarter. Interviewee F disagrees and argues that the 
assessment of accounting charges depend on cash flow estimation models; pointing at the 
limited discretion to incorporate adjustments in the financial report. 
 Our interviewees largely agree that principles-based accounting standards leave more 
room to engage in earnings management using postponed impairment losses. Since rules-
based standards have increased requirements, the degree of ‘professional judgment’ in this 
type of accounting standards is less; leaving less room to engage in earnings management. 
Moreover, interviewee F emphasizes that whenever cash flows deviate from the maximum 
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value in a rules-based environment, this directly leads to adjustments. In a principles-based 
environment, stressing the substance over form reasoning for long term decision making, 
small adjustments are accepted and hence not included in the financial statement. 
 
Transaction decision 4- Sell investments or assets to recognize gains this quarter 
This strategy was used in the experiment of Hunton et al. (2006) to measure earnings 
management. All interviewees agree that this strategy can and will be used in practice. 
Interviewee B expects a strong usage of this strategy when absolutely necessary, when profits 
are under pressure. These assets might be real estate, or securities that would have been sold 
anyway, but this decision is antedated. Interviewee A agrees, but questions whether this 
decision has a negative influence on the long run. If not, then this type of earnings 
management will be acceptable in his view. Interviewee D and F agree with this view 
referring to ‘timing’ decisions. When assets are sold anyway, the only question left is when to 
sell them. Depending on the financial figures, CFOs might either accrue or postpone this 
earnings management decision. Interviewee E stresses that each company owns assets 
including unrealized gains, which may be used when absolutely necessary. 
Interviewee C relates this issue to the rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standard. IFRS provides more freedom to sell investments with unrealized gains than US 
GAAP. IFRS, however, does require extensive disclosure. Interviewee D and E do not see 
important differences between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards for this 
transaction decision. 
 
Transaction decision 5- Repurchase common shares 
Graham et al. (2005) include this opportunity in their non exhaustive list of earnings 
management opportunities. Most interviewees, however, are not fully convinced that this is an 
actual earnings management decision. The decision can for instance be taken, because a 
company fails to find value adding projects (interviewee A). Interviewee E stresses that 
formally most company must inform and ask permission to their shareholders. In this way 
applying earnings management seems less useful. 
 Interviewee C emphasizes that repurchasing common shares is a result of balance 
sheet management; to improve solvency ratios or to balance a cash surplus. Interviewee B 
discerns between operational and earnings management decisions. When a company fails to 
find new financial viable projects, repurchasing common shares is the result of a general 
policy decision. When this decision is taken deliberately to improve ‘earnings per share’ then 
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it classifies as earnings management. Both interviewee B and C accept an earnings 
management decision when CFOs trade-off between dividend payments and repurchases 
common shares. When repurchasing common shares results in tax advantages for investors, 
this strategy is permitted and consistently applied.  
Interviewee D accepts that this type of earnings management is applied in his 
company, but only in relation to option programs. With rules-based standards, option 
programs to employees must be included in the annual report. Incorporating option plans 
improve the transparency of financial reports, improving insight into the dilution of earnings 
per share. Interviewee F has no opinion concerning repurchasing common shares for earnings 
management. 
 
Accounting decision 4- Alter accounting assumptions (e.g. allowances, pensions) 
Our final opportunity to engage in earnings management through accounting decisions 
discussed with our experts refers to altering accounting assumptions such as allowances, 
pensions, or deciding between measurement opportunities among equally acceptable rules 
(Graham et al., 2005). All interviewees, to a certain extent, accept that this type of earnings 
management is applied to influence financial outcomes. 
Interviewee F emphasizes that in his line of business many estimation adjustments are 
made throughout the years. Interviewee B accepts this opportunity, but point out that this 
strategy is strongly visible in financial reports. Adjustments in interest percentages and age 
structures are easily to detect by stakeholders. Interviewee A agrees and stresses that 
accounting policy changes must be disclosed (including comparable financial numbers). As 
CFO, however, interviewee A also disclosed estimation adjustments (such as the percentage 
for doubtful accounts), making this type of earnings management easily verifiable. Finally, 
interviewee C elaborates that altering accounting assumptions is more useful to decrease 
earnings than to increase earnings. Auditors apply intensive checks and balances on income 
increasing accounting decisions.  
Interviewee D admits that in the past, using principles-based Dutch GAAP, applying 
earnings management through altering accounting assumptions was much easier than it 
currently is under IFRS. Nevertheless, assumptions and estimations are necessary to finish 
annual reports, leaving room for earnings management. Interviewee E similarly states that 
principles-based standards leave more room to engage in earnings management. As an 
example his cites ‘deferred tax assets’, in which the phrase ‘expected profits within three 
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years’ (rules-based) is much more specific than the ‘probably expected profits’-phrase used in 
principles-based standards. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this part we discussed accounts used to engage in earnings management as discussed in the 
paper of Graham et al. (2005). Since we were able to divide these accounts in either earnings 
management through accounting decisions or transaction decisions, we expected to improve 
our insights concerning the relationship between rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards and earnings management. Most accounts, however, are more strongly related to 
operational decisions, with accounting standards as a given fact, rather than confirming the 
premises that the nature of accounting standards actually causes this earnings management. 
 Our first earnings management decision relates to decreasing discretionary spending 
(TD1). The prevalent feeling among our interviewees is that this operational decision was 
used quite often in practice, but that there is no difference between rules-based and principles-
based accounting environments. Most interviewees strongly believe that delaying the start of 
new projects (TD2) is in line with the first earnings management opportunity discussed, 
stressing that these are more operational business decisions rather than actual earnings 
management decision, in which our interviewees see a limited influence of accounting 
standards.  
 Our third earnings management account relates to ‘revenue recognition’ (AD1). Some 
of the interviewees see a difference between rules-based and principles-based environments 
regarding the revenue recognition issue, especially related to the opportunity to use the 
strictness of accounting standards in a rules-based setting. There was no general consensus 
among the interviewees whether this was applied very often in practice. Moreover, we did not 
see a general consensus related to providing incentives (TD3) either. Interviewee B states that 
it is very likely to apply in practice, whereas interviewee D cannot apply this strategy at all in 
his business. No specific distinctions were mentioned between rules-based and principles-
based accounting standards.   
 The following accounting decision refers to ‘draw down on reserves previously set 
aside’ (AD2). The prevalent feeling was that this type of earnings management behaviour is 
applied regularly. Interviewee D, E and F believe that principles-based standards leave more 
room to engage in this type of earnings management. Next, referring to ‘postpone taking an 
accounting charge’ (AD3), most interviewees believe CFOs may use this opportunity to 
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engage in earnings management. Moreover, they largely agree that principles-based 
accounting standards leave more room to engage in earnings management in this area. 
 In addition, all interviewees believe that earnings management is applied by selling 
investment or assets to recognize unrealized gains this quarter (TD4). This decision, however, 
was taken independently from the accounting standards. When discussing the repurchase of 
common shares (TD5), most interviewees questioned whether this actually is an earnings 
management application. The interviewees do not see a difference between rules-based and 
principles-based environments on this issue. Our latter earnings management opportunity 
refers to altering accounting assumptions (AD4). All interviewees, to a different degree, 
accept that this type of earnings management is applied to influence financial outcomes. 
Moreover, we see a difference between accounting standards; principles-based standards 
leave more room to apply this type of earnings management.   
 
§ 5: Unexposed areas 
Our latter part exposes the ‘unexposed areas’. This part provides additional information, 
extending the developed hypotheses, contributing to answering our research question. 
 
‘Other Accounts’ 
To begin with, and in addition to the enumeration of Graham et al. (2005), we elaborated on 
different accounts (potentially) being used to engage in earnings management in relation to 
the accounting standards. Interviewee A argues that pension plans have been adjusted after 
the introduction of IFRS in the Netherlands. As a result of IFRS, many companies were 
obliged to include the ‘defined benefits’ rather than the ‘defined contributions’ of employees’ 
pension plans in the annual report. Consequently, companies had to recognize provisions; 
causing declined balance sheet positions. Therefore, several companies deliberately searched 
for opportunities to adjust contracts (interviewee A); engaging in earnings management 
through a transaction decision. To further disclose the impact of rules-based and principles-
based accounting standards related to pension plans interviewee A points at AKZO. Resulting 
from the ‘defined benefits’ and ‘defined contributions’ contradiction, AKZO reported a net 
loss in the US, whereas at the same time showed a net profit in the Netherlands; indicating a 
considerable effect on financial outcomes. 
 A second account interviewee A points at refers to ‘purchase price’ and ‘pooling 
accounting’. The amount of goodwill included in the financial report depends on the questions 
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whether or not to capitalize intangible assets; potentially causing dramatic differences in 
earnings in upcoming years. Thirdly, interviewee A discusses the distinction between 
‘completed contact method’ and percentage of completion method. In this area the question 
relates to recognizing revenues and resulting from the matching principle also relates to 
recognizing costs. For instance, in the Netherlands, the percentage of completion method is 
allowed, whereas IFRIC 15 (Agreements for the construction of real estate) requires using 
‘completed contact method’; having a significant influence on financial figures. 
Using a similar line of reasoning, interviewee B discusses taxes. To create a 
smoothened tax pressure, earnings management is used to diminish fluctuations to a large 
extent. Furthermore, interviewee B questions the effect of ‘compensable losses’ that are 
recognized differently in the Netherlands (Dutch GAAP) compared to IFRS. Interviewee E, 
on the other hand emphasizes opportunities of ‘off balance’ financing, resulting in improved 
balance sheet ratios. Another example interviewee E discusses relates to using ‘non GAAP’ 
performance measures.
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 This area was also discussed by interviewee C. Interviewee C 
emphasizes to decrease the importance of IFRS reporting and to put emphasis on the 
importance of pro forma reporting, using EVA, EBIT(DA) or a comparable measure. 
Essentially, our interviewees discuss different areas in which accounting standards 
have an influence on earnings management. Resulting from differences between Dutch 
GAAP, IFRS and US GAAP, CFOs see opportunities to adjust financial numbers anyway, yet 
still in line with the accounting standards to comply with. 
 
Income increasing versus income decreasing decisions 
A second area we discussed with our interviewees relates to the distinction between income 
increasing and income decreasing decisions. Using different words, the prevalent feeling was 
that level of earnings management hardly depends on the distinction between income 
increasing versus income decreasing decisions. Interviewee E states that managing earnings 
simply depends on meeting expectations, and these expectations can be either higher or lower 
than current results.  
 Interviewee C only partly agrees. In his interview he points at the difference in scope 
of the audit. Auditors are more willing to accept earnings management when financial figures 
are managed downwards than upwards. This line of reasoning is confirmed by interviewee A. 
Interviewee B, in addition, discusses the relation between income increasing or decreasing 
                                                 
61 See Bowen et al. (2005) for a scientific contribution in this area. 
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earnings management in relation to direct or indirect bonuses. Managing earnings upwards 
directly improves bonuses, whereas using income decreasing decisions provides better 
opportunities of meeting bonus plans in the upcoming years.  
 
Role of incentives 
A third and important area to discuss involves the importance of incentives.
 62
 Nelson (2003) 
argues that incentives are even more important than accounting standards for CFOs to engage 
in earnings management, which is confirmed by interviewee D and E. They argue that CFOs 
will not engage in earnings management without incentives. “When there is a will, there is a 
way”. So when there are (strong) incentives involved, most often there are opportunities left 
to engage in earnings management, either through transaction decisions, or through 
accounting decisions. 
Another important debate in this area draws on ‘short run versus long run’ effects of 
earnings management decisions (interviewee A, B and C). Sometimes it is important to take 
decisions for the long run to keep the company fit and viable. On the other hand, when debt 
covenants (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) play an important role, CFOs may be forced to offer 
long term revenues for meeting current year’s bank expectations. Hence, although CFOs may 
try to create the best benefits for the company in the long run, short run requirements may 
become even more important, resulting in short term adjustments.  
A third area our interviewees came up with refers to the use of ‘net income’ measures 
included in bonus plans. Interviewee B argues that only a very few companies actually 
include net income measures in their bonus plans. On the other hand, interviewee F 
emphasizes that monitoring bonus plans and earnings management is especially important 
when bonuses are only based on one measure rather than several measures including sales, 
earnings, risk and sustainability. When only one earnings based incentive is involved, the risk 
of people engaging in earnings management is much higher. 
Furthermore, interviewee C stresses the importance of the extent of bonuses for 
engaging in earnings management. Bonus plans work well when the levels of bonuses are 
fairly limited. In his view, limited bonuses are sufficient to stimulate employees to work 
harder. Contrarily, when the level of bonuses is too high, this may very well results in 
                                                 
62The issue of incentives was previously discussed in section 4.2 of Chapter 2. These incentives, however, do not 
directly refer to monetary incentives gained by experimental subjects as they show a better performance. These 
incentives, among others, refer to contractual, governmental and capital market incentives of importance to the 
accounting environment to influence professional decision making.  
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manipulation and fraud. In his view, bonuses may be included to stimulate employees; 
however, the balance between salary and potential bonus is important. 
 
Role of integrity 
Another area we discussed with our interviewees involves the importance of integrity on 
earnings management. Interviewee A argues that accounting standards always provide 
opportunities to engage in earnings management. “Whenever there is a will, there is a way” 
(interviewee E). Interviewee F argues that the role of integrity could even be evaluated 
independently from the accounting standards. The remaining question for interviewee F refers 
to the integrity of the CFO, whether or not to engage in earnings management decisions.  
Moreover, interviewee A continues that applying earnings management also depends 
on the loyalty towards the company. Interviewee C in this area refers to the ‘trustworthiness’ 
of CFOs. How trustworthy is the particular CFO? Because earnings management may have a 
negative influence on companies’ reputation (Hunton et al., 2006), integrity is partly 
controlled for by an unregulated market of reputation and trust (interviewee C). As a result of 
this unregulated market, CFOs have private incentives not to engage in earnings management, 
if this would harm companies’ reputation. 
Interviewee B adds to this argument the importance of coping with bad news. When 
results are sufficient, it is easy to resist the opportunity to engage in earnings management. 
But how about periods of bad news? Important here is the role of pressure in relationship to 
integrity. The level of earnings management depends on the level of pressure and integrity. 
When regular earnings fall short, there is a high pressure from external stakeholders. And if at 
that very moment the level of integrity would be limited, the likelihood of earnings 
management applications is high. 
 
Additional insights rules-based/ principles-based and earnings management 
Our main research question relates to the influence of rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards and earnings management. In our ‘unexposed’ part we therefore ask our 
interviewees whether they have additional insights in this area. Interviewee B argues that 
principles-based standards are easier to understand and therefore better applicable. High 
integrity combined with principles-based accounting standards result in the most faithful 
annual reports. Low integrity combined with rules-based standards improve opportunities for 
manipulation (interviewee E), since there are always opportunities to apply earnings 
management decisions and hide behind the standards.  
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In this area, interviewee D refers to a big difference in culture between US and other 
countries. In the US: everything is allowed, until it is forbidden. In IFRS countries, however, 
financial reporting more strongly depend on integrity rather than just following the accounting 
standards (interviewee C). In addition to culture, interviewee E points at the importance of 
enforcement regimes. To him, the monitoring position of the independent reviewers (AFM in 
the Netherlands) is even more important than the accounting standards in use. The influence 
of the SEC (US), for instance, is much bigger than the influence of a local authority. 
Another important issue relates to the subject of IFRS not being principles-based 
(interviewee D). Although IFRS contains a phrase, pointing at their standards being 
principles-based, the standards are simply too think and complex for representing a principles-
based system. For practitioners (preparers and auditors) in the Netherlands, he states that they 
have to get used to these more rules-based standards. Furthermore, interviewee D elaborates 
that rules-based regimes improve transparency. However, rules-based accounting standards 
also result in (too) condensed financial reports. As a consequence, CFOs and auditors may 
create a ‘ticking the box’ mentality in rules-based environments, not using substance over 
form arguments anymore; providing opportunities to hide behind the standards. 
Finally, interviewee D and E debate the role of standards setters. Standard setters 
should no longer focus on eliminating and diminishing earnings management rather than 
emphasizing the importance of providing decision useful annual reports (interviewee E). 
Collusion, namely, is always possible, under both rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards (interviewee D). Interviewee D, above all, argues that standard setters should not 
longer brook earnings management behavior, but should simply forbid earnings management 
applications; even if tricks are involved within the boundaries of GAAP. 
 
Other unexposed areas 
At the end of each interview we kindly requested our interviewees whether there were other 
unexposed areas of importance contributing to answering our research question. Since this 
part is a relatively incoherent amongst interviewees, we shortly reflect on their points being 
made. First, interviewee A sees earnings management as an instrument to communicate 
against press and analysts, which might refer to the signalling function of companies (Scott, 
2009, 456-459). Although the boundaries are vague, applying earnings management is not 
always bad, for instance to overcome a debt covenant violation (interviewee C). This is in line 
with the grey definition on earnings management we took for this study. Interviewee B, 
however, states that relatively few companies actually engage in earnings management. And 
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if they do CFOs more often manage cash flows than earnings. Furthermore, interviewee B 
adds that earnings management and fraud more often is applied on the level of business units 
rather than on corporate level. Interviewee C argues that the level of earnings management 
strongly depends on the type of company; pointing at the opportunities left to engage in 
earnings management. Interviewee E puts an emphasis on strongly rejecting earnings 
management as ‘manipulation’; strappingly crossing the line. Interviewee D even holds a 
stronger position; to forbid earnings management, even though it is within the boundaries of 
GAAP. The problem namely is that although standard setters are trying to diminish the level 
earnings management CFOs still have equally strong opportunities to engage in earnings 
management as they had in the past. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this latter part of our interview we discussed ‘unexposed areas’. These discussions 
contribute to creating a more thorough understanding into our research area and may provide 
opportunities for future research. We started this section discussing other accounts, in addition 
to the enumeration of Graham et al. (2005), potentially being used to engage in earnings 
management. Accounts pointed at were, amongst others, pensions, taxes and purchase price 
accounting. These accounts may have an incredibly influence on financial outcomes and 
therefore provide large opportunities to engage in earnings management. 
 Then we discussed the role of income increasing versus income decreasing earnings 
management, but this influence was only limited. More importantly, however, is the role of 
incentives and integrity. From the perspective of our interviewees, the role of incentives is 
even more important than the accounting standards being used; serving as explanatory factor 
whether CFOs will, or will not engage in earnings management. Similarly, the role of 
integrity is quite important, especially when bad results show up. 
 At the end of our interviews we discussed additional insights concerning the influence 
of rules-based and principles based accounting standards and earnings management. Our 
interviewees strongly accept that both types of accounting standards differ in scope. 
Principles-based standards are better to understand, whereas rules-based standards improve 
transparency. However, we must not forget the importance of culture and enforcement 
regimes to diminish earnings management. Finally, we asked our interviewees whether they 
had additional points to consider contributing to our study. Although many interesting insight 
were provided, interviewee B came up with perhaps the most interesting insight that relatively 
few companies actually engage in earnings management. Most CFOs try the best they can to 
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provide a ‘true and fair view’ financial report rather than a messy one; improving 
transparency and honesty. 
 
§ 6: Contribution of in-depth interviews 
 
§ 6.1: Verifying experimental and post experimental results 
The first part of the interviews was concerned with reflecting on the earlier results found. 
Although the interviewees were not aware of these results, we were still able to deduce their 
views concerning our hypotheses. Let us start with discussing the first hypothesis (1a) 
questioning whether principles-based accounting standards induce earnings management 
through accounting decisions. The contributions of our in-depth interviews in this area were 
twofold. First, the interviews contributed to the question whether they would expect more 
accounting decisions in a principles-based setting. Second, the interviewees contributed to 
finding reasonable explanations for the lacking statistical confirmation in our experimental 
results, which was contrary to our expectations. Most interviewees generally accept that the 
flexibility in principles-based accounting standards may be used to engage in earnings 
management through accounting decisions. On balance, and combined with results from the 
post experimental survey, our results suggest that principles-based accounting standards, at 
least to a certain extent, induce earnings management through accounting decisions more 
strongly than rules-based accounting standards. Moreover, based on the interviews we were 
able to come up with four alternative explanations, contributing to explaining why the 
experiment may not have confirmed hypothesis 1a: 1) true and fair view override 2) the level 
of earnings management in general and accounting decisions in particular 3) lacking rules in a 
rules-based environment provide the ultimate freedom and 4) IFRS may even serve as an 
extra boundary to prevent earnings management.  
 When reflecting on the premise that rules-based accounting standards induce earnings 
management through transaction decisions (hypothesis 1b), the contribution of our in-depth 
interviews was limited. Although the interviewees came up with some areas of interest to 
consider, in general, they confirmed the expectation that rules-based standards lead CFOs to 
engage in transaction decisions more often. Consequently, and drawing on the experiment, 
post experimental survey, and in-depth interviews, we believe this result is valid; rules-based 
accounting standards induce earnings management through transaction decisions. 
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 Our latter hypothesis questions whether rules-based or principles-based accounting 
standards result in a lower level of earnings management. We expected rules-based standards 
to induce earnings management. This result was not statistically confirmed in the experiment, 
neither was it confirmed in the post experimental survey. Our in-depth interviews do not show 
a clear preference either on the issue whether rules-based or principles-based accounting 
standards are better able to diminish the level of earnings management. Firstly, since our 
interviewees provide different examples of how to engage in earnings management under 
both systems. In other words, both systems leave opportunities to engage in earnings 
management. Secondly, the interviewees are convinced that other factors play an important 
role when reflecting on earnings management; such as the countries’ enforcement regime. 
Essentially, and in line with the experiment and post experimental survey, the interviews have 
not provided sufficient clarity on the relationship between the type of accounting standards 
and the level of earnings management; in other words, rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards do not seem to have a significant influence on the level of earnings 
management. 
 
§ 6.2: Additional prior research  
The second issue to reflect on relates to the enumeration of Graham et al. (2005) that we 
discussed in our interviews. The primary aim of this part was to increase insights among our 
hypothesis 1a and 1b: Whether principles-based (rules-based) accounting standards induce 
earnings management through accounting (transaction) decisions. An interesting result from 
this part of the interviews is that several issues we (as scientists) see as earnings management 
applications, CFOs in practice consider this an operational decision. For instance, our first 
earnings management decision relates to decreasing discretionary spending (TD1). The 
prevalent feeling among our interviewees is that this is an operational decision rather than a 
primary earnings management decision. Moreover, most interviewees strongly believe that 
delaying the start of new projects (TD2) is in line with the first earnings management 
opportunity discussed; hence, not being a primary earnings management decision. This 
argument also holds for repurchasing common shares as well. Consequently, although we 
may classify these decisions as earnings management through accounting decisions and 
transaction decisions, our interviewed CFOs are not fully convinced that these decisions are 
always primarily taken for earnings management purposes. This may explain the reasoning of 
interviewee B as he states that the general audience expects a higher level of earnings 
management practices than CFOs are engaging in. 
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 Another interesting finding from this part of the interviews relates to the importance of 
accounting standards when reflecting on the accounting and transaction decisions. For the 
transaction decisions, the prevalent feeling was that these decisions are taken independently 
from the accounting standards. Hence, CFOs first take this decision without questioning how 
to recognize the issue in the annual report. For the earnings management through accounting 
decisions discussed, however, issues more strongly depend on the accounting standards. 
Accounting decisions are taken at the end of the year and after deliberation of the accounting 
standards. As a result, CFOs might be more aware of the stronger relationship between the 
accounting decisions to take and the accounting standards to comply with. 
When discussing these accounting decisions, most CFOs largely agree that principles-based 
standards leave more room to apply this type of earnings management, which  contributes to 
reflecting on the results related to hypothesis 1a. 
 A final contribution occurs when reflecting on the number of accounting decisions and 
transaction decisions taken. Although we have not included this analysis in Chapter 4 since it 
does not directly contribute to answering our research questions, the number of transaction 
decisions in the experiment is statistically higher (at the 10%-level) than the number of 
accounting decisions taken (p = 0.063). Interviewee E argues that he sees more and better 
opportunities to engage in earnings management through transaction decisions than through 
accounting decisions. Although we tried to create perfect analogies in the experiment in 
which the opportunities to engage in earnings management are linked to the type of 
accounting standards, the transaction decision opportunity, selling ‘available for sale’ 
securities may have been perceived as easier to apply. This may (partially) explain why 
hypothesis 1b is more strongly confirmed than hypothesis 1a in the experiment. 
 
§ 6.3: Unexposed areas 
The aim of this latter part was looking beyond the hypotheses tested, yet still of great 
importance to understand the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards on earnings management. And this part, in our view, very well served its role. We 
must notice, however, that the issues raised very often are ample research areas on their own. 
On the other hand, the subjects discussed also provide interesting handles for future research. 
Firstly, we discussed other areas to engage in earnings management in relation to the 
accounting standards. Based on two examples, the interviewed CFOs stress the tremendous 
effect accounting standards may have on financial outcomes; resulting in economic 
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consequences such as violating debt covenants (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The first 
example relates to adjusting pension plan, depending on the distinction between defined 
benefit and defined contribution after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Another example 
reflected on is that for external stakeholders, investors in particular, it must be very strange to 
have the exact same company presenting a loss in one country (United States) and a gain in 
another country (The Netherlands); as in the case of Akzo. 
Moreover, we found a contradiction in the interviews compared to the experimental 
results; related to income increasing versus income decreasing incentives and earnings 
management. In our experiment, our results demonstrate that when incentives are sufficient to 
attempt earnings management practices, neither rules-based, nor principles-based accounting 
standards are able to fully eliminate earnings management decisions. These results, however, 
only hold when our respondents have an incentive to increase earnings. Respondents in 
treatment levels to decrease earnings did not significantly engaged in earnings management. 
In the interviews, however, CFOs emphasize that there is no difference between income 
increasing versus decreasing incentive. One interviewee even states that downgrading 
financial outcomes is easier, since external auditors more strongly focus on deliberate 
earnings upgrades. 
Another interesting view resulting from the interviews and adding to our knowledge 
concerning the influence of accounting standards and earnings management comes from the 
interaction effect accounting standards may have with integrity. High integrity combined with 
principles-based accounting standards result in the most faithful annual reports. CFOs are 
better able to use the provided discretion in accounting standards for representing the true and 
fair view of companies’ financial position. Low integrity, on the other hand, combined with 
rules-based standards improves opportunities for manipulation, since there are always 
opportunities left to engage in earnings management and hide behind the standards. 
Essentially, related to the integrity issue one could conclude that principles-based standards 
better serve decision usefulness and limit earnings management. 
Similarly, the interviewees discussed several other intervening variables, having an 
influence on the relationship between accounting standards and earnings management, such as 
culture, enforcement regimes, the interactivity between incentives and integrity. These 
insights contributed to having a better understanding of our research area, and moreover, may 
provide us with some new opportunities for doing research. 
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§ 6.4: Reflection on contribution in-depth interviews 
Essentially, the aim of the in-depth interviews was to contribute to the study in three distinct 
ways: 1) reflect on and nuance results from the experiment and post experimental survey 2) 
discuss other areas related to accounting decisions and transaction decision of importance to 
our study 3) explore other areas influencing the relationship between rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards and earnings management. With regard to the first part, 
the interviews contributed to creating deeper insights into our quantitative results found. 
Firstly, we explored the expected relationship between the types of accounting standards and 
the nature of earnings management. Amongst other, results show that most CFOs agree with 
the premise that principles-based accounting standards generally better induce earnings 
management through accounting decisions than rules-based standards. Secondly, by exploring 
alternative explanations why our hypothesis 1a was not statistically confirmed in the 
experiment. Thirdly, although most of our interviewed CFOs have a preference for principles-
based, they agree that the opportunities to engage in earnings management are comparable for 
both accounting systems; in other words, rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards do not strongly influence the level of earnings management; strengthening our 
conclusions related to hypothesis 2. 
 The second part contributed to our study by discussing other research areas. We 
expected to have more in-depth insights concerning the relationship between accounting 
decisions and transaction decisions on the one hand, and accounting standards on the other 
hand. Contrarily, however, most interviewees explain that earnings management decisions 
may very well be taken independently from the accounting standards. Furthermore, we found 
that our interviewees, on several topics, have a different view on earnings management than 
we as academics. Finally, our ‘unexposed areas’ contributed, creating additional insights 
beyond the hypotheses tested. Consequently, we have a more thorough understanding of 
interacting variables such as integrity and incentives. These insights may also be used for 
future studies. 
 
§ 7: Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter we discussed the in-depth interviews with experienced CFOs in the area of 
rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and earnings management. We 
reflected on our results from the experiment and post experimental survey. Moreover, we 
discussed accounts and real activities being used to engage in earnings management, in line 
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with Graham et al. (2005). This chapter ends with a schematic overview of the interview 
outcomes (see Table 1); providing a summary for section 3 and 4. We did not include results 
from section 5 on unexposed area in this scheme, since this section was too divers to capture. 
In the concluding remarks of section 5 you find a recapitalization of the unexposed areas, 
including accounts, incentives, integrity and other areas of importance to our research 
question. Section 6, in the end, reflected on the contribution of the interviews complementing 
the experiment and post experimental survey, including three aims: 1) reflect on earlier 
quantitative results found in the experiment and post experimental survey and try to come up 
with alternative explanations 2) reflect on other accounts being used to engage in earnings 
management, in relation to the accounting standards in use 3) explore new areas of 
importance to our research question. We may conclude, at least to a large extent, that the 
interviews indeed fulfilled these aims.  
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Results in-depth interviews 
Interviewee 
A 
Interviewee 
B 
Interviewee 
C 
Interviewee 
D 
Interviewee 
E 
Interviewee 
F 
Principles-based accounting standards induce 
more accounting decisions than RB acc. standards  Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Rules-based accounting standards induce more 
transaction decisions than PB acc. standards  Yes Yes Yes Yes Indifferent No 
Total effect on earnings management  Indifferent Indifferent 
RB more 
EM 
PB more 
EM 
RB more 
EM 
RB more 
EM  
Preference accounting standards 
Principles-
based 
Principles-
based Indifferent 
Rules-
based 
Principles-
based 
Principles-
based 
Decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, 
advertising, maintenance, etc.) (TD) Perhaps Most likely Most likely Most likely Most likely 
Probably 
not 
Delay starting a new project even if this entails a 
small sacrifice in value (TD) Most likely Most likely Most likely Most likely Perhaps Most likely  
Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if 
justified in either quarter) (AD) 
Probably 
not 
Probably 
not Most likely 
Probably 
not Most likely 
Perhaps/ 
Most likely 
Provide incentives for customers to buy more 
products this quarter (TD) 
Perhaps/ 
Most likely Most likely Perhaps 
Not 
applicable 
Probably 
not 
Probably 
not 
Draw down on reserves previously set aside (AD) Perhaps Perhaps Most likely Most likely Most likely Most likely 
Postpone taking an accounting charge (AD) Most likely Perhaps 
Probably 
not Perhaps 
Perhaps/ 
Most likely 
Probably 
not 
Sell investments or assets to recognize gains this 
quarter (TD) Most likely Most likely Perhaps Most likely Most likely Most likely 
Repurchase common shares (TD) Most likely Perhaps No EM Perhaps 
Probably 
not 
Not 
applicable 
Alter accounting assumptions (e.g. allowances, 
pensions) (AD) Most likely Perhaps Most likely Most likely Perhaps Most likely 
 
Table 1: overview results in-depth interview
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Appendix: Interview guide 
After a broad conceptualization of the interview topics to be discussed, we need to 
operationalize these topics into an interview guide. We expect that the interviews will last 
approximately one hour, including the following structure: 
 
- Introduction 
- Definitions 
- Experimental results 
- Prior research 
- Unexposed areas 
- Closing remarks 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of the introduction is twofold. First, the interviewee exposes his or her prior 
experience as a CFO, and with accounting standards and earnings management in 
particular. With this introductory information we are able to assess the interviewees’ 
expertise and the potential contribution for our research. 
Second, the interviewer elaborates his research questions and emphasizes the 
purpose of the interview. Our main research question is: ‘What is the influence of rules-
based and principles-based accounting standards on earnings management?’ With this 
research question we aim to contribute to the overarching question: ‘Which type of 
accounting standards, rules-based or principles-based, is likely to be the more effective?’ 
Related to these research questions, the interviewer exposes the purpose of the 
interview: 
- Verify results found in our experiment 
- Verify results found in other prior research 
- Discuss unexposed areas important to these research questions 
  
Definitions 
 
Before we start the in-depth interview, it is important to discuss the definitions we have 
in mind related to the thesis. In this way we overcome ‘translation’ and communication 
problems. In this thesis, the most important definitions are: 
- Principles-based accounting standards: Principles-based accounting standards 
refer to a system of financial reporting that is based primarily on the fundamentals 
of accounting (decision usefulness, true and fair view, going concern, substance 
over form) with an appropriate level of specificity. 
- Rules-based accounting standards: Rules-based accounting standards refer to a 
system of financial reporting, that is based on detailed provisions of methods for 
most accounting problems, where it is unambiguously clear how and when it is to be 
applied. 
- Earnings management: All deliberate and purposeful interventions in the 
financial reporting process or actions affecting earnings, so as to influence 
stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes that depend on the financial 
report, within the boundaries of GAAP. 
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- Accounting decisions: Accounting decisions refer to choices among equally 
acceptable rules and/ or judgment and estimates required to implement GAAP. 
- Transaction decisions: Transaction decisions refer to choices of structuring 
transactions and contracts or adjusting real production and investment activities 
that are aimed at engaging in earnings management  
 
Experimental results 
One of the aims of these interviews is to verify whether these experts agree on the 
empirical results found. The results of our experiment show the following: 
 
Experimental results 
1. Participants in the principles-based setting more often use their impairment loss 
(accounting) decision to engage in earnings management than participants in a rules-
based environment. These results, however, are insignificant. 
2. Participants in a rules-based setting are more likely to use transaction decisions, selling 
‘available for sale’ securities, to engage in earnings management compared to 
participants in a principles-based environment. 
3. Neither rules-based, nor principles-based accounting standards are able to fully 
eliminate earnings management decisions. 
4. The extent of discretion in the standards is found to have a small, statistically 
insignificant impact on the average amount of earnings management participants include 
in their financial report. 
5. These results suggest that changing the discretion in accounting standards may affect 
the nature of earnings management, but is unlikely to prevent earnings management 
applications. 
 
Although we accept the importance of verifying these experimental results, we should 
have an open and unaffected interview. As a result, we consider the following questions 
to discuss with the interviewee rather than the actual statistical results: 
- What is the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on 
earnings management? 
o Type of accounting standards  
 Which type of accounting standards, rules-based or principles-
based, leaves more room for engaging in earnings management? 
o Extent of earnings management  
 Does this also imply a higher occurrence of earnings management 
application? 
o Accounting standards and type of earnings management (transaction 
decision and accounting decision) 
 Which type of accounting standards induces which type of 
earnings management? 
- On the rules-based/ principles-based continuum, which direction would you prefer 
the accounting standards to develop? Why? 
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Prior research 
In 2005, Graham et al. survey and interview more than 400 executives to determine 
factors influencing earnings management decisions. We distinct between accounting 
(AD) and transaction decisions (TD). Although the opportunities provided are non 
exhaustive and may be complemented with elements from the work of Nelson et al. 
(2002), we consider the enumeration of Graham et al. (2005) concise and relatively 
comprehensive. 
Response to the following question: ‘Near the end of the quarter, it looks like your 
company might come in below the desired earnings target. Within what is permitted by 
GAAP, which of the following choices might your company make?’ (Graham et al., 
2005, pp. 35) We distinguish between ‘probably not, perhaps and most likely’. 
 
  
- Decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, advertising, maintenance, etc.) (TD) 
- Delay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in value (TD) 
- Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if justified in either quarter) (AD) 
- Provide incentives for customers to buy more products this quarter (TD) 
- Draw down on reserves previously set aside (AD) 
- Postpone taking an accounting charge (AD) 
- Sell investments or assets to recognize gains this quarter (TD) 
- Repurchase common shares (TD) 
- Alter accounting assumptions (e.g. allowances, pensions) (AD) 
 
Unexposed areas 
In this final part of the interview we try to find unexposed areas in this research and 
discuss the way it (potentially) affects our research question. 
In your view: 
- In addition to the non exhaustive list of Graham et al. (2005), which other 
opportunities could you use to engage in earnings management?  
- Are these methods used differently when income increasing incentives are 
involved compared to a situation with income decreasing incentives? 
- How often did you use earnings management methods to improve financial 
numbers to meet expectations? 
o Is this different for different CFOs? And why? 
- What is the role of incentives in applying earnings management methods? Also 
compared to type of accounting standards? (Which is pervasive?) 
- What is the role of integrity when considering the topic of earnings management? 
- What is your general attitude towards the topic of earnings management? 
o Will CFOs (in general) brook this behavior, or is earnings management 
behavior more or less seen as unethical? 
- Would you like to add new areas to consider interesting to discuss in relation to 
our research question? 
 
Closing Remarks 
Thank the interviewee for his/ her cooperation. 
 206
Chapter 7: Summary and conclusions 
 
§ 1: Rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and 
earnings management 
Although there has been extensive debate on rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards (e.g. Jamal and Tan, 2010) and earnings management (see Cohen et al., 2008 
and Ronen and Yaari, 2008 for recent contributions), prior studies provide limited 
evidence on how reporting standards affect the type of earnings management, either 
through accounting decisions or transaction decisions, and the level of earnings 
management applied (Libby and Seybert, 2009). Using an experiment, a post 
experimental survey and in-depth interviews, our research contributes to the literature by 
examining the effects the nature of accounting standards has on both accounting 
decisions and transaction decisions. The main question we seek to answer in this thesis is: 
‘What is the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on 
earnings management?’ With this question we contribute to the overarching research 
question: ‘Which type of accounting standards, rules-based or principles-based, is likely to 
be the more effective (read: induces less earnings management)?’ 
 Principles-based accounting standards refer to a system of financial reporting that 
is primarily based on the fundamentals of accounting (decision usefulness, true and fair 
view, going concern, substance over form) with an appropriate level of specificity. 
Resulting from the freedom within the accounting standards, there is an important role for 
professional judgment of both CFOs and external auditors. Moreover, principles-based 
environments (such as in a Dutch context) have a ‘true and fair view override’, providing 
professionals with the flexibility to deviate from the accounting standards when this 
improves the insights of companies’ financial position. Rules-based accounting 
standards, on the other hand, refer to a system of financial reporting that is based on 
detailed provisions of methods for most accounting problems, where it is unambiguously 
clear how and when it is to be applied. The degree of specification is quite large; hence, 
leaving limited room for professional judgment. In academic literature, US GAAP is 
generally considered to be rules-based. 
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Turning to earnings management, the concept refers to all deliberate and purposeful 
interventions in the financial reporting process or actions affecting earnings, so as to 
influence stakeholders or influence contractual outcomes that depend on the financial 
report, within the boundaries of GAAP. Two distinct possibilities to engage in earnings 
management are accounting decisions and transaction decisions (Libby and Seybert, 2009; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Francis, 2001). Accounting decisions refer to choices among equally 
acceptable rules and/ or judgment and estimates required to implement GAAP, whereas 
transaction decisions refer to choices of structuring transactions and contracts, or 
adjusting real production and investment activities that are aimed at engaging in earnings 
management (Libby and Seybert, 2009). 
 
§ 2: Design and Results 
In this study, we use three methods to answer our main research question: an experiment, 
a post experimental survey, and in-depth interviews. The first method to test the 
hypotheses is the experiment. Where prior survey research (inter alia Nelson et al., 2002) 
and database research (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008) examine the substitution effect between 
earnings management through accounting and transaction decisions, these research 
methods have some disadvantages not present when using an experiment. Survey 
research, for instance, only examines what people intend to do, whereas database 
research has the disadvantage that different environmental developments may have 
contributed to changing earnings management applications. Contrarily, our experiment 
allows us to test hypotheses in a more controlled environment, resulting in stronger 
conclusions related to the autonomous effects of types of accounting standards on both 
the type and level of earnings management. We expect managers to engage more in 
earnings management through accounting decisions in a principles-based setting than in a 
rules-based setting (hypothesis 1a). Moreover, we expect managers in a rules-based 
environment to engage more in earnings management through transaction decisions than 
managers in a principles-based setting (hypothesis 1b). Finally, we expect that managers 
are more likely to attempt earnings management in a rules-based setting than in a 
principles-based setting (hypothesis 2). 
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By means of our experiment, involving 175 Registered Controllers, we test the 
effect the nature of accounting standards has on earnings management. More specifically, 
we examine the influence of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards on 
both accounting and transaction decisions. In the experiment, financial managers decided 
on whether to sell an available-for-sale security (transaction decision) and/or take an 
impairment loss (accounting) decision to engage in earnings management. IAS 32 
(Financial instruments) and IAS 36 (Impairment of assets) were manipulated for 
representing the rules-based and principles-based setting. In addition, analysts’ 
expectations were manipulated (either high or low), creating a 2x2 between-subjects 
design. In line with prior expectations (Nelson et al., 2002), managers tend to adjust their 
decisions based on the latitude given by the accounting standards. Our results 
significantly show that participants in a rules-based setting are more likely to use 
transaction decisions, selling ‘available for sale’ securities (hypothesis 1b). On the other 
hand, hypothesis 1a was rejected in the experiment. Although participants in the 
principles-based setting more often use their impairment loss (accounting) decision to 
engage in earnings management compared to participants in the rules-based setting, the 
results are insignificant. Furthermore, our experimental results demonstrate that when 
incentives are sufficient to induce earnings management practices, neither rules-based, 
nor principles-based accounting standards are able to eliminate earnings management 
decisions. Finally, our results demonstrate that the type of accounting standards provided, 
either rules-based or principles-based, does not have a significant influence on the level 
of earnings management participants included in the financial reports. Consequently, we 
must reject hypothesis 2. Essentially, our results suggest that increasing or decreasing the 
discretion left in accounting standards may not be useful to prevent earnings management 
applications. Applying either rules-based or principles-based accounting standards will 
only result in a substitution effect, i.e. creating different types of earnings management 
applications. However, due to the limitations in the design of the experiment63, some 
caution must be applied when drawing conclusions solely on the result of the experiment. 
Hence, for reflecting on the hypotheses, it is also important to incorporate the results 
                                                 
63 See section 5 of Chapter 4 and section 4 of this chapter. 
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from the post experimental survey and in-depth interviews; contributing to the validity of 
the study.   
 
The second method used in this study is the post experimental survey. Because surveys 
and experiments are complementary, using a multi-method design results in the strongest 
basis for valid conclusions (Libby and Seybert, 2009). Our post experimental survey 
hence contributes to creating more valid results in two ways. First, we ask questions 
related to the experimental case; referring to age, gender, prior experience with rules-
based and principles-based accounting standards, and recent experience with either 
impairment loss decisions or selling financial assets. In this way we control for 
influencing variables leading to cleaner and more subtle insights into the relationship 
between rules-based/ principles-based accounting standards and earnings management of 
interest to standard setters. Second, and in addition to these case related questions, our 
post experimental survey includes questions directly asking respondents to assess 
whether they agree or disagree with our developed hypotheses. We use the same 
respondents (n = 175) for the post experimental survey as we did for the experiment. 
The first part of the post experimental survey reflects on control variables that 
might have influenced the experimental outcomes. Measured items related to personal 
characteristics, such as age and gender, however, do not show significant influences 
related to our experimental results. On the other hand, two items from the post 
experimental survey have a significant influence on the earnings management decisions 
taken in the experiment. 64 The first item reflects on whether respondents find the 
experimental case a proper reflection of their day-to-day activities. Our results show that 
when respondents find the case a more proper reflection of activities, they are more likely 
to engage in earnings management. A good reflection of daily activities might stimulate 
them using their professional skills in taking earnings management decisions. Secondly, 
recent experience with selling ‘available for sale’ securities was significantly associated 
with the earnings management decisions taken in the experiment. In other words, if 
                                                 
64 Due to the limitations in the experiment, as we discussed in Chapter 4 and we will further discuss in 
section 4, some caution is needed when reflecting on these relationships. However, since only two items are 
significantly correlated to earnings management in the experiment, this problem is limited. 
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subjects have had recent experience selling short term financial assets, they are more 
likely to engage in earnings management in the experiment. 
In the final part of the post experimental survey we included three questions 
autonomously referring to the developed hypotheses concerning accounting decisions 
(hypothesis 1a), transaction decisions (hypothesis 1b) and the total level of earnings 
management applied (hypothesis 2). Our post experimental survey results show that 
managers are more likely to engage in earnings management through accounting 
decisions in a principles-based environment than in a rules-based environment; reflecting 
on hypotheses 1a. Drawing on the limitations of the experiment we should take some care 
not to draw too strong conclusions related to the experimental results of hypothesis 1a. 
Based on the experiment, results suggest that we should reject the expectation that 
principles-based standards increase the number of accounting decisions taken. Our post 
experimental survey, on the other hand, significantly shows that principles-based 
accounting standards induce accounting decisions. On balance, and combined with earlier 
empirical results found (e.g. Nelson et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2008), results provide 
evidence suggesting that principles-based standards, to a certain degree, induce 
accounting decisions more often than rules-based standards. Furthermore, when 
reflecting on hypothesis 1b, our post experimental survey results significantly confirm the 
expectation that rules-based accounting standards induce earnings management through 
transaction decisions. This result is in line with the experimental results. Consequently, 
we conclude that hypothesis 1b is confirmed in both the experiment and post 
experimental survey. Finally, the respondents in our post experimental survey do not 
agree with the proposition that rules-based standards induce more earnings management 
than principles-based accounting standards (reflecting on hypothesis 2). Hence, our 
premise that managers in a rules-based environment more often engage in earnings 
management was rejected in both the experiment and post experimental survey. 
 
In addition to our experiment and the post experimental survey we use in-depth interviews 
to contribute to our research question. For these interviews we use actual CFOs rather than 
the financial managers used for the experiment and post experimental survey. The in-depth 
interviews, in this way, contribute to complementing the experiment and post 
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experimental survey; improving the validity of the study by discussing three areas. First, 
we discussed the results from the experiment and post experimental survey. Discussing 
these results with CFOs creates more subtle insights into our earlier results found. 
Second, we included questions reflecting on earnings management through accounting 
decisions and transaction decisions; improving insights into hypothesis 1a and 1b. Third, 
we used our in-depth interviews expanding our knowledge concerning rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards and earnings management by exploring 
‘unexposed areas’.  
In the first part of the in-depth interviews we start reflecting on hypothesis 1a. The 
premise is that principles-based accounting standards induce earnings management 
through accounting decisions. Related to hypothesis 1a, most interviewees affirm that the 
flexibility in accounting standards in a principles-based environment provide better 
opportunities for engaging in earnings management through accounting decisions than 
rigid rules-based environments. Related to hypothesis 1b, the interviews lead to sufficent 
confidence that the conclusions drawn from the experiment and post experimental survey 
are valid; rules-based standards induce earnings management through transaction 
decisions more than principles-based accounting standards. Hypothesis 2 was already 
rejected in our experiment and post experimental survey. Consistently, when drawing on 
the in-depth interviews, we may conclude that there is no mutual agreement among 
interviewees which type of accounting standards more strongly induces earnings 
management. One of the aims of this study was to have improved insights which type of 
accounting standard is better able to diminish the level of earnings management applied. 
From an earnings management perspective, however, we are not able to assess whether 
rules-based or principles-based accounting standards are better able to reduce the level of 
earnings management.  
In the second part of the interviews we reflected on Graham’s (2005) list 
concerning different opportunities to engage in earnings management through accounting 
decisions and transaction decisions. The aim of this part was to improve insights 
regarding hypothesis 1a and 1b. An interesting result here was that the decisions taken 
are most often considered being operational decisions rather than primarily earnings 
management decisions. Only when referring to ‘postponing accounting charges’ and 
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‘revenue recognition’ we saw some differences between rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards. Overall, our interviewees argue that principles-based accounting 
standards leave more room to engage in earnings management using postponed 
impairment losses (accounting decisions). Since rules-based standards have increased 
requirements, the level of ‘professional judgment’ in this type of accounting standards is 
limited, leaving less room to engage in earnings management through accounting 
decisions. These results are largely in line with results found in the experiment and post 
experimental survey.  
In the final part of our interviews we discussed ‘unexposed areas’. These 
discussions contributed to creating a more thorough understanding of our entire research 
area and provided several opportunities for future research. We started this latter part of 
the interviews discussing ledger accounts being used to engage in earnings management 
in relation to rules-based and principles-based accounting standards. Accounts pointed at 
were pensions, taxes and purchase price accounting. These accounts may have a 
significant influence on financial outcomes and therefore may be used to engage in 
earnings management. Furthermore, our interviewees argue that the role of incentives and 
integrity is important for an in-depth understanding of earnings management. Our 
interviewees also point at the role of culture and enforcement regimes when explaining 
earnings management applications. At the end of our interviews we discussed additional 
insights concerning the influence of rules-based and principles based accounting 
standards and earnings management. Our interviewees argue that both types of 
accounting standards differ in scope. Principles-based standards are better to understand, 
whereas rules-based standards improve comparability.  
 
Essentially and when reflecting on the hypotheses we come up with the following 
conclusions. Reflecting on hypothesis 1a we see contradicting results. This hypothesis 
presumes that financial managers engage more often in earnings management through 
accounting decisions in a principles-based setting compared to a rules-based setting. This 
hypothesis was not statistically confirmed in the experiment and leads us to reject 
hypothesis 1a. However, the experimental results must be interpreted with some due care 
resulting from the limitations of the experiment. In the post experimental survey and in-
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depth interviews, on the other hand, we find a general agreement with regard to this 
premise. On balance, and combined with results from prior studies (e.g. Cohen et al., 
2008), our results suggest that principles-based accounting standards, at least to a certain 
extent, induce earnings management through accounting decisions more strongly than 
rules-based accounting standards. When reflecting on hypothesis 1b, the empirical 
findings among the three methods show consistent results, suggesting that rules-based 
standards induce earnings management through transaction decisions more than 
principles-based accounting standards. Our second hypothesis reflects on the influence 
rules-based and principles-based accounting standards have on the level of earnings 
management. The results in our experiment, post experimental survey and in-depth 
interviews suggest that there is no significant influence of the type of accounting 
standards on the level of earnings management. In other words, we are not able to assess 
which type of accounting standards is better able to reduce the level of earnings 
management. 
 
§ 3: Contributions 
Our study contributes in the area of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards on the one hand, and earnings management on the other hand. More 
specifically, we examine the effects rules-based and principles-based standards have on 
both transaction decisions and accounting decisions in one single experiment. Where 
prior survey research (Nelson et al., 2002) and database research (Cohen et al., 2008) 
examine the substitution opportunity between accounting decisions and transaction 
decisions, these research methods have some disadvantages not present when using an 
experiment. Consequently, and by using an experimental design, we are able to 
manipulate the type of accounting standards (rules-based and principles-based), and 
directly test the effect it has on the type of earnings management (accounting decisions 
and transaction decisions) and the level of earnings management; disentangling 
interference found in other settings.  
In addition to testing the substitution effect between types of earnings 
management decisions, either accounting or transaction decisions, we reflect on the 
question how much earnings management is applied in both a rules-based and a 
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principles-based environment. Our research contributes in this area, because earlier 
experimental studies in this area show contradictory results (e.g. Nelson, 2003 and Jamal 
and Tan, 2010). Furthermore, and contrary to most prior experimental studies (e.g. 
Peytcheva and Wright, 2010), this research uses financial managers to participate in the 
experiment rather than auditors; contributing to the validity of the experimental results 
representing CFO behavior.  
Additionally, and resulting from our multi-method design, the validity of our 
results improved. When reflecting on hypothesis 1b, for instance, the experiment, the post 
experimental survey and the CFOs in our in-depth interviews consistently suggest that 
rules-based accounting standards induce transaction decisions in common practice more 
strongly than principles-based standards. The multi-method design also helped when 
reflecting on hypothesis 1a. The premise was that financial managers would engage in 
accounting decisions more often in a principles-based setting compared to a rules-based 
setting. However, we found contradicting results. Where the experiment rejects 
hypothesis 1a, the premise that principles-based accounting standards induce earnings 
management more strongly than rules-based standards was confirmed in the post 
experimental survey, in-depth interviews and prior empirical studies (e.g. Cohen et al., 
2008). However, some caution must be applied when interpreting the results from the 
experiment. Consequently, and on balance we argue that results provide sufficient 
evidence with the idea that principles-based standards, to a certain degree, induce 
accounting decisions more often that rules-based standards. Finally, and contributing to 
the question what the influence is of rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards on the level of earnings management, we find some convincing and valid 
results. Our three methods, though in different ways, consistently reject hypothesis 2 in 
which we expected more earnings management in a rules-based environment. In other 
words, and when specifically reflecting on the level of earnings management, we see no 
significant influence of the type of accounting standards in their ability to reduce the level 
of earnings management. 
 
In addition to the scientific contributions of this study our findings also have a number of 
important implications for current and future accounting practice. In particular, this study 
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may be useful to the FASB and IASB. The discussion on rules-based and principles-
based accounting standards became more important after the US debate concerning 
whether to incorporate IFRS for financial reporting (Peytcheva and Wright, 2010). From 
an earnings management perspective, however, our results do not show a significant 
difference between rules-based and principles-based accounting standards and the level 
of earnings management applied. Standard setters may contemplate our results when 
discussing the direction they are heading for developing future accounting standards. This 
study may also contribute to CFOs; since we reflect on how CFOs may engage in 
earnings management, when CFOs may choose certain earnings management patterns 
and how often CFOs actually engage in earnings management. Furthermore, results from 
our in-depth interviews might provide a benchmark of how other CFOs perceive the 
concept and usage of earnings management in practice. Furthermore, our research 
contributes to external auditors. This study provides insights into the use of earnings 
management, which might help external auditors improving their financial audits. 
Especially when the accounting environment holds a ‘true and fair view’ concept and 
override, results from this study may help auditors starting a discussion related to the 
economic substance and earnings management. Finally, the study helps external 
stakeholders, investors in particular. We discussed many opportunities related to the 
questions ‘when’ and ‘how’ CFOs might engage in earnings management. One 
conclusion is that investors should be more careful when strong incentives are involved. 
Another contribution for investors is that the level of earnings management does not 
strongly depend on the nature of accounting standards, creating better opportunities for 
international investments. 
 
§ 4: Limitations and future research 
This study has several limitations, creating opportunities for future research. We start 
with the limitations evolving from the experiment. First, we provide participants in the 
experiment with only limited information before taking their accounting and transaction 
decision. Even though enriching the experimental study might contribute to creating more 
external valid results, we believe that leaving participants with a relatively simple design 
strengthens causal inferences. Second, we use only two positions on the rules-based and 
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principles-based continuum in our experiment, whereas we could have chosen 
intermediary types as well. Such tests could be conducted in future research and may 
contribute to creating more subtle insights among the distinctions between rules-based 
and principles-based accounting standards. Furthermore, and similar to Hunton et al. 
(2006), we provide respondents with only one incentive, whereas in daily practice 
financial managers have various incentives, and we offer respondents only two ways to 
manage earnings. We recognize that CFOs in practice may have more than two 
opportunities for earnings management attempts and perceive various incentives to either 
increase or decrease earnings. Future researchers may want to include more distinct 
incentives and earnings management opportunities. Moreover, we only tested our 
experiment in the Netherlands, in which principles-based accounting standards are more 
commonly acknowledged than rules-based standards. Future research might consider 
participants from a rules-based country such as the US. Finally, the use of manipulation 
check questions results in some serious concerns related to the internal validity of the 
study. Particularly, we must note a caveat related to the manipulation check questions on 
the accounting standards, which limits the internal validity of the experiment. We 
deliberately asked these two questions before respondents had taken their earnings 
management decisions. And as we showed in section 3.1 of Chapter 4, this decision was 
necessary to prevent us from losing 61 experimental subjects. However, by asking these 
two manipulation check questions up front, the subjects had insights into the ‘other’ 
treatment levels. In other words, by asking these MC questions before assessing their 
earnings management behavior, participants in the rules-based treatment levels may have 
been aware of the wording in the principles-based treatment, and vice versa. 
Consequently, threats occur related to the internal validity of the experiment. Resulting 
from the opportunity to gain insight into the other treatment levels, subjects may have 
started to ‘guess’ the hypotheses and respond accordingly, which is an internal validity 
limitation as it can create a demand effect. The difficulty is we are not able to assess the 
influences, which threatens the causal inferences of the experimental results. As a result, 
we needed to apply some caution when we reflected on the experimental results. A lesson 
for future research is to never ask any manipulation check questions before the decisions 
on the dependent variable are taken.    
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 In addition, there are also a few limitations resulting from the post experimental 
survey and in-depth interviews. As reflected on in Chapter 5, our final question related to 
hypothesis 2 was formulated incomprehensively: the result shows that respondents 
disagree with hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the result does not provide evidence 
whether principles-based accounting standards would induce the level of earnings 
management. A second limitation of our post experimental survey was that the same 
respondents participated as in the experiment. For the first part, still reflecting on the 
experiment, this was important and valid. For the second part, however, directly 
reflecting on the hypotheses, it may have created an order effect. However, asking these 
questions before the experiment would potentially have created a demand effect. As such, 
we decided to include these questions after the experiment. Moreover, no significant 
influences were found between results in the second part of the post experimental survey 
and the experimental decisions, suggesting a valid contribution (read: no ordering effect) 
from the post experimental survey when reflecting on the developed hypotheses. One 
limitation that occurs from the in-depth interviews is that we did only six interviews. And 
within these interviews we have only spoken with native Dutch (former) CFOs. Although 
these CFOs have international experience and are familiar with both rules-based and 
principles-based accounting standards, they lack different premises concerning financial 
accounting and reporting, which partly limits external validity.  
 Resulting from these limitations, many opportunities are left for doing future 
research. For instance, our experiment could be expanded in different directions, such as 
including more incentives, or taking more discrete positions on the rules-based and 
principles-based continuum. Furthermore, our in-depth interviews left us with some new 
ideas. What is the influence of culture and accounting standards on earnings 
management? What is the effect of enforcement regimes in relation to accounting 
standards on earnings management? Additionally, suggestions came to further explore 
the role of incentives and integrity related to rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards. These ideas may be incorporated in future experiments. And also beyond the 
experiment we see some opportunities for future research. Reflecting on, and repeating 
our interviews with CFOs working in a rules-based environment may provide different 
insights into this research area. Additionally, we see opportunities of combining methods 
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as suggested by Libby and Seybert (2009). They emphasize the potential contribution of 
survey methods complementing experiments. We even expand their argument 
emphasizing that many interesting opportunities are left for future research, combining 
experiments and in-depth interviews, or surveys and interviews. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
Als gevolg van verschillende rapporteringsschandalen van onder andere Ahold en Enron, 
aan het begin van de 21e eeuw, rijst de vraag hoe resultaatsturing kan worden voorkomen 
of gereduceerd. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat daarbij een belangrijke rol is weggelegd voor 
accounting standaarden. Echter, hoewel er reeds verschillende onderzoeken zijn gedaan 
naar op principes gebaseerde en op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden en 
resultaatsturing, is er nog steeds geen eenduidige conclusie omtrent de invloed van 
accounting standaarden op het type resultaatsturing, alsmede de mate van 
resultaatsturing. De hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift is dan ook wat de invloed is van op 
regels gebaseerde (rules-based) en op principes gebaseerde (principles-based) accounting 
standaarden op resultaatsturing (earnings management). Met het beantwoorden van deze 
vraag leveren we een bijdrage aan een overkoepelende vraag, te weten welk type 
accounting standaard is nu eigenlijk ‘beter’, oftewel leidt tot minder resultaatsturing? Een 
belangrijke keuze voor beleidsbepalers in dit kader is of toekomstige accounting 
standaarden meer op regels of op principes gebaseerd dienen te worden.  
De resultaten van deze studie zijn in twee opzichten van belang voor het 
verbeteren van het inzicht in dit onderzoeksgebied. De bijdrage richt zich allereerst op de 
relatie tussen accounting standaarden en het type resultaatsturing, te weten 
resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties en verslaggevingsgebaseerde 
resultaatsturing. Ten tweede richt dit onderzoek zich op de relatie tussen op principes en 
op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden en de mate van resultaatsturing. Te 
beginnen met het eerste deel wijzen resultaten uit eerdere onderzoeken (o.a. Nelson et al., 
2002; Cohen et al., 2008) uit dat op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden meer 
leiden tot resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties (transaction decisions), terwijl 
op principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden meer leiden tot 
verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing (accounting decisions). Nadeel van eerdere 
studies zit echter in de methode die gebruikt wordt. Nelson et al. (2002) gebruiken een 
survey, waarbij respondenten slechts aangeven wat ze van plan zijn te doen. Het archief-
onderzoek van Cohen et al. (2008) heeft als nadeel dat relatief veel externe invloeden de 
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relatie tussen accounting standaarden en resultaatsturing kunnen verklaren, waardoor dit 
nooit gemeten kan worden in termen van ‘oorzaak-en-gevolg’. Om deze beperkingen te 
ondervangen gebruikt deze studie een experiment, waarbij interveniërende factoren 
constant kunnen worden gehouden en overige beïnvloedende factoren door randomisatie 
worden geëlimineerd. Op deze manier kan er een oorzakelijk verband gelegd worden 
tussen op regels en op principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden enerzijds, en het type 
resultaatsturing anderzijds. 
Naast het substitutie-effect omtrent resultaatsturing via reële operationele 
transacties en verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing, richt dit onderzoek zich in de 
tweede plaats op de relatie tussen accounting standaarden en de mate van resultaatsturing. 
Uitkomsten uit eerdere experimentele onderzoeken leiden niet tot een eenduidig 
antwoord op de vraag welke type standaard leidt tot minder resultaatsturing. Deze studie 
draagt bij aan het inzicht door het meten van de effecten van op regels en op principes 
gebaseerde accounting standaarden enerzijds en op de mate van resultaatsturing 
anderzijds. De resultaten vergroten het inzicht van beleidsbepalers die behelst zijn met 
het opstellen van accounting standaarden. 
 
Om de hoofdvraag te beantwoorden, beginnen we in Hoofdstuk 2 met een uiteenzetting 
van de theorie en hypothesen. Op principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden verwijzen 
naar een systeem van externe financiële verslaggeving, dat primair gebaseerd is op de 
fundamenten van accounting (decision usefulness, getrouwe weergave, 
continuïteitsbeginsel en economische realiteit), met een afdoende niveau van toelichting. 
Dit type standaard erkent het belang van professionele oordeelsvorming. Daarnaast 
kennen we het systeem van primair op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden. Dit 
systeem is gestoeld op een gedetailleerde uiteenzetting van de meeste accounting 
problemen, waarbij het zonder meer duidelijk is hoe en wanneer deze exact dienen te 
worden toegepast. Het voordeel van op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden is dat ze 
accountants betere mogelijkheden bieden voor het verifiëren van accounting informatie. Een 
nadeel is echter dat dit type standaard complex is in het gebruik.  
Naast accounting standaarden is resultaatsturing één van de kernbegrippen van dit 
proefschrift. Healy en Wahlen (1999) wijzen in hun definitie op het gebruik van 
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beoordelingen en resultaatsturing via reële transacties, teneinde belanghebbenden te 
misleiden, of ter beïnvloeding van contractuele uitkomsten die afhangen van 
gerapporteerde cijfers. Deze definitie valt echter binnen het zwarte perspectief, waarbij 
bewust gebruik gemaakt wordt van ‘truckjes’ ter misrepresentatie of het bewust 
reduceren van de transparantie. In onze ogen is deze definitie te extreem en gaan we uit 
van een definitie die te plaatsen valt binnen het grijze perspectief. Dit perspectief gaat 
naast het opportunistische gebruik van resultaatsturing uit van de visie dat 
resultaatsturing tevens de transparantie van een jaarrekening kan vergroten. We komen 
daarbij tot de volgende definitie van resultaatsturing: “Alle weloverwogen en bewuste 
acties in het financiële verslagleggingsproces of acties in reële operationele activiteiten, 
gemaakt met als doel om contractuele resultaten en/ of belanghebbenden te beïnvloeden 
die van het financiële rapport afhankelijk zijn, binnen de grenzen van de accounting 
standaarden.” 
Hoewel resultaatsturing op verschillende manieren kan worden toegepast, geldt 
over het algemeen dat er twee typen resultaatsturing kunnen worden onderscheiden: op 
verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing en resultaatsturing via reële operationele 
transacties. Op verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing richt zich op keuzes in het 
proces van financiële verslaggeving die benodigd zijn wanneer verschillende 
waarderingsalternatieven zijn toegestaan, alsmede wanneer schattingen nodig zijn om 
gebeurtenissen op te nemen in de jaarrekening (dus zowel stelselwijzigingen als 
schattingswijzigingen). Voorbeelden van eerdere onderzoeken in dit gebied hebben 
betrekking op: voorraadwaardering, gerealiseerde en ongerealiseerde omzet en reële 
waarde inschattingen. Resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties richt zich 
daarentegen op keuzes die gemaakt worden rondom het (her)structureren van transacties 
en contracten, of het bewust aanpassen van reële productie en investeringsactiviteiten, 
teneinde bepaalde financiële doelstellingen te bewerkstelligen. Voorbeelden van eerdere 
onderzoekingen in dit kader zijn: het strategisch gebruik van de verkoop van financiële 
effecten of overige activa, strategisch gebruiken van ‘sale and leaseback’ transacties, 
evenals het desinvesteren van machines. 
In 2009 schrijven Libby en Seybert een literatuuroverzicht waarin gekeken wordt 
naar de invloed van op regels of principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden op 
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resultaatsturing. Uit hun overzicht blijkt dat financiële managers, werkend in een op 
principes gebaseerde omgeving, eerder gebruik maken van verslaggevingsgebaseerde 
resultaatsturing. De vraag is echter waarom dat gebeurt. Zoals gesteld zijn op principes 
gebaseerde accounting standaarden flexibeler, hebben ze minder strikte regels en laten 
derhalve meer ruimte over voor professionele oordeelsvorming. Een nadeel van deze 
flexibiliteit en mogelijke alternatieven is echter dat deze gebruikt kan worden voor 
resultaatsturing doeleinden. Deze alternatieven zijn niet of nauwelijks aanwezig in een op 
regels gebaseerd accounting systeem. Daarom wordt de hypothese geformuleerd dat op 
principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden meer leiden tot op 
verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing (hypothese 1a).  
Als gevolg van de nadelen van een op principes gebaseerd systeem kunnen 
beleidsbepalers beslissen om de vereisten ten aanzien externe verslaggeving aan te 
scherpen en uit te breiden. Door het het invoegen van strikte regels en numerieke 
informatie worden standaarden meer op regels gebaseerd. Hierdoor ontstaat een 
beperking in de mogelijkheden voor financiële managers om de flexibiliteit binnen 
accounting standaarden bewust te gebruiken om financiële cijfers te sturen. Een nadeel is 
echter dat deze strikte regels of numerieke informatie gebruikt kunnen worden als veilige 
havens (‘safe harbours’). Met andere woorden, Chief Financial Officers (CFO’s) kunnen 
contracten aan laten passen, waardoor deze exact voldoen aan de numerieke vereisten die 
in de accounting standaarden zijn verwoord. In een op principes gebaseerd systeem 
ontbreken dergelijke strikte regels en numerieke vereisten, waardoor contracten niet op 
eenzelfde wijze kunnen worden aangepast. Daarnaast is er in een op principes gebaseerd 
systeem sprake van het ‘derogatiebeginsel’, waardoor mag worden afgeweken van de 
accounting standaarden indien dit het inzicht van de externe gebruikers vergroot. De 
verwachting is dan ook dat resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties meer 
voorkomt in op regels gebaseerde accounting systemen (hypothese 1b). 
Als laatste wordt in Hoofdstuk 2 gekeken naar de relatie tussen het type 
accounting standaarden en de mate van resultaatsturing. Uit de theorie kan de 
verwachting worden afgeleid dat op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden leiden tot 
meer resultaatsturing. Jamal en Tan (2010) geven onder meer aan dat de 
onderhandelingskracht van managers groter is in een op regels gebaseerd systeem. Als de 
 232
gekozen accounting procedures in lijn zijn met de strikte accounting standaarden, is een 
accountant niet in staat wijzigingen af te dwingen in de gepresenteerde jaarrekening, 
ondanks dat de economische substantie af kan wijken van het gepresenteerde resultaat 
(form over substance). Daarnaast bespreken Jamal en Tan (2010) psychologische 
literatuur, op basis waarvan mag worden verwacht dat een op principes gebaseerd 
accounting systeem minder leidt tot resultaatsturing. Als regels namelijk zeer strikt zijn, 
zoals in een op regels gebaseerd systeem, dan zijn mensen eerder geneigd om bewust te 
zoeken naar mazen in de wet om daarmee resultaatsturing toe te passen. Onze 
theoretische veronderstelling wordt vervolgens bekrachtigd in eerdere experimentele 
onderzoekingen  (o.a. Jamal en Tan, 2010; Tsakumis et al, 2009).  In een experiment met 
financiële managers tonen Jamal en Tan (2010) bijvoorbeeld aan dat op principes 
gebaseerde accounting standaarden, gecombineerd met op principes-georiënteerde 
accountants, leiden tot minder resultaatsturing. Dus gebaseerd op deze theoretische 
uiteenzetting en eerdere empirische onderzoekingen veronderstellen wij dat de mate van 
resultaatsturing hoger zal zijn in een op regels gebaseerd accounting systeem (hypothese 
2). 
 
De uitwerking en toetsing van deze hypothesen vindt plaats in de Hoofdstukken 3 tot en 
met 6. In Hoofdstuk 3 worden de onderzoeksmethoden van dit proefschrift besproken, 
zijnde een experiment, post experimental survey en diepte-interviews. Allereerst vindt de 
toetsing van de hypothesen plaats binnen het experiment, zodat we op directe wijze 
kunnen meten wat de invloed is van op principes en op regels gebaseerde accounting 
standaarden op het type en de mate van resultaatsturing. Een nadeel van een experiment 
is echter dat de externe validiteit beperkt is. Met andere woorden, blijven de resultaten 
die gevonden worden in het experiment ook in praktijk overeind, zodat de resultaten 
gebruikt kunnen worden door beleidsbepalers, CFO’s,  accountants en investeerders. Om 
deze externe validiteit te verbeteren, zijn in dit proefschrift naast het experiment, ook een 
post experimental survey en diepte-interviews uitgevoerd. Door de complementaire 
aspecten leveren deze drie methoden gecombineerd een sterkere bijdrage aan het 
vergroten van de validiteit van deze studie.  
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Het testen van de hypothesen vindt allereerst dus plaats door middel van het experiment 
(Hoofdstuk 4). Het experiment is uitgevoerd onder 175 leden die verbonden zijn aan de 
‘Vereniging van Registercontrollers’. De respondenten ontvingen een casus waarbij twee 
beslissingen dienden te worden genomen. De eerste beslissing was een mogelijke 
verkoop van financiële effecten. Deze mogelijkheid dient als proxy voor resultaatsturing 
via reële operationele activiteiten. De tweede beslissing had betrekking op het 
afwaarderen van de waarde van het gebouw met bijbehorende grond, wat gebruikt wordt 
als proxy voor verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing. Voor het experiment werd 
gebruik gemaakt van een 2x2 between-subjects design. De ene experimentele manipulatie 
had betrekking op de accounting standaarden, waarbij op regels gebaseerde en op 
principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden waren ontwikkeld. De tweede manipulatie 
was gericht op prikkels toegekend aan respondenten, waarbij analistenvoorspellingen 
ofwel hoog ofwel laag werden weergegeven. De resultaten van het experiment tonen aan 
dat hoewel financiële managers in een op principes gebaseerd systeem meer 
verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing toepassen (in aantal), dit resultaat niet 
significant is. Hypothese 1a wordt daarmee verworpen op grond van het experiment. 
Daarnaast kan worden geconcludeerd dat op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden 
leiden tot significant meer resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties (p < 0.01). 
Hypothese 1b wordt hiermee bevestigd. Ten aanzien van de totale mate van 
resultaatsturing wordt geen significant verschil gevonden in het experiment tussen op 
regels en op principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden. Met andere woorden, 
hypothese 2 wordt verworpen vanuit de resultaten van het experiment. 65  
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt vervolgens het post experimental survey uitgewerkt. Het doel van 
deze survey is tweeledig. Het eerste deel van de post experimental survey is bedoeld om 
de gevonden resultaten in het experiment te kunnen nuanceren. Zijn de resultaten 
bijvoorbeeld afhankelijk van leeftijd, geslacht, ervaring of iets dergelijks? Deze 
                                                 
65 Zoals besproken wordt in de Hoofdstukken 4 en 7 van het proefschrift blijkt dat er een belangrijke 
beperking voortkomt uit het experiment. In het experiment zijn namelijk vragen opgenomen om te 
verifiëren of de respondenten de casus correct hadden begrepen. Hiermee hebben de respondenten echter 
ook inzicht gekregen in de verschillende groepen van manipulatie, wat een serieuze beperking is voor de 
validiteit van het experiment. Als gevolg hiervan dienen we enige voorzichtigheid te betrachten bij het 
interpreteren van de resultaten uit het experiment.  
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informatie is van belang voor het vergroten van de externe validiteit en leveren daarmee 
een bijdrage richting beleidsbepalers. Het tweede deel van de post experimental survey 
vraagt respondenten direct naar hun mening over de door ons geformuleerde hypothesen. 
Voor de post experimental survey worden dezelfde repondenten gebruikt als voor het 
experiment (n= 175).  
Uit het eerste deel van de survey blijkt dat geslacht, leeftijd en ervaring geen 
significante invloed hebben gehad op de experimentele resultaten. Er wordt wel een 
significante samenhang gevonden tussen resultaatsturing in het experiment enerzijds en 
twee vragen uit het post experimental survey: 1) of de casus een goede weerspiegeling is 
van dagelijkse werkzaamheden en 2) of de respondenten onlangs betrokken zijn geweest 
bij het verkopen van financiële effecten. Het eerste item leert ons dat indien de casus als 
een goede weerspiegeling wordt gezien van dagelijkse werkzaamheden, respondenten 
eerder geneigd zijn tot het toepassen van resultaatsturing in het experiment. Het tweede 
item suggereert dat respondenten die onlangs betrokken zijn geweest bij het verkopen van 
kortlopende financiële activa eerder voornemens zijn om resultaatsturing in het 
experiment toe te passen.  
In het laatste deel van de post experimental survey worden de door ons 
ontwikkelde hypothesen voorgelegd aan de respondenten. Hypothese 1a vraagt 
respondenten om aan te geven of ze het eens zijn met de stelling dat op principes 
gebaseerde accounting standaarden meer leiden tot verslaggeving gerelateerde 
resultaatsturing. Deze stelling wordt significant bekrachtigd in de post experimental 
survey. Rekening houdend met de beperkingen van het experiment, leiden de resultaten 
uit de post experimental survey, alsmede eerdere empirische onderzoekingen (Nelson et 
al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2008) tot de suggestie dat op principes gebaseerde accounting 
standaarden meer samenhangen met verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing dan op 
regels gestuurde accounting standaarden. Hypothese 1b, die luidt dat resultaatsturing via 
reële operationele transacties meer voorkomt in op regels gebaseerde accounting 
systemen, wordt net als in het experiment ook in de post experimental survey 
bekrachtigd. De laatste premisse (hypothese 2), dat op regels gebaseerde accounting 
standaarden meer zouden leiden tot een hogere mate van resultaatsturing, wordt 
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verworpen. Met andere woorden, zowel uit het experiment als de survey blijkt niet dat op 
regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden leiden tot meer resultaatsturing.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 6 worden de bevindingen uit de diepte-interviews besproken. Deze 
interviews zijn gehouden met zes zeer ervaren (voormalige) CFO’s in plaats van de 
financiële managers zoals die gebruikt zijn in het experiment en de survey. De diepte-
interviews beogen daarmee de externe validiteit te vergroten door het bespreken van drie 
gebieden omtrent het belang van accounting standaarden en resultaatsturing: 1) het 
bespreken van de eerder gevonden resultaten uit het experiment en post experimental 
survey 2) overige onderzoeken naar verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing en 
resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties en 3) overige zaken van belang voor dit 
onderzoek. Ten aanzien van hypothese 1a komen de meeste geïnterviewden tot de 
conclusie dat op principes gebaseerde accounting standaarden meer leiden tot 
verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing. Dit komt overeen met resultaten van de post 
experimental survey en resultaten uit eerdere onderzoeken (o.a. Nelson et al., 2002). De 
veronderstelling dat op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden meer leiden tot 
resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties dan op principes gebaseerde 
resultaatsturing werd door de meeste geïnterviewden geaccepteerd (gerelateerd aan 
hypothese 1b). Onder de geïnterviewden was geen consensus op de vraag welk type 
accounting standaard, op principes of op regels gebaseerd, leidt tot meer resultaatsturing 
(hypothese 2).  
In het tweede deel van de interviews zijn we vervolgens ingegaan op 
verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing en resultaatsturing via reële operationele 
transacties. Uit de interviews blijkt dat beslissingen vaak meer genomen worden als 
autonome operationele beslissingen in plaats van als bewuste resultaatsturingsbeslissing. 
Daarna wordt vastgesteld op welke manier, conform de accounting standaarden, de 
beslissing opgenomen dient te worden in de jaarrekening. Het laatste gedeelte van de 
interviews leverde een aantal inzichten op die mogelijkerwijs gebruikt kunnen worden 
voor toekomstig onderzoek. Naast accounting standaarden is een rol weggelegd voor de 
effecten van prikkels en integriteit in relatie tot accounting standaarden en 
resultaatsturing. Daarnaast zijn ook aspecten als cultuur en financieel toezicht in relatie 
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tot de accounting standaarden en resultaatsturing besproken. De kracht van het toezicht 
met mogelijke straffen kan naast de bijdrage van accounting standaarden eveneens van 
invloed zijn op de mate van resultaatsturing.  
 
In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt een samenvatting beschreven, conclusies getrokken, en 
mogelijkheden verkend voor toekomstig onderzoek. De belangrijkste conclusie van dit 
onderzoek is toch dat het type accounting standaard van invloed is op het type 
resultaatsturing. Op regels gebaseerde accounting standaarden leiden tot meer 
resultaatsturing via reële operationele transacties dan op principes gebaseerde 
resultaatsturing. Rekening houdend met de beperkingen van het experiment, leiden de 
resultaten uit de post experimental survey, diepte-interviews, en eerdere onderzoeken 
(o.a. Cohen et al., 2008) tot de conclusie dat op principes gebaseerde accounting 
standaarden leiden tot meer verslaggevingsgebaseerde resultaatsturing dan op regels 
gebaseerde accounting standaarden. Als laatste blijkt dat uit het experiment, de post 
experimental survey en de diepte-interviews geen eenduidig beeld naar voren is gekomen 
welk type accounting standaard nu leidt tot meer resultaatsturing. De vraag welke type 
accounting standaard beter is in het reduceren van resultaatsturing kan dus ook niet 
eenduidig worden beantwoord.  
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